

SEATTLE PUBLIC LIBRARY

HISTORY

B
L547V

837315 **DA STOR.**

Seattle Public Library


Please keep your card in this pocket. The borrower's card must be presented whenever a book or periodical is taken out or renewed.

Form

SEATTLE PUBLIC LIBRARY
B L547V 010111
Vernadsky, George, 021
Lenin, red dictator, by G 2632748



0000104945050



BY THE SAME AUTHOR
A HISTORY OF RUSSIA
(*Revised Edition, 1930*)





Lenin Haranguing a Crowd

Wide World Photo

LENIN

RED DICTATOR

BY GEORGE VERNADSKY

RESEARCH ASSOCIATE IN HISTORY IN YALE UNIVERSITY

TRANSLATED FROM THE RUSSIAN BY

MALCOLM WATERS DAVIS



NEW HAVEN

YALE UNIVERSITY PRESS

LONDON • HUMPHREY MILFORD • OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

1931

a-

Copyright 1931 by Yale University Press
Printed in the United States of America

All rights reserved. This book may not be reproduced, in whole or in part, in any form, except by written permission from the publishers.

NDV 1 2 1938

FEB 25 1939

1934

Nov 6

Nov 6


B
L547V

CONTENTS

<i>List of Illustrations</i>	vii
<i>Introduction</i>	1
<i>I. Before the Second Convention of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party</i>	14
<i>II. Lenin and the Revolution of 1905</i>	47
<i>III. From the Summoning of the Third Duma to the World War</i>	93
<i>IV. Lenin during the World War</i>	122
<i>V. Lenin and the Revolution of 1917</i>	144
<i>VI. From the Bolshevik Seizure of Power to the Brest-Litovsk Peace</i>	176
<i>VII. From the Brest-Litovsk Peace to the End of the World War</i>	212
<i>VIII. From the End of the World War to the New Economic Policy</i>	242
<i>IX. The New Economic Policy</i>	272
<i>X. Lenin's Illness and Death</i>	301
<i>XI. Lenin as a Political Leader</i>	312
<i>Notes</i>	331
<i>Index</i>	337

HISTORY

837315



ILLUSTRATIONS

<i>Lenin Haranguing a Crowd</i>	<i>frontispiece</i>
<i>The Family of Ulianov (Lenin)—1881-82</i>	<i>facing page 14</i>
<i>The Petrograd Uprising of July, 1917</i>	162
<i>Crowd scattering under machine gun fire across the Nevsky Prospect</i>	
<i>Revolutionary Orator Addressing an Army Meeting</i>	174
<i>Red Guards with an Armored Car</i>	174
<i>A Squad of Guards Starting for Duty</i>	218
<i>"Workers, Peasants, and Soldiers"</i>	218
<i>Lenin in the Council of People's Commissars</i>	260
<i>Two Aspects of Lenin</i>	302
<i>At the height of his power</i>	
<i>Recovering from illness</i>	
<i>The Tomb of Lenin</i>	310
<i>Dedication of the permanent mausoleum before the Kremlin in the Red Square, Moscow, on the Thirteenth Anniversary of the November Revolution, in 1930</i>	



INTRODUCTION

1.

THE Russian Revolution began in the year 1905. By 1907 the movement had started to decline rapidly. There came a lull, which with the good fortune of peace might have directed the further march of Russian events along the line of evolution instead of revolution.

The World War led to a new outburst of revolutionary forces in Russia. The processes it set in motion have not reached an end even now, thirteen years after the beginning of the Second Revolution.

One of the causes contributing to revolution in Russia was a check in general social and political development, noticeable particularly after the end of the eighteenth century. This was complicated by the fact that Russian life in certain of its aspects changed very swiftly, out of proportion to the gradual rise in the general level of social and political standards.

In the eighteenth century the Russian state differed very little in structure from other states on the continent of Europe. In the political sphere there prevailed absolute monarchy, in the sphere of social relations the overlordship of the feudal holders of great landed estates and—in greater or less degree—serfdom for the peasants. Europe, however, commenced to throw off these earlier forms of life much more quickly than did Russia. New ways of political and social action were established in France after the end of the eighteenth century, and in German states at the beginning or in the middle of the

nineteenth century. The emancipation of peasants from feudal subjection started in Austria in the late eighteenth and in Prussia early in the nineteenth century. Constitutions, although limited in character, were adopted in Prussia in 1848 and in Austria in 1849.

In Russia the political and social influences of the nineteenth century worked more gradually. The peasants were liberated from serfdom in 1861. A constitutional order was set up only in 1905. At the time of the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, many people were still alive in Russia who had been born in the years when serfdom was in existence—that is, before 1861—and who remembered it, even if vaguely.

Upon the change in the condition of the peasants in 1861 there followed a series of other fundamental reforms, judicial, fiscal, and military, the introduction of provincial and county assemblies, known as zemstvos, as well as of municipal self-government—the so-called "great reforms" of the Emperor Alexander II. Taken as a whole, these created in Russia even before 1905, a practically normal system for a middle-class state of the period, but without centralized popular representation. The adoption of a constitution or the crowning of the structure, as it was then called, seemed to be an affair of the near future.

One circumstance, however, undermined the significance of the "great reforms." The peasants, who at that time made up about nine-tenths of the Russian population, had not been granted a full share in the blessings of the new order. Although they had been emancipated in 1861, they nevertheless formed a special class which did not enjoy all the rights of Russian citizens. The land allotted to them under the reform of 1861 became

the property not of each individual peasant but of communal groups. Each peasant received only a strip of land, which might be altered in new redivisions depending upon the size of his family. Upon the peasant communal groups, and not upon the individual peasants, the Government imposed the obligation of payment for the land assigned to them by the reform. As a result the peasant communes acquired certain rights which interfered with the freedom of the individual peasants. For example, without a passport from his own communal center, no peasant could move from his village to a town.

✓From the time of Alexander III there were appointed as overseers of the affairs of the peasant communes special officials chosen from the nobility, the *Zemskie Nachalniki* ("Land Captains"). This law hampered the peasants still more; particularly it fostered in them for a long time after their emancipation an offended sense of class resentment against the nobility.

All the measures of limitation affecting the peasant class and its land were abolished during the period of the Imperial Duma, in the interval between the First Revolution of 1905 and the World War. But these reforms, which might altogether be called "The second emancipation of the peasants" came too late to exert any influence on the change of mood among them in regard to the ownership of land and in relation to other classes before the time of great trial—the War and the Second Revolution which was its outcome.

2.

THE political practice of the Russian Empire, even after the establishment of the Duma, lagged farther and far-

ther behind the systems in effect in the states of western Europe. At the same time Russia entered with the beginning of the nineties upon a period of turbulent economic growth, surpassing in speed the growth of other capitalistic countries. In each of the decades before and after the First Russian Revolution, from 1891 to 1900 and from 1907 to 1916, Russian industry made great strides. Nevertheless, there were apparent great discrepancies between the different branches of economic activity. While industry was developing violently, agriculture was progressing slowly. Further, in the different fields of agriculture itself, the pace varied. While on many farms owned by private individuals (noblemen, merchants, and peasants separated from their groups after the Duma reforms) new machinery and methods were being introduced and harvests were being increased; on peasant commune farms, with rare exceptions, there was almost no progress in agricultural practice.

The production from communal farms showed hardly any increase after 1861, in the same period that the peasant population doubled. In this way there came about the crisis in peasant farming that marked the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries, and from it arose the land hunger of the peasants. The lack of any familiarity with private ownership of land, the habit of receiving a share from the social group, and the memory of an allotment by the state in 1861 from the former estates of the nobility, all suggested to the peasants the possibility of obtaining a new share of that part of the land which had remained in the possession of the noblemen after 1861. To this desire contributed all those bitter feelings against the es-

tate owners which had not been downed since the days of serfdom.

The Stolypin reform passed by the Duma, substituting individual peasant ownership for communal ownership, came too late from the historical point of view; it could not produce solid economic and social results in the short interval set by destiny before the outbreak of the Second Revolution.

3.

PROBABLY the most fatal condition in Russia was the divergence between the different classes of the population in cultural development. At the very time when the most highly cultivated groups—the intellectuals of the towns, the estate owners, and the business middle class—were on a level in education and customs with the most highly cultivated classes in the states of middle and western Europe, the broad masses of the workers and peasants were receiving a lamentably limited education or even no education at all. In the beginning of the twentieth century only about one-quarter of the children of school age in the Russian villages had any opportunity to attend school. In this respect again, the period of the Duma brought great changes. At the time of the beginning of the Second Revolution in 1917, about three-fifths of the children of school age were attending schools, and preparations to introduce general education were in full swing.

In many instances, the sharpening of hostile relations between the estate owners and the peasants was intensified not so much by the economic strife itself as by the contrast in levels of culture. The way of life of the es-

tate owners corresponded generally to that of the cultivated classes in the West. The poverty of the peasants caused them as a mass to develop comparatively few of the contemporary cultural habits and demands. A sharp distinction marked off the life of the towns from the life of the peasant villages. At a time when, just before the Revolution of 1917, people living in Russian cities had at their disposal universities, libraries, theaters, and motion-picture houses, cultural desires were just beginning to penetrate the villages. The attitude toward the church also was quite different in the towns and in the country. While a significant part of the town population, and in particular perhaps a majority of the intellectuals, took little interest in the church and was indifferent to religion, the church continued to be almost the sole cultural institution in the villages. A new ascendancy of religious feeling among the people of the cities began just before the Revolution of 1917.

All these contradictions in culture created friction between the towns and the country villages, and also—although in a lesser degree—between the middle classes and the working classes in the towns. The masses in the peasant villages were living still according to the intellectual standards of the seventeenth century, and were only beginning to emerge from that epoch at a time when the more advanced circles in the towns had attained the spirit of the twentieth century.

4.

✓ THE growth of a factory working class in Russia naturally accompanied the development of industry. The numerical increase of the Russian industrial middle class was proportionally less rapid than that of the Rus-

sian working class partly because of the intensive concentration of Russian industry. It was not so much the number of factories as the number of workers in large factories that was rising in Russia; that is to say, a constant expansion of the large plants was taking place.

The average Russian factory worker in the nineties, in the majority of cases, was not a genuine proletarian. The regiments of factory workers were being constantly augmented by a stream of peasant villagers. In general a peasant entering a factory, who in most cases was likely to be young, did not lose his contact with his commune. Moving into town to work, he was not deprived of his share of land. In his absence some other member of his family would till the soil, or it would be rented. During the summer months many workers were accustomed to leave their places in the factories and return to the villages to labor in the fields. Thus, for the majority of employees, the factory wage was only an auxiliary means of living. On the other hand, a factory owner knew that he could easily replace one departing worker with another from some village. So there came about an opportunity for the manufacturers to impose on the workers extremely burdensome conditions of labor. Wages were very low; the working day was very long—in the eighties and in the beginning of the nineties often twelve or thirteen hours a day. Consequently there were frequent strikes.

The situation of the workers improved after the passage of the Law of 1897, limiting the working day to eleven and one-half hours. In 1913 the actual working day averaged ten hours. Wages increased somewhat after the Revolution of 1905.*

* Cf. later, chap. iii, sec. 2.

The agrarian reform of Stolypin, introducing individual peasant proprietorship, tended to break the ties between the factory workers and the land. Going to work in a factory, the peasant could now sell his land and finally cast in his future lot with the town. So it was only in the twentieth century, and particularly in the years just preceding the World War, that a solid class of factory workers began to form in Russia. In the minds of the majority of workers, however, there had not yet taken root that type of thought which ruled the minds of the workers in more highly developed capitalistic countries. The Russian workers as a mass did not possess the firm consciousness of their interests as an occupational group which characterized the workers of England or Germany. One of the causes of this situation was the fact that up to 1906 the Government did not permit the organization of trades-unions among the workers.*

The Russian workers generally had very little sense of their dependence on the development of industry as a whole and were not accustomed to reflect on their identity with it; so they were not prepared to support either the development of the industries in which they were engaged or their protection in the event of a crisis or of a struggle with foreign industries.

5.

THE Russian intellectuals presented a peculiar social phenomenon. In many ways the educated classes of the Russian population were unlike the corresponding classes in the countries of the West. The intellectuals constituted in Russia what amounted to a special class

* With the exception of those fostered by Zubatov, concerning which see chap. i, sec. 4.

with its own particular mental and theoretical interests, which were very little related to the everyday life of the other classes of the people. The term intellectuals (*intelligentsia*) was used ordinarily to indicate persons who had received a college education, or at least a secondary education, or persons who had developed their own minds through contact with individuals who had received such education.

College education in Russia, more than in other cultured nations, had an abstract and theoretical character. Particularly was this true of political education. Since there never was a parliament in Russia until 1905, nor any freedom of assembly, persons concerning themselves with political questions acquired the habit of solving them apart from the actual conditions of administrative and economic life in the country. The discussion of political issues either in the press, where it was frequently indirect in order to avoid the restrictions of censorship, or within the confines of small groups, took the place of all other kinds of political contests. The results showed in the theoretical character of the programs worked out by circles of people taking an interest in politics. Issues concerning the life of the people were debated in these circles from the point of view not of practical policies for the time, but of abstract ethical and political principles.

Naturally, people reflecting on the political destiny of Russia saw the dire need of the Russian population in contrast to the wealth of productive forces and resources in the country. But, instead of searching for practical ways of enriching the masses, and instead of working first to raise the level of output of Russian industry and Russian agriculture, the majority of the political leaders

occupied themselves with speculations about an ideal system for a future social order. It is odd that the men prominent in Russian politics in this period were much more concerned with questions as to the just distribution of wealth than with questions as to a general increase of productivity.

The set of ideas dominating the minds of the Russian intellectuals up to the middle of the nineties came to be described by the Russian word *narodnichestvo*, which may be roughly translated as "an appeal to the people." This movement was based on an adaption of the principles of the earlier French socialism to Russian social conditions. The *narodniki* or "friends of the people" concerned themselves chiefly with the lot of the Russian peasants. In the peasant communes, despite their practical shortcomings, the *narodniki* believed they saw the first form of a socialistic order, and they hoped that by developing the village communes Russia might be able to avoid the capitalistic phase of development and pass directly to socialism.

Marxist circles began to appear in the eighties, and from the middle of the nineties they absorbed the chief interest of the Russian intellectuals. The Marxists proved exhaustively to the *narodniki* the necessity for Russia to go through the capitalistic phase. But at the same time they began to insinuate to the Russian factory workers the inevitability of an immediate conflict for socialist ideals.

In the larger cities throughout the country, spears were shattered in theoretical tilts at student evening gatherings, in the closed round-table meetings of workers, and in the assemblies of the more "middle-class" representatives of the intellectuals. But in the measure-

less spaces of Russia, the peasant and the worker had to make up their own minds how to achieve some slight betterment of their burdensome life.

6.

SINCE political activity had no official sanction in Russia up to 1905, the Government concerned itself with political organizations mainly from the point of view of the police. Naturally the result was that all political organizations in Russia came under the surveillance of the Police Department. Its program was simple: not to allow any "politics." The police tried to remove members of the illegal political circles, which were constantly forming, from their social contacts through arrest and exile.

The methods of secret observation required the Police Department to set up a considerable staff of unknown "assistants" and spies. This system almost imperceptibly led to the practice of provocation. The craftier assistants of the police tried to enter the membership of hidden political circles. This made it necessary for them to take part in discussions and in the planning of activities for the circle, or even to suggest such activities, particularly the preparation of terrorist attacks on government officials. So evolved the type of individual that reached full development in the person of Azef, who acted at one and the same time as an agent of the Police Department and the director of a "fighting wing" of the Social Revolutionary party.

7.

OPEN political parties on a large scale could not exist in Russia before 1905, lacking a parliament and freedom of assembly. The organizations calling themselves par-

ties were actually very small political groups. Since the Government pursued their members, these "parties" maintained an illegal life "beneath the ground." All the circumstances of an "illegal" political leader, forced to dwell under an assumed name, to hide constantly, to change apartments or move to another town, in order to escape chase by the police, cut off an "underground" politician more and more from normal surroundings and life. In this situation a Russian party leader sometimes mistook the resolution of a limited group of like-thinking people for the expression of the social opinion of "the broad masses." So the inclinations of these circles of political ideologists were separated from the actual needs of the people.

Striving constantly to avoid the evil of "parliamentary platitudes," the Russian Government itself fostered inflamed fanatics and abstract theorizers. Another consequence was the artificial predominance of radical and socialistic groups among the intellectuals. People of a more moderate temper, who might later have formed the staff of a liberal party, met with constant opposition to political activity on the part of the Government, and so preferred to ignore political questions entirely.

It was exactly for this reason that liberal organizations took form in Russia later than socialistic parties, and that later on the Liberals were weak and lacked genuine and firm relations with the masses of the people. It was for this reason also, as became clear at the time of the establishment of the Imperial Duma, that Russian liberalism like Russian socialism assumed so abstract and theoretical a character.

The Liberals in Russia were not connected with any special class. The more important of the liberal parties

after 1905, the Constitutional Democratic or "Kadet" party, strove to realize a really intelligent democratic program "above all classes." Although the Russian Socialists accused the "Kadets" of fighting for the interests of the middle class, they were not actually a middle-class party.

The Russian middle class, as has been seen, was much smaller and weaker than the middle class of the West. Because of the peculiarities of Russian political life, the middle class did not have at its disposal a firm political organization. The lack of any close connection between Russian liberalism and the middle class gave to the liberal movement an idealistic character. And this accentuated the feebleness of Russian liberalism as a practical force in politics.

Russian liberalism proved to be only a thin layer between autocracy and Bolshevism.

I

Before the Second Convention of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party

1.

THE head of the First International, Karl Marx, gave a special greeting in London on March 5, 1870, to the members of its Russian section, voicing his gratification that Russia was "beginning to take part in the general movement of our age." Hardly more than a hundred persons in Russia at the time heard the echo of his words. Indeed the very name of Marx was probably not known to more than a thousand Russians. Now, on the contrary, it is doubtful that there can be a thousand—except children and the deaf—who have not heard the name of Marx, whatever ideas they may connect with it. Of course Marx himself could not have dreamed of such renown in Russia. Nor could he have suspected that a month and a half after his message a Russian woman would bear a son whose destiny it would be to make the principles of Marx a reality in Russia by fire and sword.

This woman was Maria Ulianova, the wife of a public-school inspector in Simbirsk. She could hardly divine that the child she carried within her in the spring of 1870 was bound by some mystical tie to the German Jew who had just made a pronouncement on the historic future of Russia.

Vladimir Ilich Ulianov, who became known throughout the world by his pseudonym Lenin, was born on April 22, 1870. His father, Ilya Ulianov, came of the



From Leninsky Sbornik, Vol. II. Publication of Lenin Institute, Moscow.

The Family of Ulianov (Lenin) 1881-82

Left to right, seated: Maria Alexandrovna (mother of Lenin) with Maria; Dimitry; Ilya Nikolaievich (father of Lenin); Vladimir (Lenin).

Standing: Olga; Alexander (the oldest brother, who was executed); Anna.



merchant class of the city of Astrakhan. In the course of his service in the supervision of the public schools, he reached the grade of "active state counsellor" and as a result, according to Russian law, was enrolled in the hereditary nobility. (Maria Ulianova, the mother of Lenin, sprang from a Russianized German family by the name of Blank. Her father was a military surgeon in the Russian army.) The Ulianov family was typical of those Russian intellectuals who did not squander their idealism on petty details in the course of daily life. Ilya Ulianov pursued his work of public education with energy and enthusiasm. The idealism of the older Ulianovs took a form of political radicalism which was apparently rather indefinite and without any thought of the possibility of its quick application to actual affairs.

There were six children in the family—three boys, Alexander, Vladimir, and Dimitry; and three girls, Anna, Olga, and Maria. Two were set apart by fate—the oldest boy, Alexander, and the second, Vladimir. By nature Alexander was endowed with many spiritual gifts. Vladimir had a much more limited and narrow character. Both brothers entered the Simbirsk Classical High School (*Gymnasium*), of which the principal was then Theodore Kerensky, the father of the future head of the Provisional Government. Both of the Ulianov brothers were brilliant students.

Alexander was graduated from the high school earlier than his brother and went to St. Petersburg to enter the scientific department of the university there; even in high school he had shown special interest in scientific subjects. Apart from science, during his university course he became concerned with politics.

Alexander determined to put the vague and ineffec-

tual political radicalism of his parents immediately into action. Entering a circle of terrorists, he took part in the attempt to assassinate the Emperor Alexander III. The participants were arrested on the street carrying bombs, were tried in court, and sentenced to death.

On May 20, 1887, Alexander Ulianov was executed. Execution is always terrible; in this instance the particularly horrible element was the destruction of a talented youth, an idealist who had decided upon his act for the sake of an idea, fantastic though it admittedly was, that through this course might be attained "the welfare of the people." Nevertheless Alexander Ulianov was the soul of an assassination plot, and the group were seized with bombs in their hands; therefore their execution, however terrible the sentence may seem, was inevitable according to the laws of any state. The penalty was no indefensible act of Tsarist malice.

The news of the arrest and later of the execution of Alexander must naturally have given a profound shock to the whole Ulianov family and among them the seventeen-year-old Vladimir. Can the whole later life of Vladimir Ulianov be interpreted, however, in terms of a wish to wreak vengeance for the death of his brother? The contention seems ill founded.

All his life Vladimir Ulianov hated Russian Tsarism, in the political sense, but quite as much he hated the middle class which he always called by the socialist term *bourgeoisie*. And there is no reason to think that he felt any personal hatred for the Tsar then occupying the throne, or that he hated the Tsar any more than, for example, Miliukov. He made no attempt against the life of the Emperor Alexander III, who had signed the death warrant of Alexander Ulianov. In later years,

Vladimir Ulianov, who had then become Lenin, showed no haste to square accounts with the son of Alexander III, who fell into his power after the Revolution of November, 1917, so long as it did not seem necessary to him for political reasons.

The attack of the eldest son on the life of the Tsar naturally subjected the Ulianov family to special police supervision. In order to judge the police instructions issued by the administration of the time, it is necessary to carry one's thought over to the action of a period thirty years later. What fate would have awaited a youth and his sympathizers if they had attempted to assassinate Lenin in 1918? That he would have been executed, there can be no doubt—for the girl who attacked Lenin in 1918 was executed. In expiation for her deed scores and hundreds of people, who were not directly concerned and took no part in the attempt, suffered—being seized and shot as hostages.* Thus the government of Vladimir Ulianov-Lenin in 1918 responded to an assault on the life of its chief. The government of the Emperor Alexander III in 1887 punished by execution the conspirators who had directly taken part in the plot, but did not molest their families, except for the institution of police surveillance, and did nothing to people who were not concerned and took no part in the affair. The mother of Alexander, Maria Ulianova, continued to receive the government pension allotted to her after the death of her husband. This pension supported the family. For several years Vladimir Ulianov himself lived by means of it.

Alexander Ulianov was executed on May 20; and on June 22 his brother, Vladimir, was graduated from the

* See later, chap. vii, sec. 13.

Simbirsk High School and received his certificate. After this the Ulianov family moved to Kazan, and in accordance with his request Vladimir was admitted to the Law School of the Kazan University. It is impossible to refrain from comparison of this fact with the regulations set up in Russia by the government of Ulianov-Lenin. In 1887 the imperial Government of Russia admitted to a university, without reservation, the brother of a man who had unquestionably been the blood foe of that government. Thirty years later the Communist Government began to deny entrance into higher institutions of learning to its "class foes," that is to say, to the children of persons who frequently had taken no active part in any movement against the Communist authority, and who in many instances had not even opposed it intellectually.

Vladimir Ulianov did not stay very long, however, in the university. On December 16 he was one of the attendants at a student assembly, and at the time any assemblies of students were prohibited. On December 17 he was arrested together with forty other students for presence at the assembly, and afterward was expelled from the university and sent out of Kazan to the village of Kokushkino, forty versts from Kazan, where his grandfather on his mother's side owned an estate. The winter of 1887-88 and the summer of 1888 he passed in the village. Requests made by him and his mother for readmission to the university were rejected, but in the autumn of 1888 he was allowed to return to Kazan. With that autumn began Ulianov's allegiance to Marxism.

The eighties were inanimate years for the liberal and radical school of political thought in Russia. The government censorship watched the newspapers and pe-

riodicals strictly, as the police also watched the tendencies of the intellectuals. The slightest hint of political liberalism was considered dangerous. But the minds of Russian intellectuals during that period were concerned not so much with political questions as with problems of social life, which could be discussed in the press although caution was required.

The basic tendency in Russian social thought during those years was the "appeal to the people." The psychological reasons for this movement have been discussed in the introduction. On the one hand, the *narodniki* demanded that the middle class and the nobility must recognize their duty to the people and come to their aid through the promotion of literacy, medical care, and other social services; on the other hand, they idealized the peasant way of life, seeing in the peasant commune a partial realization of the socialist dream and hoping that through the communes Russia might avoid entirely the process of developing factory industry and a proletarian working class which had taken place in the West.

At the beginning of the eighties, however, it could hardly be denied that a proletariat was growing in Russia together with the expansion of factory industry. The industrial situation in those years and the impoverishment of factory workers caused labor outbreaks and led the Government to begin industrial legislation. Among the intellectuals the study of Marxism spread gradually. A Russian translation of the first volume of Marx's *Capital* was published two years after the birth of Ulianov. In 1883 Plekhanov founded abroad the "Group for the Liberation of Labor," a circle of intellectuals which proved to have considerable significance in the history of socialist ideas in Russia.

Closely knit Marxist groups of intellectuals began to form in various Russian cities. Such a group was established in the autumn of 1888 in Kazan under the leadership of N. È. Fedoseiev. Ulianov apparently did not become a formal member, but simply got acquainted with various members of the group and commenced to study Marx's volume.

The Fedoseiev circle did not last very long. Its leader and its members were arrested in the summer of 1889. Ulianov was not in Kazan at the time; he was passing the summer in his mother's cottage in the village of Alakaevka in the Samara province. That autumn the Ulianov family moved to Samara. Ulianov continued to take an interest in the theories of Marxism, and at the same time started Marxist propaganda among the young people of Samara. He spent two winters in the town, living apparently on his mother's means; if he earned anything himself, it was only casually and very little. Several years in succession Ulianov and his mother entered applications to the Minister of Public Education, Delianov, for permission for him to take examinations to complete the law course apart from a university. Delianov at first refused, but then allowed him to address himself to the examining committee of the St. Petersburg University.

At the end of March, 1891, Ulianov arrived in St. Petersburg, and in the course of April and May took half of the examinations; the other half he took in November. The examining committee in law, on November 27, 1891, granted him a diploma with the first grade. Having passed the examinations, he returned to Samara; and in January, 1892, he became assistant to an

attorney, A. N. Khardin, a man of liberal views.* But Ulianov practically did not occupy himself at all with the affairs of the law office. He went on with his study of Marxism and with propaganda, presenting in the local groups of intellectuals reports of a Marxist tendency. Further, he now became formally a member of one of the Marxist circles.

Thoroughly imbued with the spirit of Marxism, Ulianov commenced to apply its methods in his own independent, scientific way. In 1893 he wrote in regard to the book by V. E. Postnikov, *Southern Russian Peasant Agriculture*, his first and perhaps most significant scientific work, *New Economic Movements in the Life of the Peasants*. This later formed the basis of several chapters of his volume, *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*, and it revealed Ulianov as a profound student of economic phenomena, capable at the same time of observing actual life itself instead of simply interpreting appearances according to party formulas. Ulianov read this work in the Samara circle. At the time it was not printed. The only manuscript copy was seized by the police when they arrested one of his sympathizers, S. I. Mitskevich, in December, 1893. In August of that year Ulianov had left Samara for St. Petersburg, where he secured employment as assistant to the attorney, M. F. Volkenstein, a lawyer holding radical convictions in politics. But Ulianov had no intention of concerning himself with the practice of law in St. Petersburg. He went there to take part in the activities of the Russian center of the Marxist movement.

* Later Khardin became a member of the Constitutional Democratic party.

2.

ULIANOV'S move to St. Petersburg came at the time when a new period in the social and economic life of Russia was commencing. It was a time of active growth in Russian industry, which had begun in 1887 but was intensified particularly when Witte was in power, that is to say, after 1891. An increase in the number of factory workers naturally accompanied the expansion of industry. The conditions under which these workers labored were, however, not improved at once after the beginning of the rise of industry, and up to 1897 they hardly differed at all from those that had prevailed in the period of industrial depression during the eighties. These burdensome conditions of labor and the length of the working day caused constant unrest and strikes. The growing sharpness of the labor problem created more and more lively activity among the Marxist groups of intellectuals. Among the young students, Marxism began to outweigh the movement of the *narodniki* in influence. Warm debates between Marxists and *narodniki* took place both in the gatherings of learned economic societies and in the illegal evening assemblies of students.

As soon as he reached St. Petersburg, Ulianov assumed a prominent position in Marxist circles. He joined the group that came to be known later as the "Elders" (*Stariki*), which existed in St. Petersburg from 1892 on; in this circle another active worker was Nadezhda K. Krupskaya, who later became the wife of Ulianov. Closely allied to it was a circle of Social Democrats, among whom stood out the young Tsederbaum (known under the revolutionary pseudonym of Martov). Both these groups were secret. But there formed

in the same time in St. Petersburg a circle of so-called "legal Marxists" who adhered to the Marxian program without practicing underground political methods. Two young scholars, Peter Struve and Michael Tugan-Baranovsky, were the rising stars of this group. All these circles consisted of intellectuals, mainly young men and girl students and youthful lawyers, teachers, and journalists. As for workers, only a few individuals formed any close contacts with these groups of intellectuals. The whole number of members of Marxist organizations was not large; it could be counted approximately by scores in St. Petersburg and by hundreds in the provinces. There could hardly have been more than a thousand in all Russia. The methods of spreading propaganda widely among the masses of the people were not yet perfected. The rights of free speech and free assembly did not exist in Russia, so roundabout ways of action were necessary to avert the attention of the police. The majority of the Marxist agitators strove to advance their purposes by work in the St. Petersburg Committee of Literacy and in schools assembling on Sundays. Committees of Literacy existed at the time in both St. Petersburg and Moscow; they were associations formed to assist in popular education. The Moscow Committee had a little more than four hundred members and the St. Petersburg Committee about a thousand. Among their purposes were the publication of books and pictures for the people, the circulation of free public libraries through the villages, the compilation of model catalogues for country libraries, and other similar activities. Their funds were raised by gifts from members, by the organization of lectures for admission to which a charge was made, and by special collections. In

the years 1893 to 1895, the St. Petersburg Committee of Literacy raised a sum of more than 25,000 rubles (\$12,500.00) for people's libraries. The leaders of these committees were idealistic intellectuals, who gave their energy and time without any reward. Among them were *narodniki* and Marxists and Liberals.

Ulianov regarded this peaceful work of fostering literacy with unconcealed contempt. Nevertheless he did not scorn to take advantage of activity in the Committee of Literacy as a means both of forming closer contacts with the working masses and also of making useful social acquaintances. One of the women leaders in the St. Petersburg Committee was A. M. Kalmykova, who later gave such valuable support to the foundation of the *Iskra*.^{*} She was married to an important official in the capital, but the majestic world of St. Petersburg society did not attract her and so she devoted herself with her whole soul to the radical circles of the intellectuals, being most closely associated with the Marxist organization. Struve was brought up in her family and was her *protégé* in his student years in the high school (*gymnasium*). In connection with her work for the Committee of Literacy, she opened in St. Petersburg a bookstore which became a sort of staff headquarters and meeting place for the Social Democrats. The agitation of the Marxists among the workers consisted in forming small circles whose importance lay in the self-education of the members and in the broadening of their knowledge of the world from the Marxist point of view. Ulianov took part in the programs of a number of such circles beyond the Nevsky Gate. He was also able to establish there a central circle of workers correlating the activities of in-

^{*} See later, sec. 4.

dividual centers. The more intellectually developed workers, who were comparatively well off, were the ones who usually took part in these circles. Martov even says that they surprised the students by their middle-class manner of living. The attempts of the St. Petersburg Marxists to get in touch with the broader masses of the more needy and less developed workers generally resulted in failure. The circulars and proclamations of the Marxists exerted little influence, primarily because they were made up chiefly of abstract phrases. Ulianov endeavored to bring their form of statement closer to the conditions of the actual life of the workers. With this purpose he tried to make himself familiar with the laws governing the workers and with the labor regulations in individual factories and other matters of the sort. Here appeared that trait which was later characteristic of him: the capacity to combine the most abstract theoretical principles of policy with great practicality in details, and the insight, when it was required, to understand the actual conditions of life.

His years in St. Petersburg from 1893 to 1895 were in truth the only period when Ulianov was close to the working masses. The burdensome conditions of their existence at that time determined his views throughout his life.

While he was carrying on his work of organization and propaganda among the workers, Ulianov was taking a lively part in intellectual controversies. In 1894 little notebooks were multigraphed and distributed anonymously under the title *What the Friends of the People Really Are and How They Fight the Social Democrats*. The author was Ulianov. This work, although its circle of readers was more limited, played the same part of a

long-distance weapon directed against the *narodniki* as did two other books which had appeared at the same time: Struve's *Critical Notes on the Problem of the Economic Development of Russia*, and Bel'tov's (Plekhanov's pseudonym) *The Development of the Monistic View of History*. Of all the propagandists of Marxism, Ulianov was perhaps the most irreconcilable in his attitude to the *narodniki*. He made against them the most terrific accusation from the point of view of pure socialism—the suspicion of middle-class tendencies. Their ideas and their program seemed to him only an expression of the interests of “petty bourgeoisie.” As Ulianov put it, the *narodniki* were the “knights-errant” of this class. Their movement was born “of the most vulgar principles of small-minded, middle-class radicalism.” Ulianov blamed the *narodniki* for not staking their fate on that class of the Russian population which seemed to him the hope of the Revolution. He wrote: “The man of the future in Russia is the peasant; so thought the representatives of peasant socialism, *narodniki* in the broadest sense of that word. The man of the future in Russia is the worker, think the Social Democrats.” In accordance with this view he spread the idea that it was essential to organize a special workers’ party and also independent political demonstrations by the workers. His pamphlet *What the Friends of the People Really Are* ends with the prophecy that “the Russian worker, taking the leadership of all the democratic elements, will overthrow absolutism and guide the Russian proletariat, together with the proletariat of all countries, by the direct road of open political combat to the triumph of communistic revolution.”

Ulianov's break with the *narodniki* was a forecast of

his bitter disputes with the Social Revolutionaries, especially in 1917. Not only with them but also with the moderate wing of the Social Democratic Labor party itself, known as the Mensheviks, he waged war, particularly in 1917, accusing them of compromise with the middle class. The lines of this interparty fight were already drawn in the St. Petersburg years of his youth. He was at once on guard when he suspected tendencies to compromise with the middle class in Struve's earlier-mentioned book. In his debate with the *narodniki*, Struve, in Ulianov's opinion, went too far in the justification of capitalism. Struve offered the slogan: "Let us enter the school of capitalism."

The early connection and the later contrast between the destinies of Struve and Ulianov is one of the peculiar phenomena in the history of Russian society. For both of them the starting point was the same ideas of Marxism. But Ulianov, following his temperament of an irreconcilable revolutionary, tended more and more to interpret Marxism in the spirit of revolutionary communism until he had given it a distinct new form—Leninism. On the other hand, Struve, following his temperament of a philosopher and social scientist, tended steadily to interpret Marxism in the spirit of the peaceful theory of social development, until he had departed completely from Marxism and based his theory of social evolution on new idealistic foundations. The outbursts of political antagonism between Ulianov and Struve in their first years of activity only marked the beginning of a long series of disputes.

In the spring of 1895 Ulianov decided to extend the connections that he and the St. Petersburg Marxists had with sympathizers elsewhere, and went abroad to form

an acquaintance with Plekhanov and the "Liberation of Labor" group. Ulianov visited several circles of Russian *émigrés* in Switzerland, Germany, and France. It was in Switzerland that he met Plekhanov and other leaders associated with him. Contact was established. Plekhanov made a profound impression on Ulianov. For several years from that time, up to their second meeting in the summer of 1900, Ulianov regarded Plekhanov as his intellectual chieftain and guide. What is more, Ulianov felt an actual veneration for the personality of Plekhanov. This was almost the only time in his life when Ulianov showed reverence for a person rather than for an idea alone. Later, even after his break with Plekhanov, Ulianov wrote in reminiscence: "Never, never in my life did I feel toward any other man such sincere respect and veneration; never before anyone else did I experience such embarrassment."

In Paris and Berlin Ulianov attended meetings of workers, made himself familiar with Marxist literature published abroad, and formed acquaintances with the chief leaders of the international Social Democratic movement, Lafargue in France and Kautsky in Germany. He returned to St. Petersburg in September, 1895, carrying with him in a double-bottomed suitcase a considerable supply of illegal propagandist literature.

The outcome of the activities of Ulianov and the St. Petersburg Marxist circles was their unification in one organization, which soon adopted the name of the "Union for Combat To Liberate the Working Class." The leaders of this union unquestionably were Ulianov and Martov. Preparations were made to issue a popular periodical for workers under the name of *The Workers' Cause*. But it was not destined to appear then. On the

night of December 20-21, 1895, the police searched the rooms of Ulianov and several of his comrades. In one of them was found the manuscript for the first number of *The Workers' Cause*, ready for the press. After the raid, Ulianov was sent to the House of Preliminary Detention. Arrests continued during 1896. Then the Committees of Literacy as well were suppressed.

3.

THE whole year of 1896 Ulianov was in prison. Nevertheless he tried not to waste his time; he carried on an illegal correspondence with his comrades who had kept their freedom, and composed pamphlets which were distributed in the name of the organization. Further, he began the preparation of his chief scientific work, *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*. His case was not tried in court, but was settled as an administrative matter. On February 10, 1897, there was issued an imperial order for his deportation to Eastern Siberia to live under police supervision for three years. This was announced to him on February 25. At the request of his mother, he was allowed to travel into exile without guards, at his own expense, as a free passenger. Together with two other men found guilty in the same affair, Ulianov was allowed, on February 26, to leave the House of Preliminary Detention. They all received permission to remain in St. Petersburg until the evening of March 1 in order to gather what they needed for the journey and to consult their physicians. This gave them an opportunity to talk on revolutionary business with the remaining leaders of the Union for Combat. The comparative lenience with which the police dealt at that time with the Marxist movement commands attention.

It gives an impression that the Police Department regarded the Marxists somewhat mildly, being led by earlier memories to consider the *narodniki* the most dangerous revolutionaries.¹

Ulianov left St. Petersburg on March 1, passed a few days with his mother in Moscow, and on March 18 arrived by railway in Krasnoyarsk, Siberia. From that place he had to travel by water up the Yenisei River. On March 20 he reached the point indicated for his exile, the village of Shushenskoe in Minusinsk County. An order from the Governor of the Yenisei province provided in June for the payment of a monthly subsidy of eight rubles (\$4.00) to Ulianov for food, clothing, and lodgings. The extraordinary cheapness of living in Siberia at that time made this sum suffice for a modest subsistence, especially since he had small additional amounts of money. Ulianov stayed in Shushenskoe almost without interval until the end of the three-year period of exile, which ran from the day of the imperial order and ended on February 10, 1900. Up to that date, he left Shushenskoe only twice: once to spend a short period of time in the town of Minusinsk; and once to spend a week in the town of Krasnoyarsk, with the permission of the Governor, for medical treatment.

The locality where Ulianov passed his years of exile lies in the southern part of Central Siberia, close to Mongolia, and at the time it was sparsely populated. Natural life there was abundant, and there were many game animals and wild fowl. Ulianov hunted a great deal. In May, 1898, Krupskaya arrived in the village of Shushenskoe, and on July 22 Ulianov and she were married. In exile, as earlier in prison, Ulianov occupied himself intensively with study and scientific work, fin-

ishing his book, *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*. This volume appeared in 1899 under the pseudonym of Vladimir Ilin. At the same time Ulianov carried on from his exile constant correspondence with sympathizers, both with those banished to Siberia like himself and with those who had their freedom. Thus the time did not involve for him any break of contact with those individuals who thought alike with him. On the contrary, exile cast an aureole around his name. It was no matter of chance that in March, 1898, the First Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Labor party chose Ulianov in his absence as editor of the projected official organ of the party, *The Workers' Gazette* ("Рабочая Газета"). This first party Convention assembled illegally in Minsk. Representatives were present from Marxist groups in St. Petersburg, Moscow, Kiev, Ekaterinoslav, and also from the Jewish Social Democratic Union known as the Bund. The delegates of the Bund declared that it was ready to enter the Russian Social Democratic Labor party as an autonomous organization. There were in all nine delegates. The organizers of the Convention were the Kiev Marxist group, two of whose delegates formed the presidium of the Congress. A central committee was elected, consisting of three individuals: one from the Kiev group, one from the St. Petersburg Union of Combat, and one from the Bund. Soon after the first Convention, the police again raided the quarters of the chief organizations which had brought the assembly together. Of the three members of the Central Committee, they arrested two. So the first Convention did not actually bring a party into being as an organization, and was significant only for its declaration of the idea of a party. From this point of view it

produced a great impression through the manifesto of the first Convention of the Russian Social Democratic Labor party which the St. Petersburg group issued in its name. The author of this manifesto was Struve.

A year after this first Convention, an internal division became marked in Russian Marxist circles between the "hard" and "soft" Marxists—a division that Ulianov had already felt to be imminent while he was in St. Petersburg, when he protested against Struve's book. The moderate tendency in Russian Marxism expressed itself in the form of what was then called the economic school. It was not peculiar to Russian Marxism; in Germany the revisionist school, or the Bernstein movement, corresponded to it—Bernstein's book *Evolutionary Socialism: A Criticism and Affirmation* appeared in its original German edition in 1899. In that same year one of the active women leaders of the economic school, E. D. Kuskova, issued a general statement of her views on the labor movement in Russia. This draft fell into the hands of the "hard" Marxists, who took it as practically a manifesto from the economists' wing of the party, called it their Creed, and sounded the alarm. Various groups of "hard" Marxists signed protests against the Creed. The colonies of Marxist exiles in Siberia seethed with indignation, and resolutions against it were adopted by the Minusinsk group headed by Ulianov and the Turukhansk group headed by Martov. The Creed had its origin in the thought that the Russian labor movement bore a character which was not political but purely economic. If the Social Democratic Labor party wished to be a workers' party, it must make an approach to them not based on abstract theories but on their own immediate interests. Such a party must not operate ac-

cording to the instructions of persons living abroad, but on the basis of the activities of the workers themselves. The ideas of the Creed were actually the ideas of trades-unionism.

The conflict with the ideas of the economic school undoubtedly aroused Ulianov to rally the forces of the "hard" Marxists. He felt in himself the capacity for leadership and power in the party to be, and together with it the obligation to guard the purity of the social democratic idea as he understood it. To prepare the way for a party it was indispensable to have available a periodical organ, and under the prevailing conditions of censorship there could only be a hope of establishing it abroad. With these projects in mind—the establishment of a periodical Social Democratic Labor organ and the unification of the "hard" Marxists in a single organized party—Ulianov lived through the last months of his exile.

4.

ULIANOV's period of exile ended on February 10, 1900; and on February 11 he left the village of Shushenskoe for European Russia. The police forbade him to reside in a series of university and industrial centers. He chose Pskov as his dwelling place, a town which presented considerable geographic advantages, since it was near both St. Petersburg and the frontier. The point was that Ulianov had no intention of establishing himself firmly in Russia. As has been said, he departed from exile with the idea of taking charge of a Social Democratic Labor journal and with the aim of uniting the opposed groups of Social Democrats in a solid party. The realization of this plan involved, however, great difficulty. First of all,

he faced a fight against the contradictory tendencies among the Social Democrats in Russia. Then arose the question of means. It is true that comparatively small sums were required. The problem was the publication not of a large daily newspaper but of a small sheet. The printing of it could not cost much. Ulianov himself and the other proposed collaborators and editorial assistants were ascetics, like most of the Russian intellectuals of that day, and made the most modest demands for the comforts of living. The proposed paper was not to provide them with a source of income but with an opportunity for intellectual work. They were not seeking salaries; they needed only the least amount required for daily life.

Nevertheless some money had to be secured; and Ulianov and his sympathizers could only eke out a living with difficulty, so that to procure one or two thousand rubles at once was a matter of the greatest difficulty. They had to look for funds outside their immediate circle, and that meant an appeal for aid to those very "legal" Marxists whom Ulianov had condemned so harshly, Struve and Tugan-Baranovsky. These "legal" Marxists had a wider acquaintance among the more well-to-do, or—according to Ulianov's habitual terminology—the more *bourgeois* intellectuals, part of whom sympathized with or adhered to Marxism. These people were willing to aid in the affair on condition that the "legal" Marxists should have a part in it and an influence on the direction of policy. Ulianov's group had to agree to this; and in March, 1900, there took place in Pskov a conference in which participated delegates of the "illegal" Marxists (Ulianov, Martov, and Radchenko) and of the "legal" Marxists (Potresov, Struve,

and Tugan-Baranovsky). It may be said that Potresov was counted at one and the same time as a "legal" Marxist and a member of the organization of "Elders" who at the time practically agreed with Ulianov. An understanding as to the publication of a Marxist newspaper abroad was reached; and after this Potresov went abroad to make preparations and to carry on preliminary conferences with Russian Social Democrats beyond the frontier, while Ulianov, after some time, received the sum of 1,000 rubles (\$500.00), which was quite enough to make it possible to start activities. This money, like later payments, passed through the hands of A. M. Kalmykova, a part apparently coming directly from her own personal means. Ulianov went abroad with legal permission, receiving a foreign passport from the Governor of Pskov. At the very last minute, however, the plan almost fell through, for Ulianov visited St. Petersburg, which he had no right to do under the police restrictions, and was there arrested. But he was soon set free, and on July 29, 1900, he entered Germany. V. L. Burtsev, the best authority on the history of the secret police in Russia up to 1917, thinks that the Police Department purposely permitted Ulianov to pass the border.² The prospect of a Marxist newspaper abroad seemed to the Police Department advantageous for the conflict with the terroristic organizations of the *narodniki*, which were raising their heads; concerning these the department had information through Azef, who from 1893 on had been in its service and also in the revolutionary circles of the *narodniki*.

In the latter half of August, Ulianov arrived in Switzerland for conferences with the Liberation of Labor group; its participation, as the most authoritative

Russian Social Democratic Labor organization, was indispensable for the success of the projected publication. But Ulianov's conversations with this group nearly ended in a break.

Plekhanov, who headed the Liberation of Labor group, regarded himself as the natural leader of Russian social democracy. So it seemed to him logical that he should be in charge of the newspaper. Ulianov was to be limited to the obscure rôle of a technical assistant, mainly concerned with contacts with Russia. Probably the situation appeared in the same light to the "legal" Marxists, and Potresov must have prepared Plekhanov's mind from this point of view. But Ulianov came upon the scene with quite different purposes and ideas. Despite his former reverence for Plekhanov, still to some extent preserved, Ulianov had already begun to consider himself the chief director of the affair. The Marxists abroad, like the "legal" Marxists, were for him only implements. Even Plekhanov appeared to Ulianov only a symbol.

It is not surprising that there followed a sharp conflict between Plekhanov and Ulianov. The reverence Ulianov had felt for Plekhanov vanished forever. "My infatuation for Plekhanov was torn away," wrote Ulianov, "and I was filled with unbelievable bitterness." The affair did not reach a final and open break. Both Plekhanov and Ulianov made compromises. Ulianov agreed to an editorial staff of three members. In it were to take part, in addition to Ulianov himself, Potresov as a representative of the "legal" Marxists, and Vera Zasulich as a representative of the Marxists abroad. Plekhanov was recognized as the honorary sponsor of the enterprise, but the editorial offices of the paper were

located not in Switzerland, where Plekhanov lived, but in Munich, Germany, where Ulianov could feel freer from Plekhanov's supervision. The months of October and November, 1900, Ulianov passed in making ready for the first number of the *Iskra* ("The Spark") as it was decided to name the new paper. The first number appeared on December 24, 1900. Ulianov soon succeeded in bringing into the work people who thought more nearly as he did. From Russia came Martov, who became the chief worker in the editorial staff, and Krupskaya, who took charge of correspondence with Russia on the affairs of the *Iskra*. If Ulianov was not the sole master of the enterprise, as he had earlier thought he should be, nevertheless he was able to play the leading rôle.

When many Marxists began to voice discontent with the new turn of affairs, the editorial staff of the *Iskra*—of course at the demand of Ulianov—determined to transfer publication to a point still further removed from Plekhanov. Early in April, 1902, the editorial office of the *Iskra* was moved to London. A new member was introduced into the staff, a young man recently escaped from Siberia, named Bronstein, who later became famous under the pseudonym Trotsky. Despite his youth, Bronstein soon began to take an independent attitude toward Ulianov. As a justification for the transfer of the editorial office, Ulianov circulated a report as to technical difficulties created by increasing police surveillance in Munich. So, during the whole period of the "old" *Iskra*, from 1900 to 1903, there was actually a hidden fight between Plekhanov and Ulianov. Gradually Ulianov conquered one new position after another. "Plekhanov is a grayhound," said one of the *Iskra*

group. "He will worry and shake you, and then stop. But Ulianov is a bull dog. He has a death grip."

Plekhanov was a brilliant and astute debater and publicist whose talents, however, were somewhat superficial. The deeper content of his doctrine was contained entirely within the frame of Marxism. He did not attempt to add anything of his own, based on his observations of life. He was rather a bookish and theoretical man. Also, in the long years that he had lived beyond the border, he had unquestionably got out of touch with actualities in Russia, had become Europeanized or—perhaps more truly—had acquired something of a French spirit, although his love for Russia and his patriotism as a Russian always persisted and flared up brightly at the time of the World War when his Russian sentiments combined with his French sympathies. The inner disturbances in connection with the *Iskra* finally became obvious in a division of the *Iskra* followers at the Second Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Labor party.*

The publication of the *Iskra* played a great part in the preliminary history of the Russian Revolution of 1905. As its motto was chosen a verse ascribed to the Decembrists—so called as participants in the uprising of December, 1825: "A spark will start a big blaze." This motto was probably suggested by Ulianov. As early as 1895, he wrote concerning a letter of one of the Tsarist ministers to another: "The minister regards the workers as powder, and knowledge and education as sparks; the minister is convinced that if a spark falls in the powder, the explosion will first of all damage the government." Of course, the outburst of Russian revolutionary vio-

* See later, chap. ii, sec. 1.

lence in 1905 was not produced by the *Iskra*, but the paper actually did exert an influence on the special tactics of various Russian social groups in the commencement of the political clashes. The conflict was made sharper by the intensive governmental reaction which was connected with economic depression. This situation began to make itself felt after the end of 1899. Naturally, discontent among the workers began to grow during this crisis, and the Government tried to satisfy them by a plan of police protection. Its policy became known as *Zubatovshchina*, after the name of its originator Zubatov, the chief of the Moscow secret police, who outlined these bases of a desirable program for the labor movement:

1. Substitution of evolutionary for revolutionary instruction.

2. Propaganda in favor of the advantages of an autocratic form of government regulating social relationships; the autocratic power was to function as a sort of third judge in disputes between employers and workers.

On the basis of this program the Government began to sanction labor organizations under the supervision of the police, instead of suppressing them as it had always done before. In May, 1901, there was founded in Moscow the so-called Society of Mutual Aid among Workers in Mechanical Industries.

Striving on the one hand to meet some of the desires of the workers, the Government on the other hand increased the repressive measures of the police toward the press, the student class, and agencies of local self-government (the *zemstvos*, or local councils, and municipalities). Two Ministers of the Interior, Sipyagin, holding office from 1899, and after him in particu-

lar, Plehve, holding office from 1902, were the chief instigators of governmental reaction. Such a policy served, however, only to increase discontent among the intellectuals. Students began to organize street demonstrations; estate owners of a liberal cast of mind began to use the zemstvo assemblies for propaganda in favor of constitutional government. The various circles of *narodniki* united in the Social Democratic Labor party, headed by a fighting organization. Terrorists began to assassinate cabinet ministers and other agents of official power.

Organizations antagonistic to the Government were still very weak. To hope for any early victory of the social groups over the Government was conceivable only if the activities of the various liberal and revolutionary factions were brought into accord with each other. Such an accord seemed comparatively easy to achieve because at the time there were in Russia no genuine organized parties. Despite the sharp debates between Marxists and *narodniki* over theoretical issues, each might obviously come to an understanding with the other on practical questions of action. In exactly the same way there could be an understanding between the adherents of the more determined revolutionaries and the more cautious liberals.

On the *Iskra*, as the most important "illegal" anti-government organ at the time, much depended. And on Ulianov, as the actual chief director of the *Iskra*, rested a great political responsibility for the direction it took. At the very outset of publication of the *Iskra*, in December, 1900, and January, 1901, lengthy editorial conferences took place in Munich on the question of collaboration by the "legal" Marxists, and among their num-

ber was Struve. The more moderate sentiment prevailed; Ulianov found himself in the minority; and one commentary by Struve was actually published in the *Iskra*. But after that Ulianov began to follow his own irreconcilable course, disregarding the conference resolutions. Struve had to separate himself from the *Iskra* and, as an advocate of agreement with the Liberals, in the summer of 1902 he took charge of a new liberal journal *Osvobozhdenie* ("Liberation"), published first in Stuttgart and then in Paris. Of course the *Iskra* carried on a fierce conflict with the Liberals, with Struve and the *Osvobozhdenie* as with the groups of the economic school among the Social Democrats. Ulianov's motto was: "Before we can unite, we must set limits." In this setting of limits, the *Iskra* had a significant part. It succeeded, in its unrelenting skirmishes with both distant and near opponents, in concentrating and separating out the group of its own adherents.

Ulianov's plan of organization was apparent in his brochure *What Is To Be Done*, printed when the *Iskra* controversy was in full flame. He considered it essential to form a conspiratory fighting organization of revolutionaries capable of leading the masses. This organization must instil into the consciousness of the workers its own revolutionary and socialistic ideals. "Give us an organization of revolutionaries and we will turn Russia upside down," wrote Ulianov. He declared these views at the Second Convention of the party, and there it was evident that he was able to raise a considerable following devoted to his ideas. Thus, although the *Iskra* was not under his control alone, among the other editors Ulianov saw how to secure the greatest political advantage. The *Iskra* made his political reputation among the

members of the Social Democratic Labor party and set the stage for his rôle as leader before a large group of its members. The *Iskra* likewise identified Ulianov with a new name—the name of Lenin, the pseudonym with which he signed the greater part of his writings during the period and by which he was known from that time in the world of Russian revolutionaries.

5.

THE basic task of the *Iskra* was to prepare for a convention of the Social Democratic Labor party in Russia. Beside the work of organization, it was necessary to draft a program for the party which could be proclaimed in the name of the future convention, since the First Convention established no program. In the course of drafting one, there again appeared internal dissensions in the *Iskra* group. Plekhanov considered it indisputable that the right to compile a program belonged to him as the founder of the Social Democratic movement in Russia. Lenin, on the other hand, was of the opinion that because of Plekhanov's long period of life abroad he could not adapt a program to Russian conditions. In 1895 and 1896, Lenin himself had made a draft in which he endeavored to utilize his experience in carrying on propaganda among the workers. The scheme which he had then outlined was confiscated by the police when he was arrested (later it was found in the police archives, and it was first published in 1924). In the end, the members of the *Iskra* group decided to confide the work of drawing up a program to Plekhanov, on the ground that Lenin was too much occupied with the day-to-day affairs of editorial and organization work. Plekhanov's outline was ready early in January, 1902, and

at the end of that month a special session of the editorial board of the *Iskra* was held in Munich to discuss the program. Lenin openly criticized Plekhanov's outline; and Plekhanov worked it over again, but still failed to satisfy Lenin, who considered the whole character of the program inadequate to its purpose. In his opinion, the plan was too theoretical. "This is not a program for a practical fighting party," wrote Lenin. "It is rather a program for scholars in an elementary course, in which capitalism in general is discussed but not capitalism in Russia." Lenin further thought that a party of the Russian proletariat ought to attack Russian capitalism in the most unequivocal style, and declare war against it. Plekhanov's program really did consist in a general description of the capitalist order and of the tasks of a labor party. In regard particularly to Russia, Plekhanov pointed out not the peculiarities of Russian capitalism but the persistence in the Russian political system of the feudal character of the early *régime*. Thus his program set up as the fighting purpose of the party a conflict with the imperial autocracy of the Tsar. Lenin considered it no less important to insist upon a conflict with the Russian middle class.

In his earlier outline of a program of 1895-96, Lenin had written that the growth of capitalism in Russia indicated a great increase of wealth and luxury in the hands of a small group of manufacturers, merchants, and landowners, and a still swifter increase of poverty and oppression for the workers. He succeeded now in securing a revision of Plekhanov's program. The editorial board of the *Iskra* chose a commission of three, among whom was Martov, to correlate the outlines of Lenin and Plekhanov. After a series of further conver-

sations and conferences, a draft was finally approved by the editorial board and published. It was a compromise between the views of Plekhanov and Lenin, but both of them were satisfied.

In this form, with a few slight editorial changes, the program was adopted by the Second Convention of the party in the summer of 1903. Its political section was formulated as follows:

The Russian Social Democratic Labor party sets as its immediate political aim the overthrow of the Tsarist autocracy and its replacement by a democratic republic, whose constitution would guarantee:

1. The supreme power of the people, that is, the concentration of all superior governmental authority in the hands of a legislative assembly composed of representatives of the people and comprising one chamber.

2. Universal, equal, and direct rights of suffrage in elections both for the legislative assembly and for all agencies of local administration for all men and women citizens who have reached twenty years of age: secret voting in elections; the right of every voter to be a candidate for all representative bodies; two-year parliamentary term; salaries for representatives of the people.

3. Wide powers of local administration, with provincial autonomy for regions distinguished by special conditions and ways of life and elements of population.

4. Inviolability of the individual and of places of residence.

5. Unrestricted freedom of conscience, speech, press, assembly, strikes, and organization.

6. Freedom of travel and occupation.

7. Abolition of class distinctions and complete equality of rights for all citizens regardless of sex, religion, race, and nationality.

This section of the program differed little in essence from corresponding sections of other party and group programs in Russia in those years, both socialist and

liberal. In regard to the labor problem, the program presented a demand for the eight-hour working day and a series of other demands concerning factory legislation which likewise did not go beyond the limits of a middle-class democratic state system.

The section of the program dealing with the agrarian question was Lenin's immediate concern, since his scientific researches in this field made him appear unquestionably the party authority on the subject. In the course of these studies, Lenin had come to the conclusion that the process of capitalistic development and class division among the peasant masses in the villages was proceeding rapidly. In accordance with his opinion, the party program demanded the removal from the villages of all traces of the pre-capitalistic feudal order, and in this connection insisted on the rectification of boundaries between the peasant communes' and the estate owners' land, in favor of the peasants.

So the agrarian section in the program of the Social Democratic Labor party was actually quite moderate and restricted to "*bourgeois*" terms. Lenin, however, issued at the same time a quite different kind of declaration on the agrarian question. In the summer of 1903, he published a brochure *Appeal to the Poor Peasants*. In this he undertook to outline the future aims of the class struggle in the peasant masses according to the conclusions of his former economic essays. To three categories of peasants he now applied political terms which he had borrowed from statistical tabulation: the "poor," the "middle," and the "rich" peasants. He sketched the following plan for dealing with the peasant problem: first, the desires of all the peasants must be satisfied by the rectification of boundaries between

peasants' and estate owners' land. Lenin also hinted in this brochure at the possibility of a distribution among the peasants of all lands not already held by them. He indicated with some enticing figures how much land might be added to the peasant holdings. He taught:

The poor peasants must first of all strike a blow at the estate-owners and throw off from themselves this most evil and harmful bond of the overlords; in this affair many rich peasants and supporters of the middle class would also stand with the poor peasants. Then the poor peasants must carry on a struggle against the rich peasants, in union with the workers of the cities.

As for the "middle" peasants, Lenin expressed a hope that they would side with the "poor" peasants. So the whole destructive scheme of starting class war in the villages, which was actually applied by Lenin in 1918, was outlined by him fifteen years earlier. But his plan was put forward apart from the program of the party. This program was, as has been said, quite moderate both in its dealing with the agrarian question and in its other sections, and might have been adopted not only by socialistic but by other liberal and radical groups.

The Russian Social Democratic Labor party entered the revolutionary arena masked in Plekhanov's conciliatory character of readiness to compromise with the liberals. But, as had been proved in the actual test of strength within the party, this was only an outward disguise: behind Plekhanov hid Lenin.

II

Lenin and the Revolution of 1905

1.

AFTER lengthy preparations, the *Iskra* group succeeded in bringing together a convention of the Russian Social Democratic Labor party. According to official party precedence, it was called the Second Convention, the First being considered the one held in 1898 which actually did not have real significance from the point of view of party organization because the majority of its leaders were quickly arrested.*

The gathering of 1903 was really the first party convention. It opened in Brussels on July 30 and held fifteen sessions, the last on August 4. Since the Belgian police, upon information from Russian agents, began to follow up its members closely, fear of arrest and deportation caused the leaders to transfer the meeting place to London, where the Convention continued to hold sessions from August 11 to 23. Delegates representing nominally twenty-five Social Democratic organizations took part. The *Iskra* group naturally had to play the central rôle, being in fact united at that time with the Liberation of Labor group. In addition, there were a few representatives of various organizations adhering to the program of the so-called economic school—the groups of the Southern Workers, the Workers' Cause, and others. A third element was the Bund; representatives both of its Foreign Committee and of its Central Committee at-

* See earlier, chap. i, sec. 3.

tended. Further there were a few delegates from local Russian organizations, distributed among the three basic groups. In all, there were forty-three delegates with casting votes (controlling fifty-one votes), and fourteen delegates with advisory votes.

The chief conflicts in the Convention, according to the opinion of the leaders of the *Iskra* group, Plekhanov and Lenin, were bound to occur between them and the adherents of the economic school, on the one hand, and on the other, between them and the Bund. The *Iskra* group, which had prepared the way for the Convention, commanded a decisive majority of thirty-three casting votes out of fifty-one. This became clear at once in the choice of a chairman of the Congress. Plekhanov was elected to the chairmanship, with Lenin and Krasikov as vice-chairmen—all three members of the *Iskra* group. As a consequence, the advocates of the economic school even accused the *Iskra* group of having packed the assembly. The Convention accepted in general the draft for a party program which the editorial board of the *Iskra* had worked out, actually representing, as we have seen, a compromise between Plekhanov and Lenin. Thus the Convention was able to celebrate a victory over the Bund. This group had wished to affiliate itself with the party as an absolutely autonomous unit, on the basis of federation. The majority of the Congress, however, ruled against this plan and agreed to give the Bund autonomy only within the limits of the general party organization. Everything, therefore, would seem to have gone successfully for the leaders of the *Iskra* group. But there soon appeared a rift in their own ranks. Internal contradictions of principle, as has been shown, existed in the very heart of that group.

Two different tendencies were now evident in the *Iskra* faction—a majority controlling twenty-four votes, and a minority controlling nine votes. This marked the beginning of the split which has become widely known since that time, between the Bolsheviks (the majority) and the Mensheviks (the minority). Both Plekhanov and Lenin officially stood at the head of the *Iskra* majority at the Convention, but in truth its animating spirit was Lenin. At the time of the Convention, Plekhanov obviously took Lenin's course only because of a feeling that it would not be correct for him to violate the unity of the *Iskra* group. But the place of first violinist in the party concert passed to Lenin. Martov, formerly a sympathizer and colleague of Lenin, stood at the head of the *Iskra* minority, and he had the support of Trotsky.

The split of the *Iskra* group into two sections occurred on a question concerning not the party program but the problem of organization, during a discussion of the formula in section 1 of the party constitution determining the conditions of party membership. Lenin proposed the following formula: "Every person shall be considered a party member who recognizes its program and supports the party both by material means and by personal participation in one of the party organizations." Martov's formula read: "Every person shall be considered a member of the Russian Social Democratic Labor party who accepts its program, supports the party by material means, and accords it regular personal co-operation under the direction of one of its organizations."

For anyone not consecrated to the cause it is difficult to discern any substantial difference between the two formulas. But around this question boiling passions

seethed; concerning it long orations were declaimed; and in consequence of it the party divided in two. The internal significance of all the conflict amounted to this:

According to Lenin's variant of the formula, the only person who could be considered a party member was one who, belonging to a party organization, must through that fact be bound in his conduct by an iron party discipline and consequently be subordinate to the regulations of the party center; thus Lenin envisaged in the party a conspiratory organization formed wholly of illegal agents. According to Martov's variant, any person might be a member of the party who accorded it co-operation, although not entering directly into the party organization and only being affiliated with it, that is to say, actually retaining the possibility always of refusing to execute instructions of the party center or to adhere to party discipline; thus individuals, following a legal course of action, might belong to the party, and in case of opportunity it would not be difficult to transform the whole party into an open legal organization.

As he had already made it clear in his brochure *What Is To Be Done*, in 1901, Lenin wanted an organization of the kind which was later realized in the Bolshevik party, that is, an organization welded together by an iron discipline. For him the party was always first and foremost an implement for the professional revolutionaries, which at that time meant chiefly the intellectuals. Only a few individual workers drilled in the revolutionary spirit were to be admitted to the organization. Lenin conceived of the party as a group of plotters, capable of setting up a future dictatorship. To Martov and the other antagonists of Lenin, making up the minority of the *Iskra* group, the idea of a party was that of a free

union rallying those wider circles of intellectuals and workers who sympathized with its general aims. Thus, in the thought of Martov and those who agreed with him, the party ought to have approximately the same aspect as the great parties in states under a constitutional system of government. Into its composition might enter both semiliberals and, as Trotsky himself said, "every striking worker." Lenin also, as may be imagined, had designs concerning the "striking worker," but he did not wish to concede him any free will, desiring rather to keep a tight grip on him. To Lenin it was the same question that he had already debated in convention with the economist Martynov, who attacked his brochure *What Is To Be Done*. Martynov supported the view that the labor movement must arrive independently at the stage of socialistic consciousness through the workers' own experiences of life. Lenin considered that the socialistic idea must be insinuated into the minds of the workers from without, by a party.

The split of the *Iskra* group had lamentable results for Lenin and his supporters. He lost the majority of the Convention; section 1 of the party constitution was adopted according to Martov's formula since all the adherents of the economic school and the Bund supported Martov. Finding themselves in the minority, Lenin and his followers nevertheless continued to take part in convention activities and were able to win revenge in the elections to the directing bodies of the party.

Because the main activity of the party was concentrated at the moment in the newspaper *Iskra*, the editorial committee of the paper had to be the actual directorate of the whole party, while the so-called Central Committee had to function rather as a technical agency

for contact between the isolated party organizations. So the chief leaders were elected to the editorial committee, and not to the Central Committee. As members of the editorial committee, the Convention chose Plekhanov, Lenin, and Martov. Thus it was made up entirely from the *Iskra* group and accurately reflected the balance of the majority and minority among them. But since the minority contended that their views represented the desires of the majority of the whole Convention, as the balloting on section 1 of the constitution had shown, they did not agree to the composition of the new editorial committee and demanded its enlargement by the addition of three moderates, not counting Martov himself. Failing to secure reconsideration of the question, Martov announced his resignation from the editorial committee, and threatened a boycott against all the central institutions of the party in case the Convention should leave the editorial committee as at first organized.

So the Second Convention of the Russian Social Democratic Labor party ended in the most unexpected fashion. At the head of the party emerged the majority of the *Iskra* group, although it was in the minority among the party members—as the Convention had made clear. It was exactly for this reason that Martov's protests acquired quite unpleasant significance for the party managers.

During the first period after the Convention, the *Iskra* began to appear under the editorship of Plekhanov and Lenin, in view of Martov's resignation from the board. But as such an outcome clearly did not correspond to the mood of the party, the new editorial board quickly began negotiations with Martov. Lenin and Ple-

khanov declared that they were in agreement to coöpt Martov as a member of the editorial staff, and to recognize three of his sympathizers as close associates. Martov, however, insisted on the direct inclusion of himself and his three sympathizers in the editorial staff. In all probability, Plekhanov felt his moral alienation from the majority of the party unendurable, in view of the fact that his personal relations with Lenin had long been strained.

By the end of October, 1903, the split in the party was obvious. One of the influential Social Democratic organizations, the Foreign League of the Russian Revolutionary Social Democracy, at a convention in Geneva, emphatically adopted in its entirety the point of view of the *Iskra* minority, and refused to act on the confirmation of the party constitution in view of the election of the new Central Committee of Bolsheviks. Plekhanov could not bear the moral torment and declared to Lenin that compromises must be made to avoid an open break in the party. Lenin retorted at once, on November 1, 1903, with an announcement of his resignation from the editorial staff of the *Iskra*. Plekhanov signed his name alone as editor of issue No. 53 of the *Iskra*, and after that invited Martov and three "Martovists" to take part in the editorial direction of the paper.

Plekhanov then definitely went over to the side of the Mensheviks whose position corresponded more closely to his views. Control of the *Iskra* passed completely into the hands of the Mensheviks. But Lenin was not ready to capitulate. Although he left the editorial board, that is to say, the body in control of the central organ, he tried to gain strength in the other chief party committees to which he himself had previously assigned ob-

scure rôles. He had no difficulty in getting himself co-opted as a member of the Central Committee, which was inclined to favor the Bolsheviki. Almost at once he took advantage of this to bring up the question of summoning a third convention of the party.

For nearly a year from this time, practically all of Lenin's attention was taken up by the conflict with the Mensheviki. In his own words, it was a fight to a finish. In this struggle within the party, Lenin displayed amazing energy—appearing constantly in various party circles, maintaining contact with the Russian party organizations, composing article after article against his antagonists. A whole volume of his writings is made up of his polemics and letters on the subject of the party split.

Inevitably the impression is formed that Lenin almost let slip—because of factional disputes—the opportunity dawning for the Russian revolutionary movement. His immediate goal, however, he attained: he finally secured a party organization completely subordinated to his will. He achieved this at the price of division in the party and of evident lessening of its influence on the course of imminent events.

2.

THE growth of revolutionary sentiment in Russia, as has been seen, began to make itself apparent in the beginning of the twentieth century in connection with the industrial crisis and the reactionary policy of the Ministry of the Interior.

Witte, the Minister of Finance, was allowed on August 29, 1903, to resign. At the same time he was appointed chairman of the ministerial committee, but the post was then an honorary sinecure without any actual

authority or influence on affairs, since no cabinet of ministers existed in Russia before 1905. The strongest influence over the mind of Tsar Nicholas II was then exercised by the Minister of the Interior, Plehve, whose policy had as its first aim the suppression of the incipient movement of the zemstvos and liberalism. He regarded the liberal union formed in the summer of 1903 under the name of *Osvobozhdenie* ("Liberation"), as unquestionably the organization most dangerous to the imperial régime. In January, 1904, he began an investigation of the activities of the Tver Zemstvo, inspired probably in the main by the fact that Struve had lived there before the publication of the newspaper *Osvobozhdenie*. The outcome of the investigation was the disbanding of the former Tver Zemstvo board, which had been legally elected, and the appointment of new members as an acting board. As for revolutionary organizations, Plehve attributed greater importance to the Social Revolutionaries than to the Social Democrats. The agents of the Police Department confined themselves to keeping an intensive watch on the Social Democrats, and had excellent information of the course of events in the sessions of the Second Convention of the party, at least while they were held in Brussels. In regard to the Social Revolutionaries, the department did not content itself with surveillance, but resorted to the system of provocation. An agent of the Police Department, Azef, not only entered the fighting organization of Social Revolutionaries but soon made himself its leader.* From that time revolutionary and police activities in the fighting organization were so confused with each other that they

* Concerning the system of provocation and its significance from the point of view of the Police Department, see Introduction, sec. 6.

can hardly be separated. Pushing the system of provocation further, Azef arranged for attacks on the lives of the Grand Duke Sergius Alexandrovich and Plehve himself.

The tactics of the Police Department in relation to the working class, known under the term *Zubatovshchina*, which have already been described, acquired great significance as well. Plehve approved the program of Zubatov in Moscow and planned to extend it throughout Russia.

So long as Witte was in power, Plehve had to encounter his opposition to the Zubatov scheme and even had to dismiss Zubatov himself from the police service. But Zubatov's movement did not stop with his removal from power. As the leader of a working-class movement shielded by the Police Department in St. Petersburg there appeared a priest, George Gapon. Under his direction there was opened on April 24, 1904, a so-called Association of Russian Factory and Mill Workers of the City of St. Petersburg.

The growth of a revolutionary and antagonistic mood in the country was intensified after the outbreak on February 9, 1904, of the Russian-Japanese War. This appeared to have arisen from the incautious imperialistic policy of Nicholas II in the Far East. After the resignation of Witte the possibility of war was evident.

Witte had been the real instigator of Russian imperialism in the Far East; but at the same time, like a clever and careful statesman, he would probably have been able to limit his policy to economic penetration by Russia in the East, chiefly with the aid of French capital. His retirement in 1903 was caused by the desire of Nicholas II to proceed independently of him. The ag-

gressive activities of agents and concession seekers of Nicholas II led directly to the attack of Japan upon Russia.

War on this distant frontier was incomprehensible to the great majority of the Russian people; the soldiers went without enthusiasm. When the war developed unfavorably for Russia, mainly in consequence of the lack of ability and preparation on the part of the Government, it served to foster a quick growth of discontent and revolutionary sentiment among Russians. Plehve, the Minister of the Interior and the central pillar of governmental reaction, was assassinated on July 28, 1904. After this event, the attitude of the Government became less positive. It began gradually to yield to the pressure of public opinion, particularly as it became clearer that the war was going less and less successfully. The Russian army suffered a defeat on September 2, 1904, near Lao-yang; and on September 8, Prince Sviatopolk-Mirsky, a man of rather liberal political opinions, was appointed Minister of the Interior. The reactionary *régime* was modified. In the autumn of 1904 the Liberals organized an elaborate campaign. The Congress of Zemstvos which assembled in St. Petersburg, from November 19 to 21, 1904, presented a demand for a constitution.

In the course of all these months which were preparing the way for revolution, Lenin's attention was concentrated chiefly, as has been said, on internal party affairs. For him the heaviest penalty of the party split of 1903 was loss of control of the party organ, the *Iskra*. It continued to appear, but it was the *Novaya Iskra* ("New Spark"), as Lenin and the Bolsheviks had begun to call it, which refused to take a position of flint-like irreconcilability and was ready to consider a politi-

cal agreement with the Liberals—that very middle class than which there was in the world nothing more horrible to Lenin. He perceived that without an organ of the press he could have no influence within the party. His basic task was therefore the establishment of a new organ entirely under his own direction.

First of all, there arose the inevitable difficulty concerning finances. The funds for publication of the *Iskra*, as has been explained, were secured at the beginning through A. M. Kalmykova from Russian groups who were following legal lines of action. She afterward continued to supply money regularly to the *Iskra*; this fund, in the slang of the *Iskra* group, was termed the "bucket." In addition the *Iskra* received some money from an unknown source, the secret of which the Russian Social Democrats have not yet revealed. This was the so-called "California gold mine." In a letter to Kalmykova written after the party Congress, Lenin declared his certainty that the "California gold mine" had ceased to produce in consequence of the division of the party. From this the conclusion may be drawn that the individual or organization managing the "California gold mine" considered that the split had weakened the Social Democratic party and that there was no use in advancing money to it with the hope of realizing "Californian" aims, that is to say, obviously, "conflict with Tsarism." As for the "bucket," Kalmykova proposed to divide its resources between Lenin and Martov, but Lenin refused to take a share. So, as a result of the split, Lenin found himself temporarily without funds. On top of everything else, he lost his posts in the Central Committee. The mood of the majority of the party was too hostile to Lenin.

Plekhanov published in May, 1904, an attack on the Central Committee accusing it of "Bonapartism." Under the influence of party opinion, the Central Committee began to put forward the idea of reconciliation between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks. Among the members of the Committee who favored reconciliation was L. B. Krassin. His position had special practical significance since he controlled certain financial resources. The writer, Maxim Gorky, introduced Krassin, in the winter of 1903-4, to a manufacturer, Savva Morozov, who had inclinations against the Government. Morozov promised to give the Social Democratic party two thousand rubles (\$1,000) a month.¹ From the spring of 1904 on, Krassin worked in the Morozov factory in the capacity of an engineer.

The Central Committee took formal action limiting Lenin's authority to the maintenance of the contacts with party agencies, with the purpose of supplying revolutionary literature to Russia, that is to say, to a function purely of transmission. To the staff of the Central Committee there were added in December, 1904, three Mensheviks. This led to a break between Lenin and the Committee. He began to organize the forces of a Bolshevik group without any connection with earlier party institutions. Settling near Geneva, he began to rally around him the Bolshevik adherents. A conference took place in Geneva in August, 1904, attended by twenty-two Bolsheviks who addressed an appeal to the party. Soon after that, Lenin began to make ready to publish a Bolshevik paper, the first number of which appeared on January 4, 1905, under the heading *Vpered* ("Forward").

At that instant revolution was already pounding at

the gates of Russia. It was in January, 1905, that a broad mass movement of labor began in St. Petersburg. Its center was the Association of Russian Factory and Mill Workers of the City of St. Petersburg, headed by the priest, George Gapon.

Gapon was the son of a peasant of Poltava province. He had been graduated from the Poltava Theological Seminary in 1893 and had become a priest in Poltava. In 1898 he entered the St. Petersburg Theological Academy, finishing its course in 1903. While he was still a student at the Academy, Gapon distinguished himself by his benevolent activities among the needy workers of the city of St. Petersburg. This won him an acquaintanceship among the philanthropists of the capital, and particularly among the patronesses of charity. Thanks to these acquaintances, Gapon began to be known in administrative and police circles in St. Petersburg. Then he met Zubatov. Gapon was a responsive person, with an enthusiastic temperament, attractive in appearance, and a good talker. All these qualities aided him to gain quick popularity among the workers. He was able to gather around him a sympathetic group who were carried away with the idea of the new labor organization activities.

Gapon's organization unquestionably had great influence among St. Petersburg workers in 1904. In contrast to it, the Social Democratic organizations were meeting little success. This was due in part to the internal conflict among the Social Democrats. Even in February, 1905, when the mood of the workers swung in favor of the Social Democrats after the events of January 22, both the Bolshevik and Menshevik organizations in St. Petersburg could muster altogether a few hundred

members, in any case not more than one thousand. The Ministry of the Interior and the police were still encouraging the labor movement in 1904; but it is clear that from the very beginning there was a menace of possible conflict, since the workers' organizations might submit to the direction of the Police Department only so long as it did not cramp their activity. In December, 1904, the management of the Putilov works in St. Petersburg discharged several laborers who were members of Gapon's association. The incident at once raised the general problem of the unemployed, whose numbers were increasing with the development of an industrial crisis. On January 20 the workers of practically all factories and mills in St. Petersburg declared a strike.

In this situation arose the idea of submitting to the Tsar a petition concerning the hard lot of the workers. The date for its presentation was set for Sunday, January 22. A mass procession of workers to the Winter Palace was planned, to deliver the petition to the Tsar in person. Of course the police authorities and the Tsar himself had word of this. The Tsar had to decide what policy was to be adopted. His father, the Emperor Alexander III, when he was yet the heir to the throne, decided in a similar case, in 1878, to receive a deputation of workers. Nicholas II could now either follow his father's example or take measures in advance to prevent the procession. Neither was done. The Tsar himself left before the indicated day for Tsarskoe Selo. The workers tramped to an empty palace. The authorities had no definite plan. The Minister of the Interior, Sviatopolk-Mirsky, did not sympathize with the policy of his predecessor, Plehve, and was not well informed about the Zubatov movement. The result was that a frightful ca-

tastrophe occurred. The authorities permitted the workers to reach the center of the city, and then took unexpected action. The workers were marching unarmed, bearing sacred ikons and portraits of the Tsar, and chanting prayers. Then, at the order of the military authorities, troops fired on them. Several hundred were either killed or wounded.

By this mad act the government of Nicholas II shattered at one blow the faith of the workers in the rule of the Tsar.

3.

THE news of the events of January 22 gave a stunning shock to Lenin, as they did to the majority of the Russian revolutionaries in exile. They saw in the tragedy, and justly, the beginning of revolution in Russia. At the same time, it is necessary to note, the news came to them as an absolute surprise.

"Bloody Sunday" had not been prepared for in advance by the Russian revolutionary organizations. Lenin and the other leaders were watching the development of events, but they had not produced them nor taken any active part in them. After receipt of information of the occurrences of January 22, Lenin considered the moment a favorable one to take a hand in affairs. Without the slightest hesitation, he sounded the slogan of armed uprising. Desiring to master the technique of the new task, he rushed to study in the Geneva Library the memoirs and notes of General Cluseret on the tactics of barricade warfare and the methods of revolt, and also to read the articles by Marx and Engels on preparation for an armed uprising. The very choice of sources of information for guidance shows how theoretical and re-

mote from actual life at that moment were the revolutionary ideas of Lenin. It was a novice's approach to the business in hand. Lenin was preaching an armed conflict against military and police forces possessing the equipment of the twentieth century, and at the same time was seeking wisdom from Cluseret whose military experience related to the year 1848, when he took part in the suppression of the workers' uprising in Paris, and to the Civil War in the United States in 1861-65. Even in 1870, when he was Minister of War under the Paris Commune, Cluseret showed that he was not fully able to cope with the situation. This example makes apparent the gulf between the Lenin of 1905 and the Lenin of 1918. In 1905 he thought he could direct an uprising on the basis of Cluseret's knowledge. In 1918 he summoned, as specialists, officers of the General Staff of the imperial Russian army who, from the technical point of view, saved his cause.

All this while events in Russia were taking their destined course. On the second day after "Bloody Sunday," the Gapon Association of Factory and Mill Workers in St. Petersburg was closed. Sviatopolk-Mirsky was allowed to resign. In his place was appointed a colorless individual named Bulygin, but actual authority passed into the hands of the new head of the St. Petersburg police, Trepov, who had served earlier in Moscow and had there been a protector of Zubatov. Trepov arranged for a reception by the Tsar of a deputation from the workers, doubtless artfully chosen by himself. The Tsar declared to the workers that he "pardoned" them for their revolutionary intentions and requested them to believe firmly in his readiness to aid the workers. A special government committee was established to deal with the im-

provement of their lot. None of these measures could have any serious significance. Labor sentiment changed radically. Social Democratic organizations in St. Petersburg and Moscow began to grow swiftly.

Meantime Gapon escaped across the frontier, after signing a proclamation to the workers stating that they no longer had a Tsar. Abroad he addressed an open letter to the Socialist parties of Russia, appealing to them to come to an agreement among themselves and to take up the cause of an armed revolt against Tsarism. He tried to get into personal contact with the most prominent revolutionaries, among them Lenin. Lenin showed no confidence in Gapon, but tried to make use of him for the purposes of the revolution.

Gapon succeeded in making arrangements for a conference in Geneva, on April 2, 1905, of representatives of eighteen Socialist parties of various nationalities in Russia. From the very first, it was clear, however, that he could not be a political leader. He was indeed pushed forward by the accident of events to a leading place. But he lacked a sufficiently strong will, and also terms of thinking in common with the Russian intellectuals in exile. Gapon was a democrat, by his very origin, but he was not and could not become a socialist by conviction. The rôle that he played abroad was actually pathetic. To find his way among the confused relationships between the Russian revolutionary circles, with their different programs, was quite beyond his own independent powers, and so he acted at the instigation of others. He became disillusioned soon by the revolutionaries, and with his characteristic instability he shifted back to the side of the police, with whom he carried on secret rela-

tions. When the Socialists finally were convinced of this, one of them killed Gapon in April, 1906.

Although Lenin talked of the desirability of an agreement to organize a revolt in Russia, he nevertheless continued to carry on a struggle with the Mensheviks within the party. German Social Democrats now began to interfere in the relations between the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, in the endeavor to reconcile the Russian factions to each other in view of the revolutionary fire springing up in Russia. The leader of the German Social Democrats, Bebel, addressed himself to them with an offer to mediate and arrange an impartial tribunal. Both the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks assented, but no reconciliation followed. Lenin was ready for it, but only on condition that the Mensheviks would recognize the direction of the party by the Bolsheviks. For this purpose, he needed as an essential a party convention disposed to favor the Bolsheviks. From the autumn of 1903 to the spring of 1905 his diplomatic labors were directed to the end of fostering the required sentiment in the party. Various committees and organizations now wavered between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks, now united themselves to one or the other group. Individual organizations first favored and then opposed a convention, their attitude depending on the chances of a balance of power. At the last moment, it became clear that the balance would be likely to swing down on the side of the Bolsheviks, especially since the Central Committee, which was inclined toward the Mensheviks, was arrested by the police in Moscow on February 22, 1905, in the apartment of the writer Leonid Andreiev. At last only Bolsheviks attended the convention in London. The

Mensheviks at the same time held a conference of their own in Geneva.

Despite the absence of Menshevik delegates, the Bolsheviks who had gathered in London declared themselves the Third Convention of the Russian Social Democratic Labor party. In truth, this was the first convention of the Bolshevik party, held from April 25 to May 10, 1905. Lenin was, of course, its leader, and all its work proceeded under his immediate direction. The basic resolution adopted by the Convention stated the necessity of an armed revolt and proclaimed to the working proletariat the duty to carry it out. As the first task after the overthrow of the Government there was indicated the summoning of a constituent assembly on the basis of universal, equal, and direct suffrage by secret ballot. A special resolution distinguished the working class from the liberals. The Convention "insistently recommended to comrades . . . to explain to the workers the anti-revolutionary and anti-proletarian character of the middle-class democratic type of movement." In view of the probability that the future Provisional Government would not be socialistic, the Convention ordered

that propaganda be carried on as widely as possible in proletarian circles in favor of the idea of the necessity to exert constant pressure on the Provisional Government from the side of the armed proletariat directed by the Social Democratic party, with the purpose of protecting, strengthening, and extending the conquests of the revolution.

Although the chief rôle in the revolution was assigned to the proletariat, in accordance with the fundamental tenets of Marxism, the Bolshevik party nevertheless

took a decisive step now toward an understanding with the peasantry. The order of the Convention read:

Taking into account the fact that the growing peasant movement, although elementary and politically unaware, is nevertheless turned inevitably against the existing order . . . the Third Convention of the Russian Social Democratic Labor party authorizes all party organizations: to carry on propaganda among the broad masses of the people showing that the Social Democratic movement sets as one of its tasks the most energetic support of all revolutionary measures on the part of the peasantry, which are calculated to improve their lot, including confiscation of lands held by estate-owners, by the Government, by churches and monasteries, and in appanages. . . .

This order of the Convention had great political significance for the future, since it laid down the lines of party tactics in 1917. Although, in its resolutions, the peasantry was distinguished from the proletariat and assigned a secondary rôle, actually the ground was already prepared for the idea of a workers' and peasants' government. The slogan of a revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry had been announced by Lenin a month before in the newspaper *Vpered*. In the form in which the agrarian program was proclaimed by the Third Convention, it approximated very closely the program of the Social Revolutionary party, but the two did not exactly coincide since the resolution of the Third Convention spoke not of nationalization of the soil but of confiscation of lands not held by peasants, for their aid. Another difference from the program of the *narodniki* was due to the fact that Lenin, although he recognized the necessity to support the peasant movement as a whole, already held over the heads of the peasantry the threat of the sword

of civil war among them—which he let fall later in 1918, in order to divide the peasants against themselves, through the organization of the poor peasants to whom he had addressed an earlier appeal in 1903. The resolution of the Third Convention read that

the Social Democratic Labor party, as a party of the proletariat, must on every occasion and in any circumstances strive consistently for the independent organization of the village proletariat and explain to this group the irreconcilable antagonism of its interests to the interests of the peasant middle class.

As to the internal organization of the party, the Third Convention adopted the famous section 1, according to Lenin's formula, which had been rejected by the Second Convention.

Lenin could celebrate his triumph in the small world of the party, but this did not yet signify triumph in the course of the revolution itself.

The revolutionary process in Russia meanwhile continued to develop in an elemental fashion, and in the movement of 1905 there was actually no such division between strictly separated class and party movement as Lenin was striving to achieve. The military defeats—the routing of the Russian army before Mukden in March and of the fleet at Tsu-Shima in May, 1905—served as the chief starting points of agitation against the imperial Government. Mutinies began among the troops and in the fleet, of which the most important occurred on the armored cruiser *Potemkin* in the Black Sea from June 30 to July 8, 1905. In various places disorders among the peasants and strikes among the workers broke out.

At the same time all sorts of unions began to form independently among persons in the so-called liberal pro-

fessions—lawyers, doctors, engineers, professors, and others. These unions finally united in one general "union of unions." In the assemblies of the zemstvos and even of the nobility, there began to be adopted more and more insistent demands for reforms. Nicholas II was forced to receive on June 19, 1905, a deputation of representatives of zemstvo and municipal organizations, and to listen to an open declaration of the necessity of summoning an assembly of delegates of the people.

During all this time Lenin was trying to guide events from Geneva; but, as was to be expected, he exerted in actuality no directive influence at all. In the first place, events were moving too rapidly for him to keep up with them from abroad. Lenin could only write greatly delayed articles, under the further disadvantage of having to base them on fragmentary and often quite inaccurate telegraphic dispatches from Russia in the German newspapers. The irreconcilable tone that he adopted toward middle-class democracy was little in keeping with the general mood of the time. Lenin tried to represent the Tsar's reception of the zemstvo deputation on June 19, 1905, as treason of the middle class toward the people, when in fact this was exactly the psychological point when the will of the Tsar began to give way to the pressure of public opinion. On August 19 the Tsar signed a manifesto for the summoning of an assembly of the people, the Imperial Duma, with advisory powers. This was the so-called Bulygin Duma named after the Minister of the Interior, who drafted its program.

The manifesto of August 19, 1905, which a year before would probably have sufficed, now did not satisfy anyone. General discontent increased. Despite the fact that Witte was able to conclude peace with Japan in

Portsmouth, New Hampshire, on September 5, 1905, the imperial autocracy was in obvious peril. The army was far away in Siberia, and, furthermore, was unreliable in its allegiance to the Tsar. All during September meetings of complaint and protest were held throughout the country. They gathered in university buildings, to which the police did not have access after the publication of the decree of September 9, 1905, granting university autonomy. Finally, in the middle of October, there began in Moscow a general strike, which was followed by a railway strike throughout the whole country. All the railway systems stopped running on October 25, except those in Finland. Elections of a committee to direct the labor movement began on October 26 in the factories and workshops of St. Petersburg, and it was called the Soviet of Workers' Deputies. A lawyer named Nosar, known as Khrustalev, was chosen as chairman of the Soviet. His assistant, who in fact began at once to play the leading rôle, was Trotsky, who, as has been seen, was numbered among the Mensheviks at the Second Convention of the party. After that time he quickly alienated himself from the Mensheviks, but did not adhere to the Bolsheviks and occupied an intermediary position, apparently wishing to play an independent part. Upon receiving word abroad of the events of January 22, while Lenin was sagely cramming himself in the Geneva Library with information from antiquated treatises on barricade warfare, Trotsky illegally entered Russia.

Impressed by the general strike, the Tsar capitulated. On October 30/17, 1905, a manifesto was published on the initiative of Count Witte, transforming the advisory Bulygin Duma into a people's legislative assembly. The

Government promised to confirm the rights of citizens—inviolability of the person, and freedom of assembly and organization. A coalition Cabinet of Ministers was established on the model of constitutional governments in other countries. Witte himself was named as Premier.

4.

THE manifesto of October 30, 1905, marked the greatest concession that the Tsar could make at that moment. It amounted unquestionably to the proclamation of a constitution; and on the further tactics of the leaders of the popular movement depended the form that the constitution might take in practice. Public excitement rose to its peak just before the publication of the manifesto. Afterward feelings grew calmer for the natural reason that the basic demand of the revolution was satisfied: autocracy no longer existed.

The day after the appearance of the manifesto, political strife in Moscow ended. The St. Petersburg Soviet of Workers' Deputies adopted a resolution on November 1 terminating the strike.

Amnesty for political offenders was declared on November 3 by the Government. The publication of the manifesto contented important groups in the population, not only the liberal politicians but also great numbers of officeholders, employees in public services, and workers. At the same time it aroused serious opposition from supporters of the autocracy, at whose head stood swiftly formed organizations of extreme conservatives called the "Black Hundreds," such as the Union of the Russian People. Counterdemonstrations began, and massacres of the Jews. It would be a mistake to think

that the movement of the Black Hundreds was based entirely on the system of provocation with secret police support; it comprised also elements representing the hatred of the ignorant masses of the people toward the liberal middle class and the intellectuals. From this point of view there was considerable likeness between the ways of thinking and feeling among the Black Hundreds and the Bolshevik masses. The difference was that at the head of the Bolsheviks stood organizers and leaders of high caliber, while the Black Hundreds were directed largely either by persons who were quite insignificant in the political sense, or simply self-seeking, incapable of giving the movement any organized character. Nevertheless, the revolutionaries now had to take into account the fact that any further "deepening of the revolution" meant that they must meet opposition, not only from the Government but also from the so-called People's Organizations of the Black Hundreds, and further, that an important part of the liberal and revolutionary groups themselves were not prepared to go farther.

In this set of circumstances, Trotsky's position was significant, since he occupied at the moment the heights commanding the revolutionary struggle. And Trotsky proved himself completely to be a brilliant orator, able to sweep the masses off their feet and carry them with him. But neither then nor later did Trotsky know exactly where to lead them. In 1917 Trotsky followed Lenin. In 1905 his spiritual guide was Parvus, whose real name was Helphand, a Russian Jewish emigrant who was active at the beginning of the twentieth century in the German Social Democratic movement, adhering to its left wing. Parvus felt the exhilaration of the Rus-

sian Revolution of 1905 and illegally returned to Russia together with Trotsky. Parvus advanced the idea of "permanent revolution," which Trotsky seized upon and developed.

Trotsky's conception was as follows: Two types of revolution are taking place in the world—the middle-class and the socialist. They do not coincide with each other, but are related to each other. Entering upon a period of revolution by the path of a middle-class political change, Russia cannot emerge from the revolutionary process until the socialist revolution has been carried to its end throughout the world.

The idea of permanent revolution played an important rôle in the further development of the tactics of the revolutionary party. On November 11, 1905, the St. Petersburg Soviet of Workers' Deputies adopted a resolution favoring the introduction of the eight-hour working day in factories and mills by arbitrary action. On November 14 the Soviet determined upon a new general strike in St. Petersburg and on November 15 it issued a call to the labor organizations of all Russia to join in the strike. But the St. Petersburg Soviet was forced to issue an order on November 18 terminating the general strike, and in the course of another week it had to renounce the idea of arbitrarily introducing the eight-hour day without regard to the factory owners. So the first endeavor to deepen the revolution ended in failure.

At this juncture Lenin appeared in St. Petersburg. Immediately upon receiving word in Geneva of the manifesto of October 30, he had left for Stockholm to secure the documents indispensable to him for a return to Russia. He arrived in St. Petersburg on November 20 or 21 and at once plunged over his head into party and

revolutionary activities. At the time of his arrival the Bolsheviks had already arranged to publish, on funds from Savva Morozov, as well as another Moscow industrialist, Nicholas Schmit, a large-size newspaper in St. Petersburg, following legal lines, to be called *Novaya Zhizn* ("New Life").² Lenin thus commanded a tribune from which he could directly address the people. He took advantage of the chance for legal action which was opened before him, but at the same time he insisted on preservation of the illegal party apparatus to which he assigned appropriate tasks: the preparation for another general strike and uprising. He took this decision in the face of the failure in November of the second general strike.

It was clear that Lenin was counting now upon the aid of new circumstances, particularly the quickening of party activities due to his arrival in St. Petersburg. He saw an opportunity especially to give a practical test to the party apparatus he had created. And he did not want to miss it. He was actually able to breathe fresh strength into the party organization, and not only among the Bolsheviks; a considerable number of the Mensheviks also stood ready to follow Lenin. But he unquestionably overestimated the powers of the party organizations.

Hardly more than twenty thousand members were comprised in the Social Democratic organizations throughout all Russia at the end of 1905, including both Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. The Bolsheviks were in the majority in the north and northeast and in the center of Russia, the Mensheviks in the south, the southwest, and the Caucasus. In St. Petersburg there were enlisted in both organizations not more than three thousand work-

ers. In Moscow there were about the same number. Only an inconsiderable share of the party budget was made up of members' contributions, coming particularly from workers. An exceptional case was presented by the Bolshevik organization of Ivanovo-Voznesensk, an industrial city in central Russia, where the participation of worker members made up more than half of the local party organization budget. As a general rule, the party maintained its existence at the expense of contributions from middle-class well-wishers like Savva Morozov.

So, in terms of material support, the relation of the party to the workers was not yet secure. Nevertheless, Lenin determined to plunge the party into combat.

Filled with confidence by the failure of the November strike, the Government in December resumed the attack. The initiative was taken this time not so much by Witte himself, as by the Minister of Interior in his Cabinet, Durnovo. On December 9 the chairman of the St. Petersburg Soviet of Workers' Deputies, Nosar, was arrested. A week later, on December 16, the whole staff of the Soviet was arrested, including Trotsky. Lenin then took action according to his first plan. On December 17 he had already summoned a conference, under his direction, of both factions of a newly assembled Soviet of Workers' Deputies made up of substitute members. This gathering resolved to declare a new general strike. Moscow now became the center of events. A general strike was announced there on December 20, when huge meetings took place, and the next day there began an armed uprising led by party bands of fighters; in many streets barricades were thrown up. In the arrangement of this uprising there was probably involved, in addition to the action of the Bolsheviks, some police provocation.

A part of the supply of weapons with which the Moscow workers were armed apparently came from secret police agents. Very few troops were quartered in Moscow, although the Government had information of the plan for an uprising. The man who was the Minister of Interior, Durnovo, who in other cases showed energy and foresight, was unwilling—despite the insistence of Witte—to take any steps.³ Street fighting in Moscow went on for a whole week before reinforcements of troops and artillery were sent from St. Petersburg. Then the uprising was at once put down. One of the workers' living sections in Moscow suffered artillery bombardment.

During this time Lenin himself was not in Moscow. He took part in a Bolshevik conference on December 24 in Tammerfors, Finland. There was discussed a program for further armed conflict with the Government and for unity of action between the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. The conference ended on December 30, when the fight in Moscow had already been lost.

5.

THE armed uprising in Moscow was of fatal significance for the outcome of the Revolution of 1905. Its ruin was really not difficult to foresee, for the revolutionaries did not command the technical resources that would have justified them in hoping for success in a conflict with the army. The suppression of the revolt strengthened the extreme reactionary forces in the Government and at the Court. The Government was now able to feel sure that in the last emergency it could rely on stark physical violence in the struggle against revolution. The influence of public opinion also suffered a shock. The Moscow up-

rising, doomed in advance to failure, knocked the foundation out from under any system of popular representation.

In order to feel entirely safe, the Government considered it essential to obtain financial security before the assembly of the Duma. By means of issuing new international obligations in favor of France, a loan was procured there on April 16, 1906, for the huge sum of two billion francs. So the knot was tied which predetermined the participation of Russia in the World War. But in the sphere of internal politics, by contrast, the French loan unbound the hands of the Government in its dealings with the Imperial Duma.

The rout of the Moscow revolt was of course reflected first of all directly in the fate of the Social Democratic movement. The Social Democrats were compelled anew to seek refuge "underground." The most prominent leaders shifted to a semilegal position. Some of them, including Lenin, went to Finland, which enjoyed the privilege of a special constitution although it formed at the time part of the Russian Empire, and had a police force independent of the Police Department in St. Petersburg. The publication of legal Social Democratic papers was halted. Social Democratic agitation by means of printed material once more took the course of issuing illegal pamphlets and proclamations, and semilegal brochures. Failure also created moral disorder in the ranks of party adherents among the workers. The fighting bands which had escaped alive from the conflict changed into anarchistic plunder gangs.

Throughout the whole country swept a wave of so-called "partisan demonstrations" and "expropriations," such as the robbing of post offices and banks, and occa-

sionally of private individuals, the "expropriated" money falling in the majority of instances not into the party treasury but simply into the pockets of the expropriators.

Their general failure forced the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks to talk a little more pleasantly to each other. Bolshevik and Menshevik organizations began one after another to unite, both in the capital and in the smaller localities. A combined provisory central committee was formed, with the immediate task of preparing for the assembly of a convention to unify the party.

The first problem of practical politics to be solved concerned the elections to the Imperial Duma. In the flare-up of the Moscow rebellion, a decree was published on December 24, 1905, ordering the Senate to alter and supplement the electoral law of August 19, 1905, establishing an Imperial Duma, the so-called Bulygin Duma, approximately in accordance with the manifesto of October 30. The circle of voters was considerably widened. The right of suffrage was granted to all town residents paying a dwelling tax and also to all workers in enterprises having not less than fifty employees. Suffrage was made actually universal, but for the peasants and workers it was not direct, being realized instead through electors.

In February a date was set for the summoning of an Imperial Duma, on May 10, 1906. At the beginning of March there was published a proposal for the organization of the Imperial Duma and of an Imperial Council, which was confirmed later in advance of the assembly of the Duma itself by the basic law of May 6. Undoubtedly the new proposal had as its aim not the development but the restriction of the growth of the political power

lodged in the Duma. The new rôle of the Imperial Council proved to be particularly harmful. Of course the decline of the Revolution, evident in the failure of the December uprising, allowed the Government to begin an attack on the rights of the people's representative even before the assembly was summoned.

Temporary regulations governing assemblies, societies, and unions, were published on March 17, opening the way for the beginning of an election campaign. Two groups undertook intensive preparations for the campaign—the moderate conservative forming the party of the Union of October 17, named after the date of the manifesto of October 30, 1905, according to the Julian Calendar, commonly called the Octobrists, and the moderate liberals forming the Popular Liberty or Constitutional Democratic party, commonly called the Kadets. It soon became clear that neither the extreme reactionaries nor the extreme radicals would take any active part in the elections. The reactionaries of the Union of the Russian People, known as the Unionists, boycotted the Duma, since they did not recognize any limitation of the autocratic power. The radicals also declared for a boycott on the ground that the Duma was, from their point of view, an insufficient concession on the part of the autocracy. Both the Social Revolutionaries and the Social Democrats favored this policy. The only difference between them was the degree of boycott that they advocated. The Bolsheviks practically everywhere supported the idea of an absolute boycott of the elections. The Mensheviks considered it advantageous to take part in the choice of electors with a view to propaganda, but nevertheless essential to refrain from the election of deputies.

Lenin, of course, was one of the most energetic advocates of the point of view of a complete boycott. He based his attitude on the opinion that the revolutionary movement was still in a rising rather than in a declining phase. Lenin hoped that a new outbreak, either in the form of a general strike or of an uprising, would sweep away the Duma and lead to realization of the full program of the Bolsheviks. Fifteen years later, in 1920, Lenin himself admitted that his tactics in boycotting the first Duma were a mistake, "although," he added, "not a great one." This last comment may be accepted only in the sense that the mistake was less fatal than the preceding one which led to the December uprising—but what was done in December Lenin never recognized as an error.

Nevertheless, the mistake was made and its outcome was that the Duma began to seem incompetent to the Government because the moderate liberals and the extreme radicals were obviously divided in their views concerning it. The Duma, formerly regarded as a conquest won by a general revolutionary movement of both liberals and radicals, was now cast loose by the revolutionaries themselves and left at the mercy of fate in single combat with the Tsarist Government. Another immediate consequence of the boycott was the fact that among the deputies to the Duma was only a small number of extreme radicals. The chief political struggle in the election was between the Octobrists and the Kadets; the victors in the majority of cases were Kadets. From the villages were elected many nonpartisan peasants, little interested in political questions and concerned only with one thing—the land.

The balloting for the Duma had not yet been com-

pleted but the outcome was already evident, when the Social Democrats were finally able to assemble in Stockholm for their convention of "unification." The Mensheviks proved to have a majority, with a margin of twelve to fifteen votes on all questions. To the Central Committee there were elected seven Mensheviks and three Bolsheviks.

The main issue at the convention was, of course, the attitude to be adopted toward the Imperial Duma. The resolution on this question read that it was essential "to take advantage in a systematic fashion of all conflicts arising both between the Government and the Duma and within the Duma itself, in the interest of broadening and deepening the revolutionary movement." As the tasks facing the party, these were recognized:

(1) to make plain to the masses the inadequateness of all the middle-class *bourgeoisie* parties assuming to express the will of the people in the Duma;

(2) to lead the broad masses of the proletariat, the peasantry, and the common people of the towns, toward a consciousness of the absolute unsuitability of the Duma as a representative institution and the necessity to summon a Constituent Assembly representing all the people on the basis of universal, equal, direct, and secret suffrage.

Since both the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks hoped that the revolution would make its way "over the head of the Duma," for both of them the agrarian program—that is to say, the pledges held out to the peasants—was a matter of prime importance. Lenin proposed a resolution of the same character as had been adopted by the Third (Bolshevik) Convention of the party in the spring of 1905, embodying a demand for confiscation of all lands held by churches and monasteries, all appa-

nages of the imperial family, and all government and estate lands, for the benefit of the peasantry; and the ideal of the party was now further declared to be the nationalization of land. The Menshevik majority at the Convention adopted, however, another resolution on the agrarian question, demanding "municipalization" of land—that is to say, transfer of confiscated estates and other lands to the control of agencies of local self-government. This Menshevik resolution was an obvious compromise between the program of nationalization of the land, advanced by the Bolsheviks and Social Revolutionaries, and the program of division of estates among the peasants, under private individual ownership, advocated by the Kadets.

The formal opening of the Imperial Duma took place on May 10, 1906, boycotted by the workers at the direction of their Social Democratic leaders. On the eve of this event there occurred a change of Cabinet. Goremykin was named as Premier, in place of Count Witte. The composition of the Duma by parties was as follows:

Kadets	190
Nonpartisans	100
Laborites	94
Poles and other national minorities	44
Social Democrats (Mensheviks)	17

In consequence of the boycott tactics advocated by Lenin, of all the Social Democrats, only the Mensheviks had a little group of deputies in the First Duma and even these were there more or less by chance. This made it all the more convenient for Lenin and for the other Social Democratic leaders to carry on the most violent propaganda against the Duma, both at their meetings

and in the Social Democratic papers which had been newly authorized by law.

The Government openly slighted the Duma, appearing before it without any legislative program whatever. Only a few casual and unimportant projects of law, on petty questions, were introduced in the Duma. The first bill presented by the Government was a plan to assign funds for a laundry and a greenhouse at the university in Yuriev.

In contrast to the Government, the leading parties in the Duma issued declarations and a program based on broad theoretical principles. Their manner of working out their projects in practical detail was weaker. This was quite natural in view of their lack of practical political experience. The Government made a few attempts to come to an understanding with the opposition; under Witte's premiership and afterward, conversations were actually carried on as to the entry of the Kadets into the Cabinet. Apparently, the Tsar was ready to accept a coalition cabinet with a Kadet majority, provided other liberal groups would also participate. But the Kadets rejected all overtures, wishing to preserve their program free from taint and to await a complete political surrender by the Government.

The Government understood perfectly well, however, as the boycott tactics of Lenin and the other extreme radicals had shown it, that the Duma could not reckon on support from the radicals in its struggle and that without them it could not expect any outbreak of a new revolutionary movement in the event of violation of its rights. The Duma was in fact able to act on the basis of its moral authority, but not to exercise the direct threat of revolution. On one issue, however, the Duma could

count upon support by physical force, from the peasants if not from the workers; this was the question of the land. The Kadets advanced a plan for compulsory expropriation of lands from the estate holders, with money compensation, for division among the peasants. Unquestionably, the adoption of such a measure would have made the Duma extremely popular among the peasant masses. The project was far closer to the actualities of life than the abstract theories of "municipalization" or nationalization of the land put forward by the Social Democrats and Social Revolutionaries. The Government calmly endured the furious criticism of its action in various branches of administration by members of the Duma; but when the Duma took up the discussion of the proposed land law the Government broke up the sessions. Its dissolution was politically tactless in regard to the supporters of the Duma, but it was not contrary to the basic Russian laws on which the Duma was founded. Nevertheless, the majority of the members of the Duma, assembling in Viborg, Finland, issued an appeal to the people not to pay taxes or yield recruits to the army until a new Duma should be summoned.

6.

THE Viborg appeal was another card in Lenin's hand, since it gave him an additional argument in favor of his irreconcilable tactics. "Now it is not a few 'narrow-minded and fanatical' Bolsheviks," wrote Lenin in his brochure *The Dissolution of the Duma and the Tasks of the Proletariat*, "but those very peaceful legalist-liberals themselves who have recognized . . . the illusory character of the Russian constitution." In concluding the same brochure he further said, "The dissolution of the

Duma means a complete reversion to autocracy." Such a conclusion rendered the political situation quite simple: everything apparently had returned to the conditions of the time before October 30, 1905. Lenin could hardly contain his malicious glee. "The dissolution of the Duma means the end of the liberal hegemony, which has hindered and held down the revolution." Now it was again possible to sound the slogan of armed revolt and to demand the summoning of a constituent assembly. This Lenin did. His appeal had a degree of success. At the end of July there began an uprising of the sailors and soldiers at Sveaborg, which later spread to Kronstadt. Lenin tried to have it carried as far as St. Petersburg. But in this he did not succeed. In the capital there began, instead of an uprising, a strike of the workers, but even this movement was feeble. The workers of St. Petersburg had been nurtured by Lenin himself all during the past months in the belief that the Duma was only harmful to the interests of the people. So it is not surprising that they saw no occasion to grow excited over its dissolution. The uprisings in Sveaborg and Kronstadt were quickly put down. Lenin nevertheless declared, in the first issue of the illegal Moscow newspaper *Proletarii* ("The Proletarian"), that this was only the first ripple of armed revolts and strikes and that a new wave was rolling up. In fact there was no new wave. The Government only intensified its program of repression. The leaders of the rioters were shot. Deputies to the First Imperial Duma who had signed the Viborg appeal were prosecuted.

The program of the Government did not end with repression; at the same time, preparations began for reforms. A new Premier, Stolypin, who took the place of

Goremykin after the dispersal of the Duma, had a plan of his own for land reform. Instead of extending the area of peasant lands at the expense of estate holders, his project was to increase the yield of peasant lands, not only by technical means but primarily by economic reforms, particularly the introduction of individual private ownership in place of communal ownership of land. A decree was published on November 22, 1906, establishing the right of the peasants to demand separation of their individual lots from the communal lands, as the private property of each householder. This agrarian reform of Stolypin was of immense significance for Russia.*

Among the dust clouds of political conflict, Stolypin's figure had not been perceived by his opponents in its true proportions. However that may be, his heavy hand made itself felt swiftly in the pacification of revolutionary outbreaks in the autumn of 1906. Little hope could be cherished for the success of a revolution now, and continuation of boycott tactics could only lead to complete disorganization of the ranks of revolutionists. Almost the first among the revolutionaries to grasp this was Lenin. In October, 1906, it finally became clear to him—as he might in fact have perceived any time after October 30 of the preceding year of 1905—that the Revolution was ebbing and not rising.

Once he understood this, Lenin immediately drew appropriate conclusions and made a sharp turn in his policy. As late as September, 1906, after the failure of the Sveaborg and Kronstadt uprisings, Lenin wrote that "we are facing a tempest," and "on the eve of a great battle," in the single belief that an uprising was immi-

* See later, chap. iii, sec. 2.

ment; he discarded the Duma entirely from his political calculations. But, in October, Lenin was already writing an article on the boycotting of the elections to the Duma in which he declared that the left-wing Social Democrats must reconsider the boycott question. His conclusion was, "A time has arrived in which the revolutionary Social Democrats must cease to be boycotters." Having arrived at a conclusion, he did not recede from it but advanced it insistently in a series of party conferences. His renunciation of the boycott was a sign of that realism which curiously subsisted in Lenin along with his extremist convictions. But it was not by any means because he had begun to concede any genuine political value to the Duma that he decided to take part in elections. He had determined to utilize the Duma as a platform for propaganda, a sort of political loud-speaker. He resolved to take part in elections, not to support the Duma, but to split it from within. It was not the struggle of the Duma as a whole with the Cabinet, but the struggle within the Duma against the liberal Kadets, that appeared to Lenin to be the task of the moment.

This point of view was reflected in his tactics at the time of the elections. The Social Democrats, as was apparent on the basis of experience in the elections to the First Duma, could not expect under the electoral law that was enforced and in the mood that then prevailed in the country, to secure seats independently for any large number of their own deputies. So the question of election agreements became vitally interesting. The Mensheviks proposed to form a block with the Kadets against the Octobrists and the reactionaries. Lenin could not enter the same group with the Kadets because they were for him the worst enemies. So he advanced the

idea of a "left *bloc*" including all the socialist and labor factions, against the Kadets.

The "left *bloc*" was agreed upon for the elections in the large cities. But neither in St. Petersburg nor in Moscow did it have any success; the Kadets won. In its composition, the Second Imperial Duma was distinguished from the First in that both the right and the left wings grew larger while the center shrank. It comprised in all 515 deputies, divided as follows:

Extreme conservatives and Octobrists .	54
Kadets and adherents	99
Laborites and adherents	120
Social Revolutionaries	37
Social Democrats	65
Poles and other national minorities .	76
Nonpartisan and Cossack groups .	64

The Second Duma included a larger number of Social Democrats than the First, and among them experienced orators such as the Menshevik Hercules Tseretelli and the Bolshevik Gregory Alexinsky. Proportionately, the Mensheviks, led by Tseretelli, held the balance of power in the Social Democratic faction in the Duma, opposing the harsh tactics of Lenin. He was very dissatisfied with the faction, considering that it was tending imperceptibly to concede independent political value to the Duma and in this connection to aid the middle-class factions, in particular the Kadets. For example, he thought it a crude political mistake to vote for a Kadet in the election of the chairman of the Duma.

Meanwhile, the relations between the Government and the Duma were growing rapidly worse. The Duma refused to support Stolypin's program; but at the same time it was difficult for the various Duma factions to

come to any understanding on a definite program because there was no solid center group. The radicals and the central group in the Duma were at one only in criticizing the activities of the Government. It was a deadlock. Even the resignation of the Government scarcely improved matters, since there was no firm majority in the Duma. Stolypin began to consider the dissolution of the Duma. He only needed a plausible excuse. This was created by the revolutionary language of the Social Democrats.

The Fifth Convention of the Russian Social Democratic Labor party gathered on May 13, 1907, in London. Its sessions took place in a London Socialist church. The number of delegates was about three hundred; and it was estimated that each one represented five hundred party members. So the calculation was that the party at that time included about one hundred and fifty thousand members. These figures were, in all probability, greatly exaggerated. It should be added that they were intended to include the number of members not only in the Russian Social Democratic movement but in all the Social Democratic groups of the Russian Empire, except Finland. The proportion of Bolsheviks and Mensheviks was about even, and among the autonomous national groups the Poles favored the Bolsheviks and the Bund favored the Mensheviks. The balance of power was held by the Lettish group, which in most cases supported the Bolsheviks and gave them the advantage. So the majority of the resolutions adopted by the Convention were of a Bolshevik character, as was also the newly elected Central Committee. The Bolsheviks criticized the Social Democratic faction in the Duma violently. Although the Convention rejected a proposal to condemn the course

of action of the Duma group, it nevertheless declared its conviction that the group would act in the future in accordance with the lines of policy indicated by the Convention and under the direction of the Central Committee. Since the new Central Committee was overwhelmingly on the side of the Bolsheviks, such a resolution surrendered the Duma group to Lenin's control. On the question of the activity of the Imperial Duma, the Convention adopted a Bolshevik resolution with slight changes. This declared the necessity of a struggle not only with the autocracy but also with the "treacherous policy of middle-class liberalism whose slogan is the safeguarding of the Duma." The basic section of this resolution read:

The immediate political tasks of the Social Democratic movement in the Duma are: (a) to make clear to the people the absolute unsuitability of the Duma as a means of realizing the demands of the proletariat and the revolutionary middle class (*petty bourgeoisie*), and particularly of the peasants; (b) to make clear to the people the impossibility of attaining political freedom by parliamentary means, so long as actual power remains in the hands of the Imperial Government, and also the inevitability of an open conflict between the masses of the people and the armed force of absolutism, a conflict having as its aim the assurance of complete victory—the transfer of power into the hands of representatives of the people and the summoning of a Constituent Assembly on the basis of universal, equal, direct, and secret suffrage.

So the situation was that the Social Democratic group in the Duma henceforth, under the direction of the Central Committee, must prepare for an open conflict of the masses of the people with "the armed force of absolutism."

Stolypin, receiving word of the decisions of the Con-

vention through agents of the secret police, responded with decisive action. On June 14, in a closed session of the Duma, he demanded the immediate expulsion of the Social Democratic faction and consent to the arrest of its more prominent members. The Duma did not give an answer at once to Stolypin's ultimatum; the question was referred to a commission to inquire into the charges that had been made. Stolypin considered this delay a sufficient excuse for dissolution of the Duma. The decree breaking up the session was issued on June 16/3, 1907.

7.

THE London Convention of the Russian Social Democratic Labor party adopted together with the resolution to prepare for open conflict with the force of absolutism another resolution forbidding members of the party to have any share in "partisan demonstration" and "expropriations." It further ordered that all the special "fighting bands" existing under party organizations must be dispersed. The point was to get rid finally of the consequences of the expropriation movement which followed the Moscow uprising.

This order of the party Convention gave clear evidence of the desire in the party to get rid of the excesses of a declining revolutionary movement. On this point Trotsky writes, "After a revolution has been broken up, expropriations by force of arms and terroristic assaults become a means of disorganization of the revolutionary party itself." But the resolution of the Convention was not adopted unanimously. According to reminiscences of Trotsky, during the voting on this question there were cries from the floor, "How about Lenin? how

about Lenin?" Lenin smiled enigmatically.⁴ He smiled because he had views of his own about expropriation and was not prepared to give them up.

After the defeat of the Revolution, the Social Democratic party was in a financial crisis, since the flow of contributions into the party treasury from outside sources ceased or nearly ceased. At the London Convention it became clear that there was not even enough money to provide for the return journeys of the delegates. According to Trotsky, an English liberal advanced to the Convention a loan of £3,000 and thus rescued the representatives "of one hundred fifty thousand workers" from a dilemma. Incidentally, it may be noted that the money was later returned to the creditor by the Soviet Government.⁵

Lenin took a different attitude toward financial difficulties. Expropriation seemed to him an appropriate source of funds. Returning to Finland from the London Convention, he began to concern himself, aided by Krasin and Stalin, with plans for the expropriation of a huge sum of money in the Caucasus. A Communist from the Caucasus, unreservedly devoted to Lenin, the "honorable bandit" Ter-Petrosian, known under the nickname of Kamo, went to see Lenin in Finland to get some arms and explosives. On June 25, 1907, Kamo and several comrades, having thrown the bombs brought from Lenin, in a street in Tiflis, attacked a cart transporting money from the Tiflis branch of the Imperial Bank. Several soldiers were killed.⁶ This expropriation yielded Lenin 341,000 rubles, or about \$170,500. So for a considerable time the Bolshevik party treasury was supplied with funds.

III

From the Summoning of the Third Duma to the World War

1.

AT the same time that the Second Duma was dissolved there was published, on June 16/3, 1907, a new electoral law. This represented in fact a governmental change of front. Stolypin was setting up a new political *régime*. The aim of the Government was to procure a Duma which would in general fall in with the desires and views of the man in command at the moment, that is, Stolypin himself.

The electoral law sponsored by Witte was based on broad participation by the peasants in the elections. In contrast, Stolypin's electoral law shifted the center of political balance to the well-to-do groups in the population. The voters in the towns, apart from the workers, were divided into two categories; one comprised the more prosperous part of the town population. The number of electors representing peasants and workers was considerably decreased. The proportion of peasant electors to the total number of electors from the whole empire now amounted to a little more than 22 per cent, instead of 43 per cent according to the earlier electoral law. The proportion of labor electors made up a total of 2.3 per cent in place of 3.4 per cent. In almost all the provincial election conventions the landowners secured a balance of power. Electors from the categories of workers took part in these conventions, and in six of them one delegate's seat was assured to the workers, but

the choice of this delegate was made not by electors of the workers alone but by all the electors of the convention concerned, with the condition, however, that he must be selected from among the workers' representatives.

The change in the electoral law caused the parties of the extreme left to reconsider their attitude toward the Duma. The Social Revolutionaries declared themselves in favor of a boycott. Among the Social Democrats there were debates. On the question of elections to the Duma there was first held a general St. Petersburg conference of the Social Democratic party, which assembled at the end of July in Terioki, and then an All-Russian conference which took place in Viborg at the beginning of August, 1907. In both conferences the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks took part; the Mensheviks considered it essential to enter in the election contest, while the Bolsheviks as usual stood for a boycott of the Duma.

Lenin alone among the Bolsheviks argued categorically for participation in the election. He took this position in opposition to almost his entire faction; in the end, however, a small part of it followed Lenin, and the conference adopted a resolution against a boycott with the express purpose of taking the opportunity at the time of the election campaign and in the Duma itself to spread and strengthen among the masses the idea of socialism and to carry on a decisive struggle both against reaction and against the overlordship of the Kadets.

The resolution favoring participation in the Third Duma almost cost Lenin his authority among the Bolsheviks. Although Bolshevik party organizations entered the elections, they did so as a formality, submit-

ting to the order of their leader without any inner conviction. Indeed, those workers who sympathized with Bolshevism simply refrained from voting, because they regarded the renunciation of the boycott as a Menshevik artifice. So, among those workers who did take part in the voting, the Mensheviks predominated and the majority of the Social Democratic faction in the Third Duma, consisting of eighteen members, adhered to the Mensheviks. The Bolsheviks played no rôle in this faction. The Kadets, in consequence of the new electoral law, suffered a signal defeat at the polls. The majority of the new Duma was made up of moderate conservatives—Octobrists and Nationalists.

The division by factions in the Third Imperial Duma was as follows:

Extreme conservatives . . .	52
Octobrists and Nationalists . .	226
Kadets and Progressives . . .	92
Laborites	14
Social Democrats	18
Poles and other national minorities .	27
Nonpartisans	14

2.

THE *régime* of July 16/3 was not a thoroughgoing parliamentary administration since the Duma exercised much more limited rights than any parliament of the western European type. The "Achilles heel" of the government of June third was this weakness both of the Duma and of the Cabinet as against the imperial power. The political ideas of Nicholas II did not change after the transformation of the government on June third. He

maintained an unfriendly attitude toward the Duma of Stolypin as he had toward the Duma of Witte. And he soon even began to hate Stolypin himself, as he had hated Witte. The Tsar tried to carry out a policy of his own through extreme reactionary organizations such as the Union of the Russian People. The political inclinations of Nicholas II were not restricted to secret intrigues and oppression. He had a legal political agency for the exercise of his own influence, founded on the constitution, namely, the Imperial Council. This council had been organized as a check on the Duma at the time when the Government was afraid that it might have to face a politically hostile Duma. To have left the Imperial Council unmodified, in its first aspect, after it was possible to count on a Duma politically sympathetic to the Government, was a cardinal error on the part of Stolypin. It caused him much torment and it led later to a fatal conflict between the Emperor and the Duma during the World War.

Stolypin's own program represented an attempt at one and the same time to put down open revolutionary outbreaks, by the force of arms and the police, and, with the aid of the Imperial Duma, to carry serious reforms into actuality in the life of the people. The field courts-martial introduced by Stolypin in the interval between Dumas continued to function and were confirmed by the authority of the Duma itself. The number of executions, however, began gradually to decrease, and this was an unquestionable sign that the country was being slowly pacified. In 1908, 782 persons were executed, and in 1911, 73.

Stolypin's reforms, adopted also by the Duma, referred primarily to the situation in the peasant villages.

His agrarian plan consisted in the destruction of the communes; in essence, it was derived from the very same economic concepts that Lenin expressed in his book published in 1899, *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*. Stolypin, like Lenin, considered the commune an obstacle to the development of a middle-class type of economic system in the villages. Lenin staked his hopes on the poor peasants, whom he thought the so-called middle peasants might support. Stolypin counted on the well-to-do peasants, and also on support from the middle peasants. In addition to the question of the land itself, his reform had to do with the general legal position of the peasantry. Together with the commune, the other remnants of the laws which had placed the peasants in a special position were done away with; the peasants were placed on about the same plane as other citizens. The crowning act of this policy was the law carried through the Duma after Stolypin's death, which was a quite essential measure although mutilated in form; it abolished the juridical power of the so-called Land Captains (*zemskie nachalniki*).

The activities of the Imperial Duma in regard to public education were of great significance. In 1908, the Duma confirmed the program of the Ministry of Public Education for the gradual introduction of universal instruction in Russia, with a view to realizing this purpose in 1922. In order to carry out this program, the Duma contemplated an annual increase in the budget of the Ministry of Public Education. The Imperial Council did not give its authorization to the general plan of the Duma, but the ministerial department itself went half-way to meet the legislative body and so the plan actually began to be carried into execution.

Stolypin's Cabinet paid less attention to the labor question. Stolypin himself came from the country, and was far better able to understand and interest himself in rural problems. Further, the balance of his social program rested on the villages. To the towns he gave much less heed. Labor legislation by the Imperial Duma moved slowly. Nevertheless, a few labor measures were passed—a law for the insurance of workers was adopted later in its final form in 1912 after Stolypin's death.

Despite the great deficiencies of Stolypin's administration, it nevertheless showed itself to be of vital aid to progress in Russia.

In the political sphere, the *régime* of June third faced the task of making itself a school of constitutionalism for Russia, to a far greater degree than had the first two Dumas. It established working relations between the Cabinet and the representatives of the people. The chief opposition party in the Duma was now the Kader group, at the head of which was the St. Petersburg deputy, Miliukov. The opposition was technical in character, and not contradictory to the fundamental principles of the *régime* itself, for despite the sharp conflicts which had occurred on separate points, relations between the Octobrists and the Kadets were gradually improving and making possible the establishment of the "progressive bloc" formed at the time of the War.

The *narodniki* were very weakly represented in the Third Duma; the Social Democrats were only a little better represented. The activity of the extreme radicals outside the Duma during this third session was also feeble.

The economic forces of Russia in the period of the Third Duma and of the Fourth Duma, up to the War,

developed rapidly. After the depression of the first years of the twentieth century, industry again began to expand. The yearly national income in Russia amounted approximately to 63 rubles (\$31.50) per person in 1900, and by 1913 these figures had increased to 101.35 rubles (\$50.67) per person. Although the reforms carried out under Stolypin touched the workers least of all, nevertheless their situation was undoubtedly improved. The average wage of a St. Petersburg worker in 1904 was 301 rubles a year, and in 1906 it had risen to 313 rubles. Of course even this figure was low in comparison with wages in western Europe and in the United States. But two facts must be kept in mind: first, the cheapness of living in Russia at the time; and second, the very modest demands made by customary living standards not only among the workers but also among the intellectuals of Russia. The annual salary of teachers in village schools was also about 300 rubles, in many cases, and it was only in 1908 that the Ministry of Public Education confirmed a minimum salary for village teachers of 420 rubles a year. Evidence of the increasing improvements in the conditions under which both town and village populations, including workers, were living, is furnished by the growth of deposits in government savings banks and in petty credit associations. Such deposits amounted in 1912 to 242,000,000 rubles, and in 1914 to 424,000,000 rubles. In 1908 Russian peasants purchased agricultural machinery to the value of 54,000,000 rubles, while the corresponding figure for the year 1912 was 131,000,000 rubles.

An important phenomenon in the life of the workers was the development of trades-unions, on the basis of the law of March 17, 1906. In 1907, 652 trades-unions

were active in Russia, comprising 245,335 members, among them eighty-one unions of workers in the metal trades with 54,173 members.

The whole psychological mood of the Russian people was transformed from a revolutionary to a peaceful one. Tomsy, who later became the Soviet leader of the trades-unions, wrote bitterly in 1908 that

the reaction has profoundly influenced the workers, especially those who have only superficial ties with political organizations, and even among the class conscious workers the effort to acquire knowledge has been turned under the direction of the reactionary forces frequently into undesirable and purely academic lines, that is to say into endeavors to prepare themselves to secure a high school diploma or to enter a university and so get out of the ranks of the proletariat, to become intellectuals . . . frequently with the view of obtaining a purely professional education, as for example in such lines as sketching, drawing, and the like, which means an attempt to improve their economic situation by their individual efforts.¹

The transformation from the political point of view was noticeable not only to the workers but also among the intellectuals. According to the testimony of one of the most prominent Communist historians, Nevsky, students, both boys and girls, and in general people who were carrying on studies forgot to think of politics and turned to purely academic concerns; assignments, examinations, the acquisition of a diploma, and then an advantageous little post—such was the sacred dream of every student.²

Unquestionably Russian society was on the verge of a change from the whole former partisan and irreconcilable way of thinking in regard to the *bourgeois* system and the Government. One expression of what was taking place, from a theoretical point of view, was the appearance of the symposium *Vekhi* ("Landmarks"), in

which one of the chief collaborators was the veteran Social Democrat, P. B. Struve, who was now gradually being transformed from the liberal that he was in the period of 1905 into a moderate conservative which he became in the Revolution of 1917. *Vekhi* contended for the right of the individual to order his own personal and family life independently of direction from "underground" political leaders, and defended religion, the institution of private property, and the principle of individuality.

3.

LENIN had already concluded in the autumn of 1906, as has been said, that Stolypin had triumphed over the Revolution. This induced him to renounce his boycott tactics against the Second Duma. He continued to hold this view during the discussion of the question whether to take part in the elections to the Third Duma, steering a course directly contrary to almost the whole party.

Stolypin's further steps only served to strengthen Lenin's belief in the vitality of the Premier's *régime*. Lenin gauged Stolypin and his policy more quickly and correctly than either the Liberals or the Social Revolutionaries, who considered him an enemy of the constitutional order and the Third Duma a false parliament. In his controversy with the Social Revolutionaries at the very beginning of the year 1909, Lenin wrote: "To call the Third Duma a cardboard comic opera Duma is a model of complete stupidity, an empty comic opera phrase . . . in Russia in this epoch of the Third Duma the constitution is less fictitious than it was in the Russia of the epochs of the First and Second Dumas." A little later in the same year he wrote:

The autocracy (that is, the imperial power) stands as it always has, as the chief enemy of the proletariat and of all democracy. But it would be a mistake to think that it remains exactly what it was. The Stolypin constitution and the Stolypin agrarian policy signalizes a new phase in the disorganization of the old semi-patriarchal and semi-feudal system of Tsarism, and a new move toward its transformation into a middle-class (*bourgeois*) monarchy.

A little earlier in 1908 Lenin had written:

The change in the agrarian policy has extraordinarily great significance for a peasant country such as Russia. This change is no accident, no mere wavering in the course of action of the ministry, no invention of the bureaucracy. No, it is a most important shift in the direction of agrarian Bonapartism, in the direction of a liberal policy (in the economic sense of that word, that is to say, a *bourgeois* policy) in the sphere of the relations of the peasants to the land. Bonapartism is the manoeuvre of a monarchy which has lost its ancient patriarchal or feudal support, a monarchy which is obliged to strive for a new center of balance in order not to fall.

Lenin recognized that the agrarian policy of Stolypin if it should continue for very long periods of time, if it should alter the whole system of village institutions affecting the land and place them on a purely middle-class basis, might force us (that is the Bolsheviks) to renounce any agrarian program at all. It would be an empty and stupid democratic form of words for us to say that the success of such a policy in Russia is impossible. It is possible. . . .

If Stolypin's policy continues long enough . . . then the agrarian structure of Russia will become completely middle-class, the more well-to-do peasants will acquire all the allotments of land, agriculture will become capitalistic, and any solution of the agrarian problem—radical or not—will be impossible under capitalism.

Lenin, as the author of *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*, had to recognize that Stolypin's policy

was built up on the same economic foundation that he himself had investigated.

The agrarian Bonapartism of Stolypin . . . could not have come into being, and certainly could not have continued for two years, if the commune itself had not taken a capitalistic form of development in Russia, if there had not always been contained within the commune itself elements with which the autocracy could begin to play its game, and to which it could say: "Grow rich! Rob the commune, but maintain me!"

So, according to Lenin's estimate, the Stolypin *régime* signified the establishment of a *bourgeois* system in Russia. The country was entering on a course of peaceful evolution. But this same peaceful evolution—or *bourgeois* evolution, according to Lenin—was to him of course a horrifying apparition. So it is easy to understand that Lenin could not but hate the Stolypin *régime* with all the force of his soul. His whole hope rested in the chance that before this *régime* could succeed in growing too strong it might be possible to provoke a new outbreak of revolution. So long as the agrarian reform of Stolypin had not intrenched itself conclusively, it would be possible to carry through a program of confiscation of all lands in the possession of estate holders, for the benefit of the peasants, thereby purchasing the support of the peasants for the proletarian movement. So Lenin saw it as his task to make the party and the proletariat ready as soon as possible for a new revolution. On these two contradictory premises—first, that of the stability of the Stolypin constitution and his whole *régime*, and second, that of the necessity to prepare quickly for a new revolution—Lenin based his tactics during the years of the Third and Fourth Dumas up to the World War. The first premise forced him to grasp

the opportunities offered by legal institutions, such as the Duma, the labor organizations, and the like, to further party aims. The second premise made it necessary to guard against attributing any independent value to these legal institutions.

Both the Duma and the workers' trades-unions were to Lenin simply platforms for propaganda and means for organization. He saw no political value of its own in the Duma. His tactics called forth opposition both from the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks. The former agreed as to the necessity of working within public institutions, but in any such work they wished to concentrate their own political action and so they did not assent to the revolutionary aspect of Lenin's tactics. The latter, on the contrary, agreed with the revolutionary part of his program but could not comprehend his plan of activity within the law.

4.

THE fear of repressive measures on the part of the Government caused Lenin again to become an exile. In December, 1907, he left Finland, where he had lived since the end of 1905, and went to Sweden. By January 7, 1908, he was again in Geneva. That same year he moved to Paris, which he made his place of residence for several years. From Paris as a center he went from time to time to visit other cities and countries in Europe, either to deliver lectures or to take part in socialist conferences. All these years of his second exile he passed in ceaseless conflicts within the party. As has been seen, at the London Convention of the Russian Social Democratic Labor party in the spring of 1907, the Mensheviks not only came to an agreement with the Bolsheviks but even

accepted a composition of the Central Committee which gave the actual balance of power to the Bolsheviks.

As early as the autumn of 1907 it had become clear that the mood of the party did not correspond with the resolutions of the last London Conference. In accord with the rapid decline of revolutionary sentiment among the Russian workers, the political ideas of the intellectuals who were members of the Social Democratic party also changed swiftly. The make-up of the Central Committee was now obviously out of keeping with the inclinations of the party. And furthermore the natural political center for the party, in view of the establishment of a stable parliamentary *régime*, was evidently the Social Democratic faction in the Duma, in which Mensheviks predominated. So there arose a discord between the party and its directing organ, the Central Committee, like that in 1903 after the Second Convention. The leader of the party at that time, Plekhanov, violating the formal decisions of the Convention, yielded however to the actual balance of forces and summoned the representatives of the recent minority to the direction of the party's organ of the press, the *Iskra*. Now Lenin was unwilling to make any concessions and desired to keep in his own hands the direction of party policy, which meant primarily the control of the faction in the Duma. This situation led to disagreement between the Duma faction and the Central Committee. In the early part of January, 1909, the Central Committee brought together in Paris a party conference, at which of course the majority proved to be on the side not of the Duma faction but of the Central Committee; that is to say, the Conference was not in accord with actual party sentiment at the time. It adopted a resolution con-

demning the course of action of the Duma group. The attention of the group was called to the fact that it had more than once failed to execute direct instructions from the Central Committee, and that in general it did not throw the required light on the *bourgeois* opposition headed by the Kadets. The faction was rebuked for not taking an attitude of wholesale antagonism toward the activities of the Duma and the Government, and particularly for having voted in favor of the appropriation of funds for public education under official supervision. This appropriation, amounting to 6,500,000 rubles (\$3,250,000) constituted the inauguration of a program of work on the part of the Duma and the Ministry for General Education in Russia. From the point of view of the Bolsheviks, even in such a case it was impossible to support the Ministry.

The results of the Conference of January, 1909, caused an outburst of dissatisfaction among the Menshevik groups who really represented at the moment the majority of the party. The Mensheviks advanced the idea of abolishing the Central Committee and terminating the whole party organization outside the law. The movement became known under the name of the "Liquidators." The position of the Mensheviks was really only the logical conclusion of the doctrine which had been stated in 1899 by Kuskova in her Creed—the renunciation of any independent rôle for the proletariat in the Revolution and the recognition that the middle class must be the main moving force. Now, in its justification, the Mensheviks could refer to the change in the political *régime* that had taken place after 1905. Naturally Lenin, continuing his unbroken line of action, entered the lists against the "Liquidators."

In addition to this quarrel, Lenin had quite enough trouble during these years with the Bolshevik section of the party, in which there arose a "recall" tendency which was a natural result of the difference between the earlier boycott tactics followed by Lenin after the First Duma and the new tactics of taking part in elections. The workers either ceased entirely to take any interest in the Duma or continued to take an unfriendly attitude toward it. The activity of the Menshevik section in the Duma encountered either indifference or hostility. So it was natural that there should appear in Bolshevik circles a new tendency to demand the recall of the representatives of the workers from the Duma. In the summer of 1909 there took place an open break between the followers of Lenin and the "recall" faction, among whom were Bogdanov and Lunacharsky, to which the historian Pokrovsky also adhered. The "recall" group and its adherents formed a special faction known as the *Vperedovtsi*, a name taken from the title of their newspaper *Vpered* ("Forward"). Lenin fought the "recall" group since its policy meant a complete renunciation of the opportunity to take advantage of the new possibilities—new in comparison with the situation before the Revolution of 1905—for organization and propaganda in Russia. Although the proposed tactics of "recall" concerned primarily the Duma, the whole program of work in the labor unions and other organizations was involved by implication.

Lenin did not see in political disagreements the chief danger of disorganization of the Bolshevik party. To him a far more threatening symptom seemed to be the wavering attitude of many of the members of the *Vpered* group—their turning away from Marxism

toward liberal idealism and the beginning on the part of some of them of attempts to establish a new "Socialist religion." As early as 1908 Lunacharsky issued a book under the title *Religion and Socialism*, in which he talked of the possibility of reconciliation between these two forces. At one time even the writer Maxim Gorky, then living in Capri, was not alien to such views. Bogdanov preached the doctrine of a kind of philosophical revisionism—a harmonization of Marxism with the empirical Monism of Mach and Avenarius. A group of empirical Monists tried to set up a school for workers from Russia, on the island of Capri, organized around the personality of Gorky. Lenin carried on an energetic campaign against these new movements in the ranks of the Bolsheviks. Against empirical Monism he launched a voluminous philosophical treatise, which was printed in Moscow in 1909 under the title *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism: Critical Notes Concerning a Reactionary Philosophy*, which he signed with the pseudonym "Vl. Ilin." He spent many hours in libraries in Paris and London in the preparation of this treatise. Its aim was to prove that all endeavors to discredit or alter materialism as a basis of thought were reactionary and played into the hands of the class enemies of the workers.

The crisis of 1908–1911 was the hardest test of the party that Lenin had to live through.

5.

WITH the beginning of 1911 the curve of Bolshevism again began to rise. The Bolsheviks were able to create and strengthen their own organization, and, on the other hand, their influence among the workers began at that time unquestionably to increase.

What were the causes of this new ascendancy? They lay both inside and outside the Bolshevik party. One of the most important causes within the party was the fact that during the years of partisan conflict Lenin had succeeded in forming anew a group of adherents subservient to him. His chief assistants were now Zinoviev (Radomyslsky) and Kamenev (Rosenfeld). Further, Lenin's tactics of coördinating the illegal with the legal activity of the party began to bear fruits. Finally there was occurring a gradual transformation in the mood of the Russian workers—a fresh accession of revolutionary feeling. This change itself was partly due to the intensified propaganda of the Bolsheviks and to the publication of Bolshevik periodicals as part of the legalized press of the country. But Bolshevik agitation could be successful only because it fell upon ready soil.

The sharpening of revolutionary sentiment among the Russian workers was not to be explained by any external damage to their material or legal position. They were no worse off than they had been. On the contrary, both the material and sometimes the legal situation of the workers was unquestionably better than it had been before the Revolution of 1905. The real reason, in the writer's opinion, was different. The mood of the workers became more hostile not because their situation was growing worse but because its betterment was not proceeding fast enough in comparison with the spread of education and of self-consciousness among the workers and with the sense of their own dignity and worth. At a time when these higher groups of workers who were earning the best pay felt themselves to be fully developed individuals, from the intellectual and political point of view, qualified for all the rights of citizens,

they were kept at a disadvantage in the sphere of politics, their representation in the Duma was negligible in contrast with that of the other ranks of the town population. No outlet for the discontent of workers through an organization in the form of an influential and large public political party, such as there was in Germany, existed in Russia. It was lacking because of the electoral law and because of police repression, and also because of the party split and the propaganda of Lenin himself and the other Bolsheviks against any final transfer of the Social Democratic party to a legal basis. Further, on the part of the Cabinet and the Duma very little was being done at that time to set up normal relationships with the working class. This was partly due, as has already been explained, to the personal inclinations of Stolypin.

The situation did not improve after the assassination of Stolypin. On September 14, 1911, he was shot in Kiev during a gala performance in the best theater of the city, in the presence of the imperial family. The murderer was a man of Azef's type, being an agent both of the Police Department and of a revolutionary group. Rumors connected Stolypin's assassination with the name of General Kurlov, assistant Minister of the Interior and head of the police force in Russia. No evidence of this connection was ever produced; and General Kurlov emphatically denied his alleged implication in this event, putting the blame on the chief of the local Kiev police department for carelessness.

After the assassination of Stolypin, the Government paid no more attention to the labor question.

In April, 1912, a strike took place in the Siberian gold mines of the English Lena Goldfields Company. A few workers were arrested at the order of the nearest police

chief. When other workers organized a demonstration, demanding their liberation, at the order of the same officer soldiers fired on the workers, killing about three hundred of them. This event as may be readily understood aroused great excitement among the workers throughout Russia. The Social Democratic faction in the Duma presented an interpellation to the Government. Answering it, the Minister of Interior, Makarov, said: "So it has been; so it will be!" His words were a paraphrase of the declaration of Clemenceau in the French Chamber of Deputies in 1907, after troops had fired upon the workers during a strike at one of the privately owned factories in France, which occurred for purely economic reasons.⁸ In retort to him, a wave of protest strikes swept through Russia, and after that time it was noticeable that revolutionary sentiment increased generally among the workers.

A significant part in all these events was played by the Police Department in whose charge, as before 1905, the direction of official policy in regard to the labor problem began to be concentrated. At the head of the department at that time was S. P. Beletsky. Under Stolypin he had been vice-director of the Police Department, from August 13, 1909; a little while after the assassination of Stolypin, Beletsky was appointed on March 5, 1912, director of the department. His tactics were based on the old idea of various police veterans of the imperial *régime* that the revolutionary groups were actually less dangerous to the autocracy than the more moderate opposition groups. So, from the point of view of men like Beletsky, the proper rôle for the department was to foster the demonstrations of the extreme radicals against the moderate liberals. To attain this purpose the

Police Department was not ashamed to use any means, including provocation. The methods of Azef did not end with his exposure and disappearance. But now the department shifted its main attention from the Social Revolutionaries to the Bolsheviks, regarding them rightly enough as the most active revolutionary group.

Without regard to its moral aspect, Beletsky's policy was absolute madness from the point of view of those who wished to see a peaceful evolution in Russia. But the policy pleased the circles of those extreme conservatives who always hoped that by suppressing an open revolutionary outbreak they could destroy for an indefinite time the fighting force of the Revolution. Such a result, in their belief, might give the Tsar an opportunity to turn back to complete autocracy. It is quite possible that under circumstances of peaceful development, this playing with fire might not have led to any very dangerous consequences, since with every year of the parliamentary *régime* Russia grew economically stronger and richer. But under the circumstances of war and of the political crisis between the Tsar and the Duma, from 1915 to 1917, the seeds sown by the Police Department yielded a bursting harvest.

In any case, it cannot be denied that the tactics of the Police Department must be taken into account in studying the successes won by the Bolshevik movement in Russia before the War. The reestablishment of a Bolshevik organization was the joint achievement of Beletsky and Lenin.

Beletsky's greatest success was in affiliating with the secret police agency, in 1910, the Moscow labor leader, Malinovsky, who played a prominent rôle in the Russian Social Democratic movement, distinguishing him-

self by his abilities as an orator and organizer. Malinovsky was a metal turner. When the metal workers' union was formed in Moscow, after 1906, he succeeded in becoming its secretary, and at the same time he became a secret assistant of the Moscow division of the Police Department. Activity on the part of the Bolshevik organization became noticeable after the end of 1910. At the beginning of that year there had been made apparently the last attempt for reconciliation between the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, at a plenary session of the Central Committee held in Paris. Soon after this meeting Malinovsky was invited to participate in the Russian section of the Central Committee. His efforts were undoubtedly directed to the goal of causing a break between the Bolsheviks and the so-called "Liquidators." When the latter began to make preparations for a conference of their own, in the autumn of 1911, the Police Department at his instigation carried out arrests among them, and the plan for the conference fell through.

At the same time an endeavor for coöperation between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks in a program of publication was broken up. A Conference including Lenin, Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Poletaiev, a member of the Social Democratic faction in the Imperial Duma, held in August, 1910, in Copenhagen, decided to arrange to issue in St. Petersburg a legal Social Democratic newspaper, the *Zvezda* ("Star"). This newspaper was not intended to be exclusively a Bolshevik organ; in addition to Bolsheviks, both Plekhanov and certain Mensheviks were to collaborate in editing it. The first number of the *Zvezda* came out in December, 1910; and it is curious to note that for its publication some financial aid was received from Germany—in any case, the

sum of 3,000 marks arrived through the agency of Bebel and the German Social Democratic party. At the same time there appeared in Moscow another legal periodical, purely Bolshevik in character, the *Mysl* ("Thought"). The editorial direction was in the hands of the Bolshevik center abroad, comprising Lenin, Kamenev, and Zinoviev. But of course the chief manager of publication in Moscow was Malinovsky. Soon a purely Bolshevik periodical began to come out in St. Petersburg also, the labor paper *Pravda* ("Truth"). The first number of the *Pravda* appeared on April 22, 1912. In the summer of 1913 the Government suppressed the paper because of its revolutionary character; and it then came out under another heading as the *Rabochaya Pravda* ("The Workers' Truth"). Under varying names, it continued to exist until the beginning of the World War, when it was finally suppressed by the censor. The *Pravda* had great influence in labor circles and was more popular than the paper of the "Liquidators." One evidence of the interest of the workers in the *Pravda* is the contributions from labor circles for its publication. It was printed chiefly through these funds. In 1912 and 1913 contributions from workers to the *Pravda* amounted to more than 3,000 rubles. At the same time, collections taken among workers for the paper issued by the "Liquidators" reached hardly one-fourth of this sum. Lenin himself confirms the fact that during the first five months of 1914 there were raised among the workers 18,934 rubles for Bolshevik papers, and 5,296 rubles for the papers issued by the "Liquidators." These figures do not include miscellaneous sales. According to Lenin's estimates, about forty thousand workers bought the *Pravda*, and many more read it.

The Police Department, on its side, was a party to the publication of the *Pravda*. One of its actual editors, Miron Chernomazov, was an agent of the police.

6.

A CONFERENCE of Russian Social Democrats gathered in January, 1912, in Prague. It was attended in the main by Bolsheviks. Malinovsky went from Moscow as a delegate. The Prague Conference really set up a complete Bolshevik party organization. Decisions were taken for a course of energetic political action in Russia and particularly for preparations to take part in the approaching elections for the Fourth Duma that were to be held at the end of the year. As a counterweight to the Bolsheviks, Trotsky strove to unify the Mensheviks, summoning for this purpose a conference held in August, 1912, in Vienna, of representatives of various Menshevik groups, the so-called "*August Bloc*." Meantime the Bolsheviks acted with vigor. In July, 1912, their central foreign agency was transferred into the then Austrian province Galicia, close to the Russian frontier. Galicia seemed to be a more advantageous point than Paris from which to direct the publication of a legal Bolshevik organ of the press in Russia and also to supervise the activity of the Bolshevik faction in the Duma. The express train from St. Petersburg to Cracow made the run in about one day and night, while the ordinary mail train took about two days and nights. Newspapers from St. Petersburg were received in Cracow on the third day. It appeared to be possible to maintain contact with St. Petersburg either by mail or by special couriers. Even the Bolshevik deputies themselves might,

in cases of necessity, go to confer with Lenin. With these purposes in view, Lenin and Zinoviev settled in a suburb of Cracow, sometimes leaving it to visit the village of Poronino in the Carpathian Mountains.

The transfer of the Bolshevik center in 1912 to Austrian Galicia compels reflection. For contact with Russia, a dwelling place near the Russian frontier would have had advantages not only in 1912 but in 1900 also. In that year Lenin could not follow this plan for fear of surveillance by the Austrian police, who then considered it necessary to coöperate with the Russian police. In 1912 obviously the situation was different. Austrian military circles must at that time have seen the clear and imminent threat of war with Russia. Russian revolutionaries must already have been regarded by the Austrian Government as allies "in hope." Probably Austrian Social Democrats informed Lenin that he was in no peril of unpleasantness on the part of the Austrian police. In any event it is known that the Social Democratic deputy in the Austrian Reichsrat, Dr. Marek, extended some assistance in connection with Lenin's journey to Cracow.⁴

Whatever the circumstances may have been, the Bolshevik center was moved to Galicia and Lenin's hand began from that time to be felt more and more definitely in the political affairs of the Russian workers. The next question in order was the elections to the Duma. The authority of the Third Duma expired in September, 1912. Elections to the Fourth Duma were held in October of that same year. In the campaign the Bolsheviks showed a much greater degree of organization than they had in the elections to the Third Duma. The result was not evident in the round number of social Democratic

deputies chosen for the Fourth Duma—the figure was actually lower than that for the Third Duma—but in the strengthening of the Bolsheviks at the expense of the Mensheviks in the Social Democratic Duma faction. While the majority of the members of the Social Democratic faction in the Third Duma had adhered to the Mensheviks, they now held only a slight balance of power—seven Mensheviks against six Bolsheviks, with one Polish Socialist in addition joining with the Menshevik seven. But the important thing, from the point of view of coördination between the group of deputies and movements among the working masses, was the fact that the Bolsheviks secured the majority among the deputies elected from the workers' categories. All six seats in the Duma assigned to these categories were captured by the Bolsheviks. During the elections it could be seen how rigid was the party discipline of the Bolshevik faction. In case the electoral college named a candidate as a representative from the workers who had not been indicated by the Bolshevik committee, this candidate would refuse to serve, and so candidates chosen by the Committee secured the seats. The success of the Bolsheviks at the elections was obtained, however, not by the efforts of the Bolshevik party committees alone. A very significant factor was the earlier discussed tactics of the Police Department.

In the elections to the Fourth Duma, the Police Department was able not only to place its agents among the labor electors, but also to secure the choice of one of them as a member of the Imperial Duma in the capacity of a Bolshevik. This was the above mentioned R. V. Malinovsky, chosen from the workers' category of the Moscow province.

The composition of the Fourth Imperial Duma by parties was in general little distinguished from that of the Third Duma. The liberal opposition was slightly increased. The Duma was made up as follows:

Extreme conservatives	65	(in place of 52)
Octobrists and Nationalists	221	(in place of 226)
Kadets and Progressives	107	(in place of 92)
Laborites	10	(in place of 14)
Social Democrats (Bolsheviks and Mensheviks)	14	(in place of 18)
Poles and other national minorities	20	(in place of 27)
Nonpartisans	5	(in place of 14)

Immediately after the summoning of the Duma there began a conflict between the Bolshevik and Menshevik sections of the Social Democratic Duma faction. The leader of the Bolshevik section was Malinovsky. The difference between the position of the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks in the Duma showed as early as the discussion of the first declaration by the Social Democratic faction. The Mensheviks saw a possibility of passing through the Duma a number of reforms—even if modest ones. The Bolsheviks regarded the Duma as simply a platform for propaganda. A formal and open break between the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks in the Duma occurred in November, 1913. The Bolsheviks formed their own separate faction. Malinovsky was chosen as its chairman. He enjoyed Lenin's confidence to such a degree that in January, 1914, he was authorized to enter into negotiations with Burtsev on the problem of combating attempts at provocation among the Social Democrats and Social Revolutionaries.

The policy of making the irreconcilable declarations

in the Imperial Duma, through Malinovsky, was only one aspect of Bolshevik activity in Russia during the period of the Fourth Duma. Another was the conquest of legalized workers' organizations. For this purpose their legalized press, and primarily the *Pravda*, rendered the Bolsheviks a great service. With the autumn of 1912 there began the so-called Insurance Campaign, a struggle to secure places for representatives of the workers both in the provincial insurance committees and in the central Insurance Council, which had been set up on the basis of the law of July 6, 1912, for the protection of workers. During the election of representatives from the workers there was a fierce conflict between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks. Interference by the administration and the arrest of several labor electors only poured oil on the flames. On March 15, 1914, the Bolshevik list won a complete victory in the elections to the Insurance Council, in which the delegates who were chosen united in a special labor group.

So Lenin conquered one position after another.

A serious crisis developed in May, 1914, in the Bolshevik faction in the Duma. At that time the assistant Minister of Interior was Dzhunkovsky, who had been appointed a short while before and who did not sympathize with Beletsky's views. Having gained knowledge of the tactics of provocation carried on by Malinovsky, Dzhunkovsky demanded that he should be immediately excluded from membership in the Imperial Duma. On May 21, 1914, Malinovsky announced his resignation, for personal reasons, and afterward he at once went abroad. Then Dzhunkovsky informed the chairman of the Duma, Rodzianko, of the true motives behind Malinovsky's resignation. Rodzianko did not give this infor-

mation to anyone else, not wishing to compromise the Imperial Duma. Malinovsky's step, which no one had expected, gave rise to many rumors, especially among the Mensheviks, that he had been engaged in provocation. The Central Committee of the Bolsheviks appointed a Commission, under the chairmanship of the Polish Bolshevik, Hanecki (Fürstenberg),* to investigate the rumors. Lenin and Zinoviev took part in its work. The Commission held sessions during June and the greater part of July, 1914, and adopted a conclusion that the charges against Malinovsky had not been proved. Even before this decision by the Commission, Lenin personally declared Malinovsky innocent on the basis of the investigations made in the Central Committee. Unquestionably, a disclosure that Malinovsky had engaged in provocation might have brought about a violent disorganization in the Bolshevik ranks, as fatal in its significance as the exposure of Azef had been for the Social Revolutionary organization. Even Malinovsky's resignation itself must have been unpleasant for Lenin, since it disorganized the Bolshevik faction in the Duma. But in July, 1914, the Malinovsky case ceased to have any importance in the face of the approaching world catastrophe.

As for Malinovsky himself and his later fate, he enrolled as a volunteer in the French army in 1915 but soon was captured and confined in Germany, where he was responsible for extensive Bolshevik propaganda among the Russian war prisoners. After the Russian Revolution of March, 1917, documents were discovered in the archives of the Police Department which indubi-

* The Russian form of the name has sometimes been rendered in English as Ganetsky.

tably identified Malinovsky. His history was also recounted by Beletsky during his examination by the Extraordinary Investigating Commission of the Provisional Government.⁸ After the Bolshevik overthrow of this Government, Malinovsky returned voluntarily to Moscow, and there he was executed in 1918 by order of the Bolshevik Supreme Tribunal.

What moved Malinovsky to return to Moscow in 1918? Did he count on a friendly attitude on Lenin's part toward him, on the basis of old memories of 1913 and 1914? Perhaps Lenin knew even then, before the War, of Malinovsky's relations with Beletsky, but Malinovsky may have offered assurance that he was deceiving Beletsky and not Lenin himself. Or did Malinovsky hope that, in spite of all, his Bolshevik activity among Russian war prisoners in Germany would secure him a position in Bolshevik Russia?

IV

Lenin during the World War

1.

THE Russian people greeted the declaration of war with Germany in 1914 with entirely different feelings from those that marked the beginning of the war with Japan ten years earlier. The Japanese war coincided with a growth of the revolutionary movement in Russia. At that time the majority of the Russian Liberals and Revolutionaries were antagonistic to the Government and particularly to its foreign policy. Many of them were openly or tacitly defeatists, and a few small groups of revolutionaries—according to the later testimony of Lenin himself—even took money from the Japanese for the propagation of revolutionary ideas in Russia. The sharply hostile attitude of the opposition parties toward the Government's foreign policy persisted for some time after the Peace of Portsmouth. Questions of foreign policy continued to be regarded exclusively from the point of view of internal politics. In the spring of 1906 Russian Liberals carried on agitation in France, before the summoning of the Duma, against the French loan to the Russian Government.

With the pacification of Russia after 1906 there began a basic change. Whatever may have been the defects of the Duma, as a parliament of popular government, it did nevertheless represent the people, and through entering the Duma the leaders of the political parties of Russia began to feel their responsibilities, not

only for the conduct of domestic affairs but of foreign affairs as well. The beginning of the Duma *régime* coincided with certain moves in the field of foreign policy which were of fatal import to Russia. The closer relationship of England first with France and then with Russia led to the confrontation of the earlier formed union of the Central Powers by a new and mighty international *Entente*. The specter of war began to loom large. The leaders of both the moderately conservative and liberal parties in Russia, it must be admitted, viewed the prospect of war without any special distaste. It is true that the rank and file of these parties were rather inclined to be pacifists, remembering the old revolutionary tradition of distrust toward the Government. However, an approaching war in alliance with liberal and democratic countries, England and France, against reactionary Germany seemed certain to strengthen the Duma and the liberal middle-class order in Russia. So the moderate conservatives and liberals favored the consolidation of the *Entente*.

For the same reason, many extreme conservatives and extreme radicals were, on the other hand, open or secret friends of Germany. But the majority not only of the first two Dumas but also of the Third and Fourth Dumas stood ready to support the *Entente* policy sponsored first by Izvolsky and later by Sazonov.

2.

DURING the days of international crisis, after the assassination at Sarajevo, Lenin was living in the mountain village of Poronino in Galicia. He remained there for the first part of the time, even after the World War had begun. Obviously, he felt quite safe in Austria.

Then occurred, according to the account of a friend of Lenin, the Polish-Russian-Jewish Social Democrat Hanecki (Fürstenberg), "a rather curious episode" which ended with the brief arrest of Lenin.¹ The occasion for the arrest, in Hanecki's opinion, was "the rude attitude of the peasants" and "the obtuseness of the Galician officials."

Austria declared war on Russia on August 6, 1914, having delayed action for almost a week after the declaration by Germany. The state of war with Russia naturally aroused the suspicion of the local police authorities and the peasants toward Lenin as a Russian subject. A search of his living quarters was carried out on August 7, when he was told that on the following day he must present himself in the town of Nowy Targ before the governor of the province. Immediately after the search, Lenin went to seek counsel of Hanecki, who was then living in Poronino. Hanecki at once telegraphed what had occurred to the Social Democratic deputy in the Austrian Reichsrat, Dr. Marek, who, as has been seen, had assisted Lenin in moving to Cracow in 1912. The next day Lenin was arrested in Nowy Targ. Hanecki began to take steps both there and in Cracow for his liberation, and he also telegraphed what had happened to the leader of the Austrian Social Democrats, Victor Adler. Lenin's wife, Krupskaya, on her own account also wrote a letter to Adler. He and the Polish Social Democratic deputy, Diamand, went personally to the Ministry of the Interior in Vienna and gave assurances that Ulianov (Lenin) was a determined enemy of Tsarism and had devoted his whole life to the conflict against it in Russia. The Ministry of the Interior communicated this news to the Cracow police.

On August 19, the military prosecutor in Cracow sent this telegram to Nowy Targ: "Vladimir Ulianov is to be immediately set free."

A few days later, on August 23, the Ministry of the Interior telephoned to the Cracow police the supplementary information that, in the opinion of Dr. Adler, Ulianov might under the existing circumstances render important services. A few days after that, Lenin and his wife and mother-in-law went to Vienna. He remained there less than a week, and then took his way to Switzerland, receiving with the aid of Adler the documents necessary for the journey. By a post card sent on September 5, 1914, from Zurich, he informed Adler of his safe arrival in Switzerland and thanked him for his help.

3.

THE outbreak of the World War was a test for the Socialist International, the so-called Second International, formed in 1889. The majority of the socialist leaders in the various countries declared themselves in favor of support of their Governments during the War, and so they transformed themselves from the Internationalists that they had been, in theory, into national defenders in practice. The German Social Democrats voted in the Reichstag, on August 4, 1914, in favor of the war credits. On the same day the French Socialists adopted a decision for complete support of the French Government. The majority of the Russian Socialist leaders likewise declared the necessity of defending their country. The groups of the *narodniki*, the Social Revolutionaries, the People's Socialist party, and the Laborites took this stand of defense, and only a few scattered Social

Revolutionaries—among them, to be sure, such influential ones as Chernov—continued to hold to internationalism.

The majority of the Mensheviks or of the Social Democrats adhering to Menshevism also spoke for defense. Plekhanov followed a particularly clear course in this direction. But a part of the Mensheviks, headed by Martov, kept to the internationalist ideal. Trotsky also took this position, and so the "August Bloc" formed by Trotsky and the Mensheviks in 1912 naturally fell apart. The internationalism of Martov, and at first of Trotsky also, was of a theoretical and platonic character.

Lenin assumed a quite different attitude. The World War signalized for him first of all the approach of world revolution. As early as 1913 he had written to Gorky, "A war between Austria and Russia would be a very useful bit of luck for the revolution, but it is little likely that Francis Joseph and Nicky will give us this gratification."²

As it turned out, the gratification was granted soon to Lenin, not only by the emperors of Russia and Austria-Hungary, but also by the rulers and governments of other great and small powers.

From the very outset of the War, Lenin held to the extreme standpoint of irreconcilable conflict with social patriotism. For him this meant betrayal of the principles of international socialism. The news that the German Social Democrats had voted for the war credits seemed incredible to Lenin; at the first moment he categorically refused to believe it and thought that the dispatch had been invented and purposely distributed by the German Government with the aim of causing disturbance in the

Socialist ranks. When the news was confirmed, Lenin flew into a fury and declared that it meant the end of the Second International.

4.

ON the first day of his arrival in Switzerland, Lenin set about the organization of his own irreconcilable group. On September 5, in Berne, he wrote his theses "The Tasks of the Revolutionary Social Democracy in the European War," which were then discussed at a conference of a group of Russian Bolsheviks in Berne from September 6 to 8, and adopted by them. Two months later these same theses, phrased in part in still more decisive terms, were confirmed by the Central Committee of the Bolsheviks in the form of a manifesto, which was printed on November 1, 1914, in Lenin's paper, the *Social Democrat*. He condemned the conduct of the social patriots of the various belligerent countries, in his September theses embodied in the November manifesto, and called for the formation of a third revolutionary International in place of the Second International, which in his opinion was dead. Lenin made an appeal for the repudiation of the "besmirched" title of Social Democrats—"besmirched" by the leaders of the Second International—and for revival of the old Marxist title of Communists. He also sounded the slogan of transformation of the imperialistic war into a civil war. In one of his articles of this period, Lenin wrote:

The propaganda of the class struggle is the duty of a Socialist even in war; activity directed toward the transformation of a war between the peoples into a civil war is the single task of Socialists in an epoch of armed imperialistic conflict be-

tween the *bourgeoisies* of all the nations. Away with all the priestly, sentimental, stupid sighings for peace at any price! Up with the banner of civil war!

5.

ONE of Lenin's theses specially concerned Russia:

The task of the Russian Social Democracy is particularly and primarily a relentless and unrestricted struggle with Great Russian and imperial monarchistic chauvinism and with the sophistry of its defense by Russian liberals. . . . From the point of view of the working class and the laboring masses of all the peoples of Russia the least of all evils would be the defeat of the imperial monarchy and its armies.

So Lenin's internationalism, in regard to Russia, took the form of advocacy of defeat. In this connection, his views in 1914 were sharply distinguished from those that he expressed in his articles at the time of the Japanese war of 1904 and 1905. His writings of that period were not defeatist in the sense that his later ones were during the World War. On the occasion of the Japanese war, Lenin did not call upon the Socialists to help to bring about, even by propaganda, the defeat of Russia. He only predicted then the inevitability of such a defeat because of the incapacity of the autocratic power to carry on a war. Among Russian intellectuals the view was widely held at the time that military failure for the autocratic government would bring unavoidably closer some reform of the imperial system in Russia. Lenin also expressed this opinion. The fact that autocratic Russia was routed by Japan, under a constitutional government, became an argument for Lenin's pen, not against war in general but against the unpreparedness of the Russian autocracy to wage war. In

other words, Lenin condemned Tsarism not for the actuality of war but for its ineffective conduct.

"The fall of Port Arthur," Lenin wrote in January, 1905, "will lead to a most important historical summing up of those crimes of Tsarism which began to be exposed from the very beginning of the war."

So Lenin was not officially a defeatist in 1904-5, and in 1914-15 he was. Yet the defeat of Russia in the war with Japan could not and did not lead to any such consequences for Russia as those to which the defeat of Russia in war with Germany must and actually did lead—even though the burden of defeat was lessened later for Russia when Germany was vanquished in her conflict with the *Entente*.

6.

At the Berne Conference of the group of Russian Bolsheviks held at the beginning of September, 1914, there was present the Bolshevik member of the Duma, Samoilov. He carried to Russia word of the adoption by the Conference of Lenin's theses concerning the War. These theses were then discussed by the Bolshevik Duma faction, by the Russian section of the Central Committee, and also by assemblies of Bolshevik workers in various factories in Petrograd. The Russian Bolshevik organizations adhered to the theses, introducing in them only a few insignificant changes. The basic thesis of the desirability of a defeat for Russia was adopted.

Knowledge of this fact was carried abroad to Lenin by Shliapnikov, who went to Stockholm in the middle of October to reestablish contact between the Russian Bolsheviks and Lenin. In the middle of November,

1914, the Russian Bolsheviks arranged a conference in Ozerki, near Petrograd, for the discussion of their further activities in Russia in connection with their defeatist attitude toward the War. All the Bolshevik deputies in the Duma, of whom there remained five after the resignation of Malinovsky, took part in this conference together with the representative of the Russian section of the Central Committee, Kamenev, and also representatives of Bolshevik organizations from various cities, Petrograd, Ivanovo-Voznesensk, Riga, and Kharkov.

Before the Conference ended its work, all the participants were arrested by the police and committed for trial. Their case was called on February 23, 1915, and was heard in a special session of the Petrograd Court of Justice. The chief evidence of guilt was furnished by Lenin's theses concerning the War. Kamenev and all five deputies of the Imperial Duma were condemned to exile in Siberia.

Lenin showed dissatisfaction that the accused men did not display enough boldness in court, and particularly that Kamenev—whom Lenin in this instance called for some reason by his real name of Rosenfeld—tried to emphasize disagreement on his part with the Central Committee and even to prove his solidarity with the social patriots. However, Lenin expressed gratification concerning the activity of the labor members of the Bolshevik Duma faction, and the hope that their propaganda had already succeeded in spreading his ideas among the workers.

"The government hopes to frighten the workers by sending the members of the Russian Social Democratic Labor party faction to Siberia. It will be deceived."

7.

LENIN laid down in the autumn of 1914, as has been seen, his general line of policy. During 1915, he strove to strengthen his position and to organize a group of sympathizers within the International Social Democratic movement. His plan of further activity was indicated at a Conference of the section of Bolsheviks abroad, held in Berne from February 27 to March 4, 1915.

Upon Lenin's proposal, this Conference declared that all hope for restoration of the Second International was a harmful illusion, and that steps must be taken to bring together all the antichauvinist elements of the International. Further, the thesis of the desirability of defeat for Russia was confirmed, and the hypothesis of a civil war was worked out more fully: "Civil war is the conflict of the armed proletariat with the *bourgeoisie*."

Three members of the Conference, it should be noted, among them N. I. Bukharin and N. V. Krylenko, made declarations against Lenin's unconcealed advocacy of defeat and tried to advance in place of it the less definitive slogan of "War for Peace."

So there was formed the so-called Bukharin group which later tried to maintain a certain degree of independent organization. Piatakov, who had escaped from exile in Siberia, soon joined it.

Lenin's next step was to appear at the Zimmerwald Conference in September, 1915. This Conference of International Socialists was composed of representatives of two different tendencies in their movements.

The minority at the Conference, who formed the so-called "Zimmerwald Left," stood for the irreconcilable point of view of Lenin. To their program also adhered the following groups and delegates: (1) the Central

Committee of the Russian Bolsheviks; (2) the Board of the Social Democrats of Poland and Lithuania; (3) the Central Committee of the Social Democrats of the territory of Latvia; (4) a few individual delegates to the Conference—one Swede, one Norwegian, one Swiss, and one German.

The majority at the Conference consisted of Social Democrats who, although they were opposed to social patriotism, nevertheless had not decided to preach an open gospel of civil war and, like Bukharin, proposed the indefinite slogan of "War for Peace."

The Conference adopted the text of an appeal against the War stating that for proletarians "it was essential to begin a war for peace without annexations or indemnities, and that self-determination of peoples must be the unshakable foundation of national relations."

The Left group at the Conference proposed a different text for an appeal which was unmistakable, sharply condemning all social imperialists and specifically declaring the slogan, "Not civil peace between the classes, but civil war." In contrast to all illusions implying that decisions by diplomats and governments might establish a basis for a lasting peace or open the way for disarmament, the revolutionary Social Democrats should "constantly show the masses that lasting peace and the liberation of all mankind could be brought about only by social revolution."

The draft resolution submitted by the left group was not adopted by the majority of the Conference, and Lenin then signed the majority appeal.

Nevertheless, the "Zimmerwald Left" decided to form a special organization for future demonstrations. So, side by side with the international Socialist Com-

mission, which the Conference elected, there was set up a bureau of the "Zimmerwald Left" consisting of three men: Lenin, Zinoviev, and Radek.

8.

As the War went on and was accompanied by military failures in 1915, the political situation in Russia rapidly became worse.

The Government had begun the War with the friendly support of practically all the political factions of the Russian people except the Bolsheviks and the extreme conservatives. Like all the other governments of the nations taking part in the War, it did not foresee the long-drawn-out character of the struggle and the frightful strain, not only on the military forces, but also on all the industrial and economic resources of the country. The lamentable retreat of the Russian army in 1915 was caused primarily by insufficiency of rifles, artillery shells, and in general of all the munitions of an army. It was obvious that only the most extraordinary exertions of all political parties and economic organizations could avert complete catastrophe.

At the very outset of the War there had been formed the Unions of Zemstvos and Towns for the relief of wounded and sick soldiers. Now these Unions took upon themselves the task of aiding in the equipment of the army. In addition, War Industry Committees were formed, with the participation of representatives of the industrial managements and of the workers, for the militarization of industry. The central agency for all these social organizations naturally was the Imperial Duma; at the end of August, 1915, the moderate con-

servative and liberal parties in the Duma united, at the instigation of the Kadet leader, Miliukov, in the so-called "progressive *bloc*," which presented a demand to the imperial authority that a government be formed of "persons enjoying the unqualified confidence of the Duma." In the opinion of the majority of the Duma, this was the only way to concentrate national energy for the successful conduct of the War.

The Duma, it must be kept in mind, actually desired only to restore the unity between the Cabinet and the representatives of the people which had existed under Stolypin and to some extent under his successor, Kokovtsev. But shortly before the War, Kokovtsev was allowed to resign and was replaced by Goremykin, an insignificant man who proved to be, as he had been during the period of the First Duma, an unquestioning tool of the policy of Nicholas II. So just at the approach of the War, the Cabinet acted as the sponsor of the personal policy of Nicholas II and the country was facing the threat of a political crisis—a break between the Government and the Duma. A political conflict like that of the period of the First Duma occurred again, in the intense moment of exertion for war.

The conflict could have been prevented by a concession either from the Duma or the Emperor. But the Duma did not consider it possible to yield ground, since it had no confidence in the capacity of the Government to carry on a war without the aid of the social organizations. Nicholas II, influenced by his wife, the Empress Alexandra Feodorovna, likewise would not agree to go any great way to meet the progressive *bloc*. There began prolonged political complications. Nicholas II several times dismissed and then again summoned the

Duma; he substituted one minister for another; he took upon himself the responsibility of supreme command, in the hope that this measure would procure him authority in the country. Gradually, there resulted the complete political isolation of the Emperor, an isolation made greater by the attitude of Alexandra Feodorovna to interfere in the administration of the country and by the hidden activities of "Elder" Gregory Rasputin, who wielded a hypnotic influence over the Empress. More and more the Emperor forfeited prestige; the crisis dragged on, and reached its final climax in revolution.

9.

THE break between the Emperor and the Duma was rendered the more dangerous for both sides by the fact that it opened the way for action by a third force—the revolutionary proletariat guided by the ideas of Lenin. The Bolshevik newspaper *Pravda* had been suppressed at the beginning of the War, but during the two years of its existence it had been able to educate a considerable circle of readers among the workers in the spirit desired by Lenin. Nevertheless, patriotic sentiment seized the minds of Russian workers also at the commencement of the War, even in circles sympathetic to Bolshevism.

The acceptance of Lenin's Bolshevik theses by the Duma faction and by the Russian division of the Central Committee of the party was in keeping with the spirit of only an inconsiderable number of workers. In a strike in March, 1915, as a sign of protest against the trial of the Bolshevik faction in the Duma, about four thousand workers in all took part. Bit by bit, how-

ever, discontent among the workers grew. The prolongation of the War intensified this feeling, as did the rising cost of living and the difficulty of getting food supplies, particularly in Petrograd.

The conflict between the Duma and the Emperor also fostered a growth of opposition sentiment among the workers, since the speeches of the deputies were printed in all newspapers. Further, the ceaseless propaganda of the underground Bolshevik organizations, which had come together again, naturally was important. The possibility likewise existed that there was provocative agitation by agents of the Police Department, and also propaganda by German agents.

Whatever the circumstances may have been, from the year 1915 on there was a noticeable increase of dissatisfaction and unrest among the workers. In that year the number of strikes began to increase: During 1915 about five hundred thousand workers took part in the strikes, and in 1916 the number rose to a million, while at the same time nearly one-third of the strikes were political in character.

The Bolshevik influence among the workers was evidenced very clearly on October 10, 1915, at the first convention of electors from mills and factories in Petrograd to choose delegates from the workers to the Central and Petrograd War Industry Committees.

By a majority of ninety-five against eighty-one a resolution offered by the Bolsheviks was adopted, in favor of a boycott "of the defense organizations of the liberal industrial middle class (*bourgeoisie*).\" The election of delegates was postponed to the middle of December, when the results were the same: out of 153 electors, ninety adhered to the Bolshevik organization

and bolted the convention. Delegates to the War Industry Committees were then chosen from the minority of the workers. A like picture of Bolshevik predominance was presented at the election of representatives from the workers of Petrograd to the Insurance Council in February, 1916. Thirty-nine ballots out of seventy were cast for the Bolshevik list.

10.

At the end of April, 1916, in the little Swiss village of Kiental, there took place a second Conference of Socialist Internationalists. The actuality of a solid organization of the "Zimmerwald Left" was made apparent at the Conference, as was also the fact that there was a general tendency toward the left among the delegates.

The German group known as the "International," newly formed at the beginning of 1916 under the leadership of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, adhered to the left.

Twelve of the delegates at Kiental out of a total number of forty-three belonged to the left, but in several ballots almost half of the delegates proved to be on their side. So the resolution concerning the International Socialist Bureau, the directing organ of the Second International, amounted to a compromise between the various tendencies at the Conference and in some of its sections it was given a tone dictated by the left. This resolution left open the question of summoning the Bureau, but in case this should be done it recognized the necessity for all members of the Zimmerwald group to prepare for a joint demonstration in the Bureau against nationalistic socialism. In regard to the

main point of the program, the question of peace, the left group advanced its special draft resolution at this Conference as it had at Zimmerwald, including on this occasion a direct appeal to proletarians: "Ground your arms; turn them against the common enemy—the capitalist governments."

This draft was not adopted, and the Conference, like that at Zimmerwald, approved the text of a declaration containing an appeal for peace without annexations or indemnities.

Lenin was satisfied in general with the outcome of the Kiental Conference, however, considering that it had shown a rise of revolutionary feeling under the effects of the growing discontent of the proletarian masses.

Even before this gathering, he had begun to write a book intended to lay the foundation of theory for the teaching of international communism. This work was entitled *Imperialism as the Highest Phase of Capitalism*. It was designed for publication in a legal Russian edition. The book was ready in July, 1916. It later became the chief groundwork of international Leninism. According to its argument, the world had entered an epoch of overlordship by financial monopolies; this new phase of economic development was distinguished from the epoch of industrial capitalism in which Karl Marx had lived. The development of financial capitalism made it indispensable to the chief capitalist states to secure an economic foothold in colonial countries. This in turn meant that the world had launched into a period of military conflicts between the great capitalistic powers for the annexation of colonies. The epoch of wars could come to an end only through the overthrow of the

capitalistic system in these great nations and the establishment of communism in its place.

Lenin was making ready both the theoretical foundation and the connecting organizations among socialistic groups for the approaching revolution. In the way of the development of wider activity by the future Communist International there was at that time, however, one difficult obstacle to be surmounted: the lack of funds. In spite of the greatest pains and an ascetically frugal personal life, the future head of the Communist International had used up by the autumn of 1916 all the money in the party treasury. In September or at the very beginning of October of that year, Lenin wrote to Shliapnikov, who at the moment was in Copenhagen: "For myself personally I will say that some income is essential. Otherwise I shall just pass away, truly. The cost of living is devilish, and there's nothing to live on."

11.

TOGETHER with his general slogan for changing imperialistic war into civil war, Lenin advanced a separate declaration, as has already been shown, as to the desirability of defeat for Russia in the War. This war Russia was waging against the Central Powers. So, of course, the defeat of Russia could only mean victory for Germany. Consequently, Lenin's internationalism, despite his condemnation of the German *bourgeoisie* together with all others, fell in with the practical interests not only of the German "social patriots," but also directly with those of the German *bourgeoisie* and of Kaiserism.

From a realistic point of view, Lenin's doctrine was

to the advantage of Germany and he was an agent for Germany from the very outbreak of the War, a truth of which the leaders of the left opposition group within the Communist party itself accused him later just prior to the peace settlement of Brest-Litovsk.³

Lenin and Ludendorff had practical tasks in common. This fact does not imply that there was any organized agreement between them. It means only that, as Trotsky phrased it, "their lines of policy crossed."

It would be difficult to admit, however, that no thoughts at all of the possibility of an organized agreement between the two forces ever arose. As has been seen, at the very outset of the War the leader of the Austrian Social Democrats, Victor Adler, declared his opinion as to the Austrian Ministry of the Interior that "Lenin might under the existing circumstances render important services."

In the autumn of 1915 the German-Russian Social Democrat Parvus, who had formerly been active in the Russian Revolution of 1905, announced in the newspaper published by him in Berlin, *Die Glocke* ("The Bell"), his mission "to serve as an intellectual link between the armed German and the revolutionary Russian proletariat." Parvus suggested to his readers the idea that the German General Staff was seeking a revolution in Russia. Actually, so far as policy toward Russia was concerned, he was rendering in the terms of concrete actuality the more abstract phrases of the resolutions of Lenin. But for Lenin Russia was only one detail in his general policy of internationalism. He had no desire that his whole concept should be subordinated to the defeat of Russia.

So, in his newspaper, the *Social Democrat*, he pre-

sented a sharp criticism of Parvus, charging him with applying different standards to the policies of the *Entente* and of the Central Powers, and with defending the pacifists and internationalists in England and the nationalists and cheering patriots in Germany. Further, he reproached Parvus with "licking Hindenburg's boots and chanting hymns to this incarnation of the German national soul." It was quite natural that Lenin should fall upon Parvus in this fashion, since Parvus all too openly wished to take advantage of Lenin's point of view in the interest not only of the policy of realism of the German General Staff, but also of the policy of idealism of the German social patriots. But with them Lenin did not wish to have anything whatever to do. They appeared to him worse than the Kadets. At one time he had been ready practically to subordinate himself to Stolypin,* but he never ceased to attack the Kadets furiously. So it was in this instance. His violent assaults on Parvus, as a social patriot, did not exclude for Lenin psychologically the possibility of fitting his activities in with the activities of Ludendorff, and with the aid, as later became clear, of the same Parvus.† A working agreement with the "imperialists" never seemed to Lenin any betrayal of his ideals. Indeed, he declared in January, 1918, before the conclusion of the separate peace with Germany, that "the only traitors to socialism are those who exchange advantages in favor of the workers for advantages in favor of the capitalists, and only such agreements are in principle inadmissible." And in his January theses concerning the

* In the matter of the elections to the Third Duma; see chap. iii, sec. 1.

† See chap. v, sec. 3.

conclusion of a separate peace, in 1918, Lenin wrote, "There is a great difference between a compromise on the part of the Soviet Government with Germany . . . and a compromise on the part of the working class with the *bourgeoisie*." On the other hand, before the actual signature of the Soviet peace treaty of Brest-Litovsk, when Germany continued to advance, Lenin did not hesitate to accept military aid from the "imperialists" of the *Entente*, who from his standpoint were just as much enemies as the "imperialists" of Germany.* So Lenin was ready to come to an understanding with the "imperialists" in any circumstances in which he saw practical advantage to be gained for communism.

Did he come to any such business agreement with German imperialism, and did anything of this sort occur before the Russian Revolution?

Jean-Henri Bint, the director of the French detective bureau of Bint and Sambin, who had charge of the observation service for the foreign agency of the Russian Police Department, made, on December 30, 1916, a report addressed to the manager of the agency, A. A. Krasilnikov. It said that according to the information of detectives on December 28 the Russian revolutionary Ulianov (Lenin) left Zurich, where he was living, for Berne, and there entered the building of the German Embassy, where he remained until the following day, after which he returned to Zurich.⁴

The question whether or not this report corresponded to the facts is perhaps open to discussion. However, it must be agreed that, in consideration of the views expressed more than once by Lenin himself and of the tactics actually followed by him on several occasions,

* See later, chap. vi, sec. 10.

there was for him nothing unacceptable in principle in carrying on conversations with any representative of the German Government during the War. In the sense of Lenin's later arguments, before the Brest-Litovsk peace, this was for him by no means "an imperialist bargain."

V

Lenin and the Revolution of 1917

1.

INTO the struggle between the Government and the Duma there entered, at the beginning of March, 1917, a new decisive factor. This was the demonstration by the workers of Petrograd. A strike which began in the Putilov works on March 3 had spread by March 10 to become a general strike of all workers in the capital.

The troops of the Petrograd garrison began on March 11 to refuse to fire on the workers. On March 12 several regiments of the garrison marched to the Tauride Palace, where the Imperial Duma was installed. The Duma was on the verge of dissolution by a decree of the Tsar, but its members had nevertheless assembled in the palace. The soldiers of the regiments that had revolted against the Government declared their allegiance to the Duma. On the evening of the same day an Executive Committee of the Imperial Duma was formed, and there also gathered a Council (Soviet) of Workers' Deputies. In the course of the next day the leaders of the Duma organized the Provisional Government headed by the chairman of the Union of Zemstvos, Prince Lvov. Together with the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies, this Government issued a first declaration.

Nicholas II abdicated on March 15 in favor of his brother Michael, who on March 16 in turn renounced

the throne, consigning authority to the Provisional Government until the summoning of a Constituent Assembly.

The Romanovs had ceased to reign. Russia had actually been transformed into a republic, although the declaration of the republic was not contemplated until the gathering of the Constituent Assembly. What were the causes of the Revolution? They were varied: the weakening of the imperial power in its psychological hold through the political conflicts between Nicholas II and the Duma; the widespread dissatisfaction with the imperial authority in the army and throughout Russia; the local circumstances in Petrograd, which were economic in character; the rising cost of living and the difficulty of providing food supplies; the lines that stood before stores where bread or other food products were sold.

The troubles with food supply were of course much less serious than they became later in 1919 and 1920. But in 1917 they were unfamiliar and so especially irritating.

Further, Bolshevik propaganda was active among the workers. It is difficult to say what provocative rôle the police may have played; apparently, Minister Protopopov counted to some extent on provocation.

Some observers also assumed that agitation by German agents played a part; but no documents to prove this were discovered.

As for the troops of the Petrograd garrison, fear that they might be sent to the front exerted the chief influence on them; that is why the first declaration of the Provisional Government included a statement that

these troops would not be sent to the front. The soldiers of the Petrograd garrison were not suffering from short rations.

Despite all these circumstances, the labor movement—even reinforced by the mutiny of the local garrison troops—did not constitute a revolution in the national sense. Only from the moment when the Imperial Duma determined to head the movement was the mutiny transformed into a revolution.

The Provisional Government formed by the Duma soon proved, however, to be the bearer of merely nominal supreme authority. Actually, authority was divided between the Government and the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. The Provisional Government consisted chiefly of Kadets and their adherents. Only one Socialist was included in its personnel, the Social Revolutionary, Kerensky. Chkheidze, a Menshevik, was invited to participate but refused.

On the other hand, the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet comprised exclusively members of socialistic parties, and their sympathizers. Members of *bourgeois* parties, even though they might be democratic in character, were not admitted to the Soviet.

Among the Socialist parties represented in the personnel of the Executive Committee, both in the plenary board of the Petrograd Soviet and likewise in other Soviets formed in various cities of Russia, Social Revolutionaries and Mensheviks predominated. The Bolsheviks were in the minority.

The first question to be settled in the Russian Revolution was the attitude to be taken toward the War. A large proportion of the Social Revolutionaries and Men-

sheviks advocated defense, that is to say, they stood for the necessity of carrying on the War. The Bolsheviks, and also the lesser group of Social Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, were defeatists, and should have advocated with determination an immediate end of the War. But during the first period of the Revolution even the Bolsheviks did not make any open demonstration in the Soviets against the continuation of the War. So the majority in the Petrograd and other Soviets was unquestionably in favor of defense. At the same time, however, an order was issued on March 15 in the name of the Petrograd Soviet—the so-called Order No. 1—which actually disrupted discipline in the Russian army, since soldiers were advised not to trust their officers and to form Soviets of their own in each army subdivision.

As General Brusilov has said in his reminiscences, activities designed to disorganize the army were logical, from the point of view of the Bolsheviks who desired to terminate the War, but were incomprehensible on the part of advocates of defense.¹ The explanation of this is to be found in the general line of action of the Socialists favoring defense, in relation to the Provisional Government.

Both the Social Revolutionaries and, in particular, the Mensheviks were prone to habits of thought derived from the political conditions that had prevailed in Russia before the Revolution. They still had the illusion that they were living in 1905, when there was need to fear a return of reaction and a reversion to the old *régime*. In truth, the Mensheviks and the Social Revolutionaries were already in power. The Provisional Government, it was soon made clear, was quite ready to change its personnel by introducing a decisive number

of Socialists. But the Mensheviks continued to consider the Provisional Government as if it were an administration of the old type with which they always had to be ready to fight. The Provisional Government was by conviction entirely democratic. But the Socialists regarded it as a government of the *bourgeoisie*. So arose the majority tactics in the Soviet, of refusing support to the Provisional Government except so far as it would carry out a democratic program.

Distrusting the Government and realizing that its support rested on the army, the Socialists consequently tried to get the army out of its hands and to secure influence over the troops themselves. They entirely forgot, apparently, that the army was waging a war.

At the moment of the Revolution almost all the Socialist groups were deprived of their more distinguished leaders, who were either in Siberian exile or abroad. The first to return were those who had been in exile. Tseretelli, a member of the Second Imperial Duma, who had been banished as a result of the trial of the Social Democratic faction in that Duma,* returned on April 1 from Siberia. The Bolshevik Kamenev arrived a week earlier, also from Siberia where he had been sent at the beginning of the War.

Immediately on his arrival, Kamenev joined the editorial board of the *Pravda*, publication of which had been revived a few days earlier. He also became the leader of the Petrograd Committee of Bolsheviks which was set up as a legalized organization on March 15.

Until the appearance of Lenin, Kamenev played the leading rôle among the Bolsheviks. His policy was conciliatory toward the Mensheviks and Social Revolu-

* See chap. ii, sec. 6.

tionaries. He was not an unyielding politician of the type of Lenin; he also sensed the fact that the Revolution which was taking place was a common achievement of the radical parties, and so he was inclined to a hopeful view.

Upon receiving word while he was still in Siberia that the Grand Duke Michael Alexandrovich had renounced the throne, Kamenev sent him a telegram of greeting, addressing it to Citizen Michael Romanov. In his articles in the *Pravda*, and in his speeches in the Soviet, Kamenev adopted an entirely loyal tone toward the Provisional Government. So, in the first period of the Revolution the Bolsheviks were not sharply distinguished from the other Socialists and were only trying to give public sentiment and the decisions of the Soviet itself a tendency to the left.

In April the leaders of the Russian Social Democrats who had been abroad began to return. Plekhanov reached Petrograd from France on April 13, Lenin and Martov from Switzerland on April 16, and Trotsky from the United States at the beginning of May. Plekhanov was now an impassioned advocate of defense; the other three were all internationalists, including Martov who consequently adhered to the minority of the Mensheviks.

Lenin and Martov got back to Russia by an unusual route, through Germany, traveling in a "sealed" railway car.

2.

LENIN was in Switzerland when the Revolution began in Russia. With the first news that the Provisional Government had been set up, he adopted toward it an atti-

tude of unmistakable hostility. On March 16 he wrote to Alexandra Kollontai: "A week of bloody slaughter of the workers, and Miliukov, Guchkov, and Kerensky are in power. It's the old European story."

In the first of these "letters from afar" Lenin described the events taking place in Russia:

The Petrograd workers and soldiers, like the workers and soldiers of all Russia, self-sacrificingly fought against the Tsarist monarchy, for freedom, for land for the peasants, for peace against the Imperialist butchery. Anglo-French Imperialistic capital, in the interest of prolonging and intensifying this butchery, cooked up palace intrigues, organized plots, incited and encouraged the Guchkovs and Miliukovs, set up a new government all complete, which seized power after the first blows dealt to Tsarism in the proletarian conflict.

This Government is no chance gathering of persons.

These are the representatives of a new class which has raised itself to political power in Russia, the class of capitalistic landowners and of the *bourgeoisie*, who have long controlled our country in the economic sense and who, as at the time of the Revolution of 1905-1907 and during the years of counter revolution from 1907 to 1914, and finally, with particular rapidity, during the period of war from 1914 to 1917, have organized politically with extraordinary swiftness, gathering into their hands local administration, public education, congresses of various sorts, the Duma, the War Industry Committees, and so on. This new class was already in almost complete power at the beginning of 1917; so the first blows against Tsarism were enough to make it collapse, clearing the ground for the *bourgeoisie*.

For Lenin the Provisional Government was simply "a clerk for the multi-millionaire firms: England and France."

Lenin wrote to Hanecki in Stockholm on March 30,

"It is essential to overthrow the *bourgeois* governments, beginning with Russia, for otherwise it will be impossible to secure peace." Living in Stockholm, Hanecki was at that time the intermediary between Lenin and the Bolsheviks in Russia. For this purpose he obviously had at his disposal large sums of money, since in the letter which has been mentioned Lenin gave him this instruction, "In maintaining relations between Petrograd and Stockholm do not spare funds."

From what source did the means come into Hanecki's hands at that moment for Bolshevik propaganda in Russia? Up to the present time the Bolsheviks have published no information concerning the party budget for that period. So it is only possible to construct hypotheses.

Hanecki acted in Stockholm as commercial representative for Parvus. As has been seen,* Parvus held the view that coördination of activities between the German military command and the Russian revolutionaries was essential. He declared it publicly as his mission to serve as "an intellectual link" between the armed German and the revolutionary Russian proletariat. Lenin at one time had furiously criticized certain aspects of the views of Parvus.† Now however, Hanecki appeared in Stockholm as the representative of both Lenin and Parvus. Unquestionably Parvus had an opportunity to supply funds to Hanecki for use in Bolshevik propaganda. During the War Parvus was engaged in furnishing supplies to the German army and in huge speculations, and so considerable amounts of money passed through his hands. Quite apart from that, Parvus could also have procured money for the "deepening of the revolution"

* See chap. iv, sec. 11.

† *Ibid.*

in Russia directly from the "German Imperialists." Whoever financed Hanecki, the fact remains that means to further Bolshevik propaganda were at his disposal in the spring of 1917.

3.

LENIN was making every effort to go to Russia, as may be taken for granted, after receipt of the first news of the Russian Revolution. But to do this was for him no easy task. The route through Germany was formally closed to all Russians in the period of war. The normal route from Switzerland to Russia at the time was through France and England. But because of Lenin's defeatist convictions, affecting the cause of the Allies, opposition to his passage was to be expected from the French and English Governments.

After having thought over the situation, Lenin and the other Russian internationalists in Switzerland reached a decision to travel through Germany. Neither Lenin nor any of his sympathizers, it must be said, applied either to the English or the French authorities for permission to pass through their territory.

In order to go through Germany it was necessary not only to secure the permission of the German Government, but also to arrange the affair so that it would present as favorable an outward appearance as possible in the face of the unavoidable suspicion of treachery which the mere fact of traveling through enemy territory was certain to arouse in patriotic Russian circles.

An appropriate plan was proposed by Martov, who had now become the leader of the Menshevik internationalists. A theorist who remained, as he had always been, far removed from the actualities of life, believing

in the power of formulas, Martov himself probably thought that the episode would seem quite blameless, once it was rendered theoretically blameless to him. In any conversations about a practical agreement with the German Imperialists, he could hardly have been involved. His plan consisted in proposing that Germany should allow the Russian exiles to pass in exchange for the corresponding number of Germans and Austrians interned in Russia.

At first it was decided to approach the Swiss Government, requesting its good offices to this end. So certain appearances of correct international decorum were preserved. As the man to carry on negotiations there was chosen the Swiss Socialist Grimm, one of the leaders of the Zimmerwald movement. According to his account, the statement was made to him in the political department of the Swiss Federal Council that the Swiss Government could not act as an official intermediary since this would constitute a violation of neutrality. Then Grimm turned privately to the representative of the German Government in Switzerland. After that he stood apart from any intermediation, and the further conversations were carried on by another Swiss Socialist, Platten, an intimate and sympathizer of Lenin's and a member of the "Zimmerwald Left." Platten presented at the German Embassy in Berne a rough outline made by Lenin of the proposed organization of the passage of the Russian exiles through Germany subject to Platten's own personal responsibility. Two days later the conditions submitted by Platten were confirmed by the German Government, of course with the agreement of the German General Staff. General Hoffmann notes the name of the Reichstag deputy

Erzberger as the intermediary in these conversations.² Scheidemann, the leader of the German Social Democratic party who later became Chancellor of the German Republic, affirms that Lenin's journey through Germany was organized by Parvus.³

The motives animating the German Government and the German General Staff were obvious, and may be judged by the brief comments that have been made by General Ludendorff and General Hoffmann.

Ludendorff says: "In having sent Lenin to Russia, our Government took upon itself a special responsibility. From the military point of view his journey was justified; Russia had to fall."⁴

General Hoffmann writes thus: "Just as I launch grenades at the enemy trenches, just as I release poison gases against them, so as an enemy I have the right to make use of the means of propaganda against the opposed force."⁵

To afford Lenin and his comrades an opportunity of passage to Russia was in the nature of introducing disease germs into the organism of the Russian state. The calculations of Germany were clear, requiring no special commentary. The measure amounted to a continuation of the same policy followed earlier by the Austrian Government in freeing Lenin from arrest and allowing him to pass into Switzerland at the beginning of the War. The German Government certainly could not have taken seriously the conditions under which Lenin camouflaged his journey, in the form of an exchange of Germans interned in Russia. As the words of Ludendorff make apparent, the question for the German Government was not one of allowing Lenin to pass through Germany, but of sending him to Russia.

The documents concerning Lenin's trip through Germany have not been published by the German Government. As for Lenin himself, he published only the resolutions of the Russian Socialists and other Socialists in Switzerland, in regard to the beginning of negotiations, and the conditions proposed for the journey.

A railway car in which were Lenin, Martov, and other exiles was attached to the train leaving for Germany on April 8, 1917. On April 13 Lenin embarked on the steamer sailing from Sassnitz for Sweden. So the trip through Germany took at least four days, April 9, 10, 11, and 12. In Trälleborg Lenin was met by Hanecki, who then accompanied him to Stockholm. On the morning of April 14 Lenin was in Stockholm, and late in the evening of April 16 he reached Petrograd. The Bolsheviks gave him an imposing demonstration of greeting. Workers, sailors, and soldiers thronged the entire Finland Station and the square in front of it.

An armored motor car which was at the disposal of the Bolshevik committee carried Lenin to the palace formerly occupied by the ballet dancer Kshesinskaya, which had been seized by the Bolshevik committee at the beginning of the Revolution and served as the staff headquarters of the Bolsheviks up to the days of the July uprising.

4.

LENIN'S arrival brought about a complete change in Bolshevik tactics. On the first night that he was in Russia, Lenin delivered a speech at an assembly of Bolsheviks in the Kshesinskaya Palace, which by its tone of sharp irreconcilability sounded a discord in the harmony of the earlier conciliatory policy of the Bolsheviks. On

April 17 he wrote his famous theses which two days later were published in the *Pravda*.

Lenin's first thesis dealt with the War. For him "war on the part of Russia under the new government of Lvov & Co. continues unconditionally to be an imperialistic war for plunder, in view of the capitalistic character of this government, and not the slightest concessions to the revolutionary theory of defense can be admitted." His third thesis read, "No support to the Provisional Government, and exposure of the absolute falsity of all its pledges." A fifth thesis proposed, "No parliamentary republic, but a republic of Soviets of Workers, Farm Laborers', and Peasants' Deputies throughout the whole country from the bottom to the top."

Lenin's theses met with lack of comprehension even in the center of the Bolshevik party itself. Kamenev replied to Lenin in the next number of the *Pravda*. Goldenberg declared that "Lenin has raised the standard of civil war in the midst of a revolutionary democracy." It hardly needs to be said that the Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries took an antagonistic attitude toward the theses.

Lenin seemed to have isolated himself completely. But he had stood alone several times in the course of his career, without fear. And he was not frightened now.

Lenin was in a far more favorable situation than he had been before. He enjoyed absolute freedom for agitation and propaganda. He was living in Russia, at the very heart of the Revolution and of the Russian labor movement, and in the place where there were solid corps of Bolsheviks among the workers, educated by Bol-

shevik newspapers during the Duma period. Lenin now directed his efforts chiefly toward the preparation of these party corps of workers and soldiers. He also strove whenever possible not to carry on agitation in the abstract, but to give practical lessons, to train his supporters by organized street demonstrations. For this purpose it was essential first of all to choose slogans and occasions that would not strike directly contrary to the ways of thinking and talking of the Soviet majority. So Lenin tried at the start to center his blows, not on the Soviet parties, but on the Provisional Government, and particularly on those aspects of its activity which could be criticized as *bourgeois* or imperialistic.

The first opportunity for Lenin was afforded by the note of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Miliukov, affirming the loyalty of the Provisional Government to the Allied aims of the War and to the treaties between the Allies. Imperialism on the part of the Provisional Government was discerned in this note, and to such a policy with its aims of annexation, not only the Internationalists, but also the Socialist advocates of defense were opposed. The Bolsheviks now had a chance to make a move against the Provisional Government, shielding themselves with the slogans, not only of their own party, but of the whole Soviet. They organized street demonstrations on May 3 and 4 against Miliukov. The Kadets arranged a counter-demonstration in his honor.

The Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies assumed the rôle of a sort of super-arbiter between the Kadets and the Bolsheviks. All demonstrations of any kind were forbidden for two days.

These events, however, led to the reorganization of

the Provisional Government. The more active ministers in its first Cabinet, Miliukov and Guchkov, were forced to tender their resignations. Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries entered the staff of the Government. Kerensky became Minister of War.

During May and June, Lenin occupied himself with intensive party activity. From May 7 to 12 he directed an All-Russian Bolshevik Party Conference, which in its resolutions adopted the main principles of Lenin's theses. The Provisional Government was declared to be "a government of landowners and capitalists." At the same time there was acknowledged the absolute impossibility of union with the Social Revolutionaries and Mensheviks advocating defense. In regard to the War, the Conference noticeably softened the tone of Lenin's theses, conceding that

it is impossible to terminate this war by the refusal of the soldiers on only one side to continue to fight. The Conference protests against the base slander, spread by the Capitalists against our party, that we sympathize with the idea of a separate peace with Germany. Our party will patiently but persistently make clear to the people the truth . . . that this War can be ended by a democratic peace only through the transfer of all governmental authority in several at least of the belligerent countries to the proletarian class, which is in fact able to put a stop to the oppression of capital.

5.

THE May Conference of Bolsheviks showed that Lenin was again in command of his party. In the elections to the Central Committee he received an overwhelming proportion of votes, securing his seat by almost unanimous acclaim. After the party itself, Lenin turned his special attention to the workers of Petrograd, endeavor-

ing by every means to increase the influence of Bolsheviks in labor affairs.

Soon after the beginning of the 1917 Revolution in Russia, there began a stormy spread of organized trades-unions, whose activity had been under considerable repression from the administration during the War. The total number of members in several trades-unions doubled from April to June, 1917. There was one tendency to strengthen the unions by trades, and another toward the establishment of labor organizations consolidating each factory or mill as a single unit. In almost every factory there arose so-called "factory shop committees," which were legalized in May by the Provisional Government. In June there assembled a Petrograd Conference of these committees, which laid the basis for their coördination.

Strife quickly developed between the shop committees and the trades-unions. It was intensified by political convictions. The trades-unions were strongly influenced by the Mensheviks. In contrast, the shop committees rapidly yielded to Bolshevik propaganda. This was disclosed clearly at the June Conference of the Petrograd committees, when Lenin sounded the slogan of workers' control of industry. The Conference approved his proposal.

Through his success among the workers, Lenin began to feel much firmer ground beneath his feet for general political demonstrations. In the middle of June there was held in Petrograd the first All-Russian Congress of Soviets. Among the 790 delegates to this first Congress, the Social Revolutionaries and Mensheviks were in the majority. In all there were only 103 Bolsheviks. Lenin launched in the Congress a condemnation of the state of

divided power represented by the Provisional Government and the Soviets. He called for a government with a unified structure in the form of a republic of Soviets. When the leader of the Mensheviks, Tseretelli, said that there was no political party in Russia which would voice its readiness to take the responsibility of power entirely upon itself, Lenin retorted: "There is. No party could refuse to do that, and our party does not refuse to do it; and any minute it is ready to assume complete power." Laughter greeted his declaration. But he was not jesting. His triumphs among the workers had made his head swim.

For June 23 the Central Committee of the Bolsheviks scheduled a demonstration by workers and soldiers in favor of support for the authority of the Soviets. Its success would have implied the task of overthrowing the Provisional Government. But rumors reached the leaders of the Congress of Soviets, and at the last moment the Bolshevik Central Committee considered it more expedient to cancel the plan. Lenin, however, had no reason to lower and fold his hands, since his influence among the workers continued to grow. At the beginning of June there gathered in Petrograd an All-Russian Conference of Trades-Unions, in which the balance of forces was quite different from that of the Soviet Congress.

The Bolsheviks, it is true, were not able to seize control of the election in the Conference, but nevertheless their forces matched the forces of the Mensheviks. For the further guidance of the labor movement, the Conference chose an All-Russian Central Council of Trades-Unions. To this Council were elected sixteen Bolsheviks, sixteen Mensheviks, and three Social Revo-

lutionaries; but thanks to the Social Revolutionaries, the Mensheviks secured the balance of power in its executive committee with five Mensheviks to four Bolsheviks.

6.

THE advance of the Russian army, for which Kerensky had made preparations, began on July 1 on the southwestern front. During the first few days it developed successfully. The occasion seemed unfavorable for further Bolshevik demonstrations. On July 11, Lenin left for several days' rest in Finland at the cottage of Bonch-Bruевич. But even within this short time the state of political affairs in Petrograd altered so much that there was a division in the Provisional Government.

The grounds for the controversy lay in the question concerning the autonomy of the Ukraine. On July 14 a delegation from the Provisional Government consisting of three Ministers, Tseretelli, Kerensky, and Tereshchenko, concluded in Kiev an agreement with the All-Ukrainian Central Rada, which had been formed there. Upon receiving word of this, the Kadet Ministers quit the Provisional Government, since they held that the question of Ukrainian autonomy could not be settled before the gathering of the Constituent Assembly. Their resignation caused a governmental crisis. The problem of reorganizing the Government arose. The Bolsheviks regarded the moment as favorable for the seizure of power.

Factory meetings and party conferences of Bolsheviks began on July 16. On the morning of the seventeenth Lenin returned hurriedly to Petrograd and took upon himself the direction of the movement. On that same day there occurred great mass demonstrations in

the capital, organized by the Bolsheviks, with such slogans as "Away with the ten capitalist Ministers"—"Peace to the huts, war on the palaces."

Several thousand sailors came from Kronstadt. The troops of the Petrograd garrison either hesitated or definitely went over to the side of the Bolsheviks. Many workers who took part were armed with revolvers. The balance of force was undoubtedly on the side of the Bolsheviks on that day of July 17. But they either did not see how to utilize it or did not want to risk taking the decisive step of arresting the Ministers of the Provisional Government and seizing the official institutions. The entire day passed in street demonstrations, during which there occurred some firing and rioting, in which a number of people were killed and wounded.

On the next day, July 18, the picture changed. The Government called away from the northern front a strong squadron of cavalry. At the same time the mood in several regiments of the Petrograd garrison shifted sharply in favor of the Provisional Government when the Minister of Justice, Pereverzev, published evidence tending to show that Lenin and other Bolshevik leaders were receiving money from the Germans.


The movement of protest was put down. On the following day, July 19, government troops occupied the building held by the Bolshevik Central Committee, the Kshesinskaya Palace, and also the SS. Peter and Paul Fortress. The editorial offices and printing shops of the *Pravda* were nearly mobbed and wrecked by a band of military cadets. On the same day the Provisional Government issued an order for the arrest of Lenin, Zinoviev, and Trotsky.



Underwood & Underwood.

The Petrograd Uprising of July, 1917

Crowd scattering under machine gun fire across the Nevsky Prospect.



7.

INFORMATION from the Military Intelligence Bureau, published on July 18, had accused Lenin of receiving funds from Germany through Sweden. The agents and intermediaries indicated by these documents were Parvus, Hanecki, and Kozlowski.

The documents were published at the order of the Minister of Justice, Pereverzev, who was a Menshevik. The actual head of the Government at that moment, Kerensky, who within a few days formally became Premier, considered the publication of the documents a mistake, since it put difficulties in the way of arresting Hanecki, who just at that time had left Stockholm for Petrograd. His arrest, in Kerensky's opinion, might have afforded new and incontrovertible evidence of relations between the Bolsheviki and the Germans. Upon hearing of the publication of the facts in possession of the Provisional Government, Hanecki turned back to Stockholm without having reached Russian territory.⁸

As a result of this disagreement with Kerensky, Pereverzev was forced to resign. On the same day, July 18, immediately upon the publication of the information from the Military Intelligence Bureau, Lenin wrote for the new Bolshevik paper *Listok Pravdy* ("The Handbill of Truth")—the *Pravda* having been raided at the time—an article asserting that the information was a slanderous invention. Lenin even denied his connection with Hanecki. He wrote at the end of his article:

We would add that both Hanecki and Kozlowski are not Bolsheviks, but members of the Polish Social Democratic party,

that Hanecki is a member of its Central Committee, whom we have known since the London Party Convention of 1903 [as printed; should be 1907] which the Polish delegates left. . . . The Bolsheviks have received no money whatsoever either from Hanecki or Kozlowski. That is all a lie.

Lenin's efforts to repudiate Hanecki produced an odd impression. Hanecki's close connection with the Bolsheviks was not open to any doubt. Together with Vorovsky and Radek, he was a member of the Foreign Bureau of the Bolshevik Central Committee in Stockholm. Both at the beginning of the War and of the Revolution,* Hanecki rendered valuable services to Lenin and executed instructions from him. Lenin's assertion that the Bolsheviks received "no money whatsoever" from Hanecki is entirely untrue, for Lenin himself wrote on March 30, 1917, to Hanecki in Stockholm: "In maintaining relations between Petrograd and Stockholm, do not spare funds."†

After the Bolshevik Revolution, it should be further noted, Hanecki served in the Peoples' Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, and later was a member of the Collegium of the Peoples' Commissariat for Foreign Trade of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics.

So the intimate collaboration of Hanecki and the Bolsheviks cannot be questioned. It is apparent that Lenin's affirmation—at least the part of it repudiating Hanecki—definitely cannot command any confidence.

As for Parvus, Lenin did not mention him in his statement of July 18, but on July 19 or 20 he wrote in an article which was not printed at the time, "Parvus

* See chap. iv, sec. 2; also sec. 2 of this chapter.

† See sec. 2 of this chapter.

is being implicated, in the endeavor by any means to indicate some connection between him and the Bolsheviks."

Lenin further noted that the Bolsheviks had refused more pointedly than anyone else to have anything to do with Parvus.* Concerning the fact that it was Parvus himself who arranged for Lenin's trip through Germany in the "sealed" railway car, Lenin kept silent.

The connection between Hanecki and Parvus, Lenin could not deny, but he undertook to limit it to merely business relations: "Hanecki carried on commercial affairs, as a member of the staff of a firm in which Parvus was a partner." Lenin protested against an endeavor by his accusers to mix these commercial relations with politics.

In any case, the opportunity was opened to Lenin to refute the charge against him in court. At the start he contemplated doing this, and in his first statement in the *Listok Pravdy* he wrote: "Now the slanderers will answer for it before the court. From this point of view the matter is plain and uncomplicated."

Nevertheless, Lenin quickly reconsidered the question. Overestimating the determination of the Provisional Government, he judged that the suppression of the Bolshevik uprising would give the Government an occasion for a rough squaring of accounts with the Bolsheviks.

"Now they are shooting us up," he said to Trotsky as early as July 18. "For them it is the most favorable moment."

In a note written three days later, he remarked that

* See chap. iv, sec. 11.

"an appearance in court would be a concession to the illusions of constitutionalism," continuing:

If we consider that there is in Russia as good a government as possible, that there is a just court, and that the convocation of a Constituent Assembly is probable, then we might come to a decision in favor of appearing in court. But such an opinion is erroneous through and through . . . the convocation of a Constituent Assembly is unlikely without a new revolution . . . a military dictatorship is in existence. To talk of a court now would be laughable. This is not a court question, but an episode of civil war. That is what the advocates of appearance in court are vainly unwilling to understand.

With the approval of several members of the Central Committee and the Petrograd Committee of the Bolshevik party, Lenin and Zinoviev decided on July 27 to go into hiding and take a position outside the law. On the same day Kamenev was arrested. Two weeks later Trotsky and Lunacharsky were arrested. In the newspaper *Proletarskoe Delo* ("The Proletarian Cause") there was published on July 28 a letter signed by Lenin and Zinoviev on the reasons for their refusal to appear in court:

The counter-revolutionary *bourgeoisie* is trying to make a new Dreyfus case. . . . There is no guarantee of just trial in Russia at the present moment. . . . To give oneself up to the authorities would mean to yield oneself to the power of the Miliukovs, Alexinskys, and Pereverzevs, into the hands of infuriated counter-revolutionaries, to whom the charges against us mean simply an incident in the civil war.

In estimating the significance of this part of the declaration by Lenin and Zinoviev, it must be kept in mind that neither Miliukov nor Pereverzev were Ministers at the time and that Alexinsky had never been a member of the Provisional Government. At the mo-

ment the Government consisted, by more than half, of Socialists—Social Revolutionaries and Mensheviks.

In concluding their statement, Lenin and Zinoviev wrote that to speak on the question of the Provisional Government's order for their arrest "only the Constituent Assembly would have authority, if it should meet and should not be called together by the *bourgeoisie*."

8.

FROM July 22 to November 7, 1917, Lenin stood outside the law. During the first few days of this period, he and Zinoviev hid in the loft of a shed belonging to a Bolshevik laborer, near Sestroretsk, about twenty miles from Petrograd. Then he went to a hut in a hayfield a few miles from the station of Razliv. At the beginning of September, when colder weather began to approach, he moved again to the frontier of Finland, traveling on a locomotive as a fireman, and went across to Helsingfors, where he stayed first with the commander of the militia, a Finnish Social Democrat, and then with a Finnish workingman who was also a Social Democrat. At the beginning of October he left Helsingfors for Viborg, in order to be closer to Petrograd because of the events which were developing. During all this time he continued to keep in the closest touch with the Bolshevik organization and press, endeavoring to direct their activity.

The Sixth Convention of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party of the Bolsheviks, which had assembled in Petrograd on August 8, chose Lenin in his absence as its honorary chairman and as a member of the Central Committee. Lenin now raised in his own mind and before the party the direct purpose of mak-

ing ready for an armed uprising. He had indicated this aim even before the Sixth Convention, in an article on the political situation written on July 23:

All hopes for the peaceful evolution of the Russian Revolution have finally disappeared. This is the actual position: either complete victory for military dictatorship, or victory in a decisive conflict by the workers. . . . The goal of the conflict can only be the transfer of power into the hands of the proletariat, with the support of the poorer peasants, for the realization of our party program. The party of the working class, never forfeiting its position of legality but never for a moment overvaluing it, must combine legal with illegal activity as in 1912-1914.

Lenin in this article calls the government of Kerensky a military dictatorship. This was of course unjust; neither Kerensky nor any of the other leaders then in power in Petrograd had enough determination to establish a dictatorship, even though circumstances were pushing them in that direction. But as events actually turned out, an attempt to establish a military dictatorship was made by an army leader at the front.

On the same day that the Bolshevik uprising was put down in Petrograd, July 19, the Germans succeeded in breaking through the Russian front near Tarnopol. The Russian army of the revolutionary period showed itself unable to withstand an enemy attack. Then began a disorderly retreat.

By an order of July 25, Kerensky reintroduced the death penalty at the front for deserters. On July 31, General Kornilov, who advocated a determined revival of discipline among the troops, was appointed Supreme Commander in Chief. At the same time Savinkov was named as Assistant Minister of War. He acted as a sort

of intermediary between Kerensky and Kornilov in the drafting of a program of measures for the reestablishment of discipline among the troops. But it became clear very soon that General Kornilov was becoming the rallying point, apart from the Provisional Government, for the forces of all those groups desiring the reintroduction of discipline in the army and order in the country.

The figure of General Kornilov actually began to loom larger and larger as a military dictator. His popularity among *bourgeois* circles was made evident at the time of the Moscow State Conference which was opened on August 25. This gathering of representatives of various political parties and social organizations was a rather aimless device. It was of interest only in so far as it disclosed the profound difference between the socialistic groups, even those advocating defense, and the *bourgeois* groups. While the left wing of the Conference hailed Kerensky with exultation, the right wing with equal exultation acclaimed General Kornilov.

This very success of Kornilov at the Moscow Conference compelled Kerensky to adopt toward him an attitude of suspicion. At the last moment, just before confirmation of the plans to restore discipline in the army, Kerensky became afraid of a Kornilov dictatorship and issued an order dismissing Kornilov from the post of Supreme Commander in Chief.

Kornilov refused to submit and moved a squadron of cavalry against Petrograd. Kerensky and the Mensheviks in the Central Executive Committee of Soviets now had to turn for aid to the Bolsheviks and the workers, in order to oppose any force to Kornilov's troops.

The workers responded, a labor militia was organ-

ized, and so there was legalized the existence of squads of a Bolshevik workers' Red Guard. Matters did not come to the point of fighting; Kornilov's troops began to fraternize with the troops of the Provisional Government. His mutiny was broken up. Kerensky became Supreme Commander in Chief; Kornilov was arrested. The failure of Kornilov was accomplished by a break between Kerensky's government and the more conservative social groups. This gave Kerensky over to the will of the left radical groups, directed by the Bolsheviks.

The Bolshevik leaders who had been arrested after the events of July were liberated, among them Trotsky. The influence of the Bolsheviks among the workers and soldiers, and to some extent among the peasant masses, began to mount swiftly. The country was in a condition of complete administrative and economic chaos. The Provisional Government appeared unable to cope with the crisis. The most important questions at the moment—that of war or peace, the solution of the problem of food shortage, the disposition of the land—were all filed in the long case marked for postponement until the Constituent Assembly.

Elections for the Constituent Assembly were set for November 25. This did not appear too far away, but the patience of the masses of the people was worn out. Nobody wanted to wait another day.

The Petrograd Soviet adopted on September 19 a Bolshevik resolution concerning the organization of authority, and this led in turn to the resignation of the Menshevik and Social Revolutionary Presidium of the Soviet. A new Bolshevik phase in the history of the Petrograd Soviet began immediately after its transfer from the Tauride Palace to the Smolny Institute, for-

merly a boarding school for daughters of noblemen. In the Tauride Palace renovations began, in preparation for the meeting of the Constituent Assembly there.

Trotsky was chosen on October 8 as Chairman of the Petrograd Soviet. At a session of the Soviet on October 22 a resolution was taken to establish a Military Revolutionary Committee to oppose attempts by the staff of the Petrograd Military District to withdraw revolutionary troops from Petrograd. This amounted nearly to a seizure of power.

9.

FROM the time of the failure of the Kornilov movement, Lenin began to reckon on the probability of an early seizure of power by the Bolsheviks. His thought then began to run in two directions: first, the consideration of an actual program to be followed after the seizure of power; and second, the spurring of Bolshevik organizations toward the quickest possible overthrow of the Government. He indicated the program of the Bolshevik power after the governmental overturn in an article entitled "The Tasks of the Revolution" which was printed on October 9 and 10 in the newspaper *Rabochii Put* ("The Workers' Path"). Summarized, it constituted the following points:

1. It is essential to prevent any compromise with the *bourgeoisie*.
2. All authority in the state must pass exclusively to the Soviets.
3. The Soviet Government must at once propose to all the belligerent peoples the immediate conclusion of peace on the basis of democratic conditions.
4. The Soviet Government must at once abolish, without

compensation, private ownership of lands in the possession of owners of large estates and transfer these lands to the control of peasant committees until final solution of the question by a constituent assembly.

5. The Soviet Government must at once introduce workers' control of production and consumption.

6. The Soviet Government must arrest the Kornilovist generals and leaders of the *bourgeoisie*, establish a special commission for investigation of counter-revolutionary plots of the Kornilovists, must shut down the *bourgeois* newspapers and confiscate their printing shops.

7. The convocation of a Constituent Assembly must be guaranteed within a stated period.

In an article entitled "Will the Bolsheviki Be Able To Maintain Governmental Power?" written in the second week of October, Lenin discussed the means by which the Bolsheviki might be able to compel the officials of the state service, after the seizure of power, to work for them. The chief means, in his opinion, must be confiscation by the state for its account of all food supplies and other necessities of life, and their issue only to persons supporting the Soviet authority:

Anyone who does not work should not eat—that is the basic, primary, and chief rule, which the Soviets of Workers' Deputies can and will bring into effect, when they come into financial power. . . . The rich must secure from the union of workers or civil servants to which their sphere of activity is most closely related, workers' certificate books; every week or at any other designated interval, they must secure confirmation from this union that they are performing their work with good will; otherwise they may not secure bread cards or permits for any other food supplies or necessities of life.

After the beginning of September Lenin began to hurry the Bolshevik organizations to make ready for an overthrow of the Government. He wrote a letter

to their Central Committee and to the Petrograd and Moscow Committees, about September 25-27, on the necessity to seize power at once in Moscow and in Petrograd: "We shall triumph unconditionally and unquestionably."

Lenin also wrote on October 10 to I. T. Smilga, then Chairman of the Regional Committee of the Army and Navy and Workers of Finland. He regarded it as extremely important to make ready for aid by the Russian troops in Finland in the Bolshevik overthrow of the Government. He expressed dissatisfaction because the Central Committee had decided to postpone any uprising until November 2, the date for the opening of the Second Congress of Soviets. Lenin considered it possible that the power might be seized by the Petrograd Soviet, which could then in turn transfer it to the Congress of Soviets.

On the day that the Military Revolutionary Committee was established under the auspices of the Petrograd Soviet, October 22, Lenin went from Viborg to Lesnoi, near Petrograd. The following day, October 23, he took part for the first time since the events of July in a session of the Central Committee, held in the apartment of Sukhanov in Petrograd under the chairmanship of Sverdlov. By a majority of ten votes against two, the Central Committee adopted a resolution presented by Lenin in favor of starting an uprising as soon as possible. The two members of the Committee who voted against it were Kamenev and Zinoviev. Lenin called them "strike breakers" and threatened them with expulsion from the party. Their opposition could no longer have any significance.

Under Trotsky's direction, essential preparatory steps

were being taken every day. On November 1, a conference of the Factory Committees adopted a resolution declaring the necessity of a transfer of power to the Soviets. The Military Revolutionary Committee was acknowledged at a conference of committees representing the regiments of the Petrograd garrison, on November 3, as the directing agency for the army sections in Petrograd. Delegates of the Petrograd regiments issued instructions on November 4 that soldiers were to obey only staff orders confirmed by the counter signature of the Military Revolutionary Committee.

During all this time the Provisional Government, as if actually bound in some sort of trance, watched events without taking any measures whatsoever. Finally, on November 6, it concluded that the military cadets must be called to guard the Winter Palace where the Government was installed. The commander of the Petrograd Military District issued an order to the troops forbidding them to execute orders of the Military Revolutionary Committee. On the evening of the same day, Lenin sent a letter to the Bolshevik Central Committee demanding that action start that same night. Paraphrasing the words of Peter the Great, he wrote: "To delay in setting forth means to die." In disguise, Lenin made his way from Lesnoi to Smolny Institute late in the evening of November 6, thence to direct the movement.

10.

TROOPS commanded by the Military Revolutionary Committee occupied on the night of November 6-7 all the chief governmental buildings, the railway stations, and the main telegraph office.

Early in the morning of November 7, Kerensky



Revolutionary Orator Addressing an Army Meeting



Red Guards with an Armored Car



managed to get away from Petrograd by automobile, to Gatchina.

The other members of the Provisional Government remained in the Winter Palace. Soon Bolshevik troops surrounded them. The victory of the Bolsheviks was now beyond question.

At ten o'clock in the morning Lenin issued a proclamation "To the Citizens of Russia," announcing that "the Provisional Government has been overthrown. . . . The cause for which the people have been fighting—the immediate proposal of a democratic peace, the abolition of large estates, workers' control of production, and the establishment of a Soviet Government—this cause is secure."

At two o'clock in the afternoon he made a more detailed statement, in the same spirit, at the session of the Petrograd Soviet.

At ten forty-five in the evening there began the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets.

A little later, Bolshevik troops occupied the Winter Palace. The members of the Provisional Government were arrested and imprisoned in the SS. Peter and Paul Fortress.

VI

From the Bolshevik Seizure of Power to the Brest-Litovsk Peace

1.

THE Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets held two sessions, both at night, the first on the night of November 7-8 and the second on that of November 8-9. Lenin did not appear at the first session.

It was devoted to the formation of a presidium and to debates as to the scope of authority of the Congress. Six hundred and seventy delegates were present; among these there were 300 Bolsheviks, or less than half. The next largest faction was that of the Social Revolutionaries, comprising 193 delegates; after them came the Mensheviks, with 68 delegates, and then various smaller socialistic groups.

The Mensheviks and the Social Revolutionaries first of all protested against the military plot and the seizure of power, organized by the Bolsheviks behind the backs of all the other parties and factions represented in the Soviets; and they then quit the Congress. But only a few score delegates actually left. The Social Revolutionaries were divided, and the majority among them proved to belong to the left wing of the party. These Social Revolutionaries of the left decided to remain. Thus the Congress was enabled to consider itself as constituted. Almost the whole first session passed in debates and discussions. The second session was devoted to the business in order. At this session Lenin was present, and without

any opposition whatever he carried through his decrees concerning peace and the land.

The first decree declared that the workers' and peasants' government created by the Revolution and basing itself on the Soviets of workers', soldiers', and peasants' deputies, proposed to all the belligerent peoples and their governments the immediate commencement of negotiations for a just, democratic peace. Lenin promised to publish at once all the secret treaties concluded by preceding governments. In an explanatory comment on his draft for the decree, Lenin said: "We do not close our eyes to the difficulties. War cannot be ended by refusing to fight; war cannot be ended by one side. We propose an armistice for three months."

The decree concerning the land consisted of two basic proposals:

1. Private ownership of holders of large estates is abolished immediately without any compensation.

2. The lands of owners of large estates and also all lands of the imperial family, and lands belonging to the monasteries and churches, with all their live stock and other equipment, farm buildings and other improvements, pass into the control of district agrarian committees and township Soviets of peasants' deputies, until the meeting of the Constituent Assembly.

The comment was further made that lands held by ordinary peasants and Cossacks would not be confiscated. As a means for guidance in carrying out the agrarian reform, a peasant order concerning the land was attached to the decree, which had been compiled by the editorial board of the then Social Revolutionary newspaper *Izvestia* ("News"), of the All-Russian Soviet of Peasants' Deputies, and published in its issue for September 1, 1917. This order or instruction began with the

declaration: "The land question, in its full scope, can be decided only by the Constituent Assembly representing all the people."

Further, the order included a program later applied in detail in the nationalization of the land. Its main proposals were:

1. The right of private ownership of land is forever abolished.

2. All land, including land held by peasants, is expropriated without compensation, and becomes the property of all the people, passing to the use of all those actually working the land.

3. All citizens of the Russian State who desire to cultivate land by their own labor may secure the right to the use of soil.

4. The use of the soil shall be based on conditions of equality, that is to say land shall be divided among those desiring to work it, depending upon local conditions, in accordance with a standard of labor or consumption.

These basic proposals were in direct logical contradiction to the principles of the decree itself, which had spoken only of confiscation of the property of owners of large estates. But Lenin was not bothering himself at the moment with logical shades of meaning. What was important to him was to attract to his support as widespread masses of peasants as possible, and the slogan of nationalization of the land might lure to his side the peasant groups that had been reached by the propaganda of the Social Revolutionaries. In his commentary accompanying the decree, Lenin said:

Voices have been heard to declare here that both the order and the decree were compiled by the Social Revolutionaries. Let us grant it. It is all the same, no matter who compiled it; but we as a democratic government cannot evade the decision of the down-trodden masses of the people, even if we should be in

disagreement with them. . . . The fact is that the peasantry has formed a firm conviction that there are no estate-holders in the country any longer, that the peasants themselves can settle all questions, and that they can order their own lives.

After having adopted the decrees concerning peace and concerning the land, the Congress proceeded to pass a resolution for the formation of a workers' and peasants' cabinet, under the name of the Council of People's Commissars. Lenin also wrote out the draft of this resolution.

The first staff of the Council of People's Commissars was without exception Bolshevik. Lenin himself was its chairman. The Commissar of the Interior was Rykov; the Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Trotsky; for the Affairs of Nationalities, Stalin. To deal with matters concerning the army and navy there were appointed three Commissars instead of one: Antonov-Ovseienko, Krylenko, and Dybenko.

At the same time as the Cabinet, the Congress chose an All-Russian Central Executive Committee, destined to discharge the rôle of a sort of parliament under the Soviet system. The first chairman of the new body to be elected was Kamenev.

2.

LENIN had been able, in one session of the Congress of Soviets, to confirm the new Bolshevik Government and to carry through the two basic decrees dealing with foreign and domestic policy. His program before the seizure of power contemplated, it is true, the promulgation of a third basic decree concerning workers' control of production. This decree followed in due course only three weeks after the change of power.

The lightning-like swiftness of Lenin's first political acts after the transfer of power must be recognized. The very speed with which they were accomplished was in itself an immense political success for Lenin. But the most difficult phase was just beginning. It meant comparatively little to proclaim principles and to announce the composition of a government. All that had been done many times since March, 1917. It was necessary to prove in action the command of power. And it was here that Lenin showed himself to be of quite different clay from the ministers of the Provisional Government and the majority of the Russian intellectuals of that time.

Lenin held to power as if with clenched teeth, grasping it firmly in a death grip and paying no attention to the jostlings and cries of people around him. He was ready to pass and did pass over dead bodies and through blood, stopping at nothing and not reflecting for an instant on questions of morals or conscience, seizing any weapon, utilizing not sailors and Red Guards only but also slander and guile, not merely threatening reprisals but tempting the propertyless masses with the slogan: "Loot the looters."

The wine of triumph did not dull Lenin's wits; he did not permit himself a moment of quiet and repose. The victory that had been achieved only compelled him to exert all his energies for fresh gains. Not losing a minute, he flung at the masses new slogans, systematically thought out, indicated the foundations of the Soviet structure, wrote drafts of the most important decrees, personally supervised measures for the defense of Petrograd, took part in endless party sessions and debates. He accepted no special portfolio in the Council of People's Commissars, but at first he actually held control of

nearly every portfolio, intervening in the administration of all the Soviet departments.

From the first hours of its existence, the new Government had to give thought primarily to its own security.

Kerensky, who had escaped from Petrograd on the morning of November 7, succeeded in reaching Pskov, and persuaded General Krasnov to move upon Petrograd at the head of several hundred Cossacks to reëstablish the authority of the Provisional Government. Krasnov and Kerensky by November 10 had got as far as Gatchina. On November 11 the military cadets made an attempt to carry out an uprising against the Soviet Government in Petrograd. That night, fighting between these cadets and students and Bolshevik troops began in Moscow. The forces of Krasnov and of the Petrograd cadets were negligible. The anti-Bolshevik fighting squadrons in Moscow were a little more formidable. The Soviet Government could oppose to these forces troops that were somewhat greater in numbers but much poorer in quality. The workers' companies in the Red Guard were undisciplined and practically incapable of fighting. The sailors gave a better account of themselves.

In direct wire conversations with Helsingfors, Lenin insisted on the dispatch of reinforcement companies of sailors. As Commander in Chief of the Petrograd Military District there was appointed Colonel Muraviev, who in the autumn of 1917 had become a left-wing Social Revolutionary. Upon him fell chiefly the task of organizing the defense of Petrograd. Krasnov's advance was quickly stopped. The uprising of the little band of cadets in Petrograd was put down. Nevertheless, the situation of Lenin's government was very shaky.

In view of this fact, Lenin had to enter into conversations on November 11 with the All-Russian Executive Committee of the Railway Unions concerning the establishment of a purely socialistic government, that is, a government composed of all the Socialist parties. The Railway Union Committee was in a position to play an important rôle at the moment, since on it depended the agreement or refusal to permit the transport of reinforcements to Krasnov and Kerensky from the front, and without reinforcements Krasnov's Cossacks were too few to have any hope for success. The Railway Union Committee took the bait offered by these conversations; reinforcements were not allowed to go to Krasnov. Not receiving any aid, the Cossacks on November 14 gave up their resistance. Kerensky fled. Krasnov was obliged to surrender. By November 15 the Railway Union Committee had ceased to have any importance for Lenin. Even on the fourteenth he had declared at a session of the Bolshevik Central Committee that the conversations with the Railway Union Committee were only a diplomatic screen for military activities. The same day, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee adopted, upon proposal by Lenin, a resolution declaring that an agreement with the other Socialist parties was possible only on condition that they recognize the program of the Soviet Government and the necessity of a relentless conflict with counter-revolution. So Lenin outwitted the Railway Union Committee and found a way to gain his own ends.

Soon after this, however, division appeared in the midst of the Bolshevik Central Committee itself. The nerves of many of the Bolsheviks were not so strong as Lenin's. Kamenev and Zinoviev began to talk about con-

cessions. Lenin then composed an ultimatum of the majority of the Central Committee to the minority, demanding that the smaller group following Kamenev and Zinoviev should either submit to party discipline or openly separate from it. "Honorable and open division at this moment is incomparably better than sabotage from within." On November 17, four of the People's Commissars, among them Rykov, announced their renunciation of their official titles. Their statement of their motives was as follows:

We stand for the opinion that it is necessary to form a socialistic government comprising all the Soviet parties. . . . We consider that beside this there is only one other path: the maintenance of a purely Bolshevik government by means of political terrorism. On this path the Council of People's Commissars has entered. And we do not wish to enter it.

At the same time five members of the Central Committee—Kamenev, Zinoviev, and three others who were both members of the Committee and signers of the foregoing declaration by People's Commissars—announced their refusal in a meeting of the Committee to continue to act as members, giving the same reasons. Besides, Kamenev had to resign from the chairmanship of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee; on November 21 Sverdlov was chosen in his place.

In the course of two days a new political crisis arose. On November 23 there gathered in Petrograd an Extraordinary All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Peasants' Deputies. It comprised 195 left-wing Social Revolutionaries, 65 right-wing Social Revolutionaries, and only 37 Bolsheviks. Its sessions were made stormy by conflict between the Bolsheviks and the right-wing Social Revolutionaries. The left-wing Social Revolutionaries hesitated

in uncertainty. The majority of the Congress refused to listen to the report of the Council of People's Commissars. Lenin had to appear as representing not the Commissars but the Bolshevik party. Finally the right-wing Social Revolutionaries quit the Congress, and the majority of the remaining delegates declared in favor of support of the Soviet Government. On November 28, all the remaining members went to Smolny Institute, where there was held a session of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. A declaration was made that the All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Peasants' Deputies was merged with the Central Committee. Further, the Bolsheviks reached an agreement with the left-wing Social Revolutionaries on November 30, for their participation in the Government. As an essential condition, the left-wing Social Revolutionaries demanded control of the Commissariat of Agriculture.

3.

ONE main idea guided Lenin in all of his activities during the first months after the change of power: to hold on at all costs until the conclusion of peace with the Germans. If it should be possible to conduct the Soviet Government up to this point, the Soviet system would be confirmed in its position in Russia. Lenin's desire as to the conclusion of peace naturally fell in with the wishes of Ludendorff. It would be difficult to imagine that, with the advantage of the complete disorder prevailing in Russia at the time, German agents were not trying in one way or another to influence the course of events in Russia. Colonel Nicolai, chief of the German army intelligence service, states plainly that in the autumn of 1917, the Germans succeeded in introducing

their agents into Russia.¹ As a matter of fact, the German General Staff had no actual need of special agents. If Lenin had been a German agent, he could not have acted otherwise than he did. As stated by Colonel Nicolai, both the German and the Bolshevik propaganda fused together in view of the fact that they had a common aim.¹ Both to Lenin and Ludendorff it was primarily necessary to smash the Russian army organization at any cost, and to stun the brain of the army—the Headquarters. Lenin feared that from it there might rise a new wave of agitation against the Soviet power. To Ludendorff it was important to insure himself against the possibility even of any last convulsive movements of the Russian army. For Lenin it was indispensable, in order to curry popularity for the Bolshevik authority among the masses, to show that in contrast to all preceding governments this authority could not only adopt resolutions but could act on them. Otherwise the passage of the decree concerning peace would not have produced the psychological results that Lenin desired.

General Dukhonin was discharging the responsibilities of Commander in Chief at the time; he had been Chief of Staff under Kerensky as Commander in Chief, and he assumed the duties of Supreme Commander after the disappearance of Kerensky.

The Council of People's Commissars sent a wireless message to Dukhonin on November 20, instructing him to propose an armistice at once to all the belligerent nations, both those allied with and those hostile to Russia. Not having received any response from him up to the evening of November 21, Lenin got in touch with him early in the morning of November 22, by direct wire.

Dukhonin replied that only the central governmental

authority, supported by the army and the nation, could enter into negotiations for peace, and that Headquarters could not do so. He added that he also considered it essential in the interests of Russia to conclude the quickest possible general peace.

Lenin regarded Dukhonin's answer as a refusal to execute the order of People's Commissars, and informed Dukhonin that he was dismissed from his post. Krylenko, who held the rank of *praporshchik*, the lowest grade for commissioned officers which may be roughly translated as sublieutenant, lower than a second lieutenant, was appointed as the new Supreme Commander in Chief.

Immediately after this, Lenin sent a wireless message to all regimental, division, corps, army, and other committees, and to all soldiers of the revolutionary army and sailors of the revolutionary fleet. He announced that Dukhonin had refused to submit to an order of the Government and that his conduct "would bring upon the laboring masses of all countries, and particularly upon the armies, unheard-of miseries."

In this manner Lenin freed the Council of People's Commissars from responsibility to the masses of the soldiers for the fact that there was yet no actual peace, and transferred it instead to Dukhonin. At the same time, he proposed to the soldiers to act for themselves. "Let the regiments holding positions at the front at once choose plenipotentiaries to enter formally into negotiations with the enemy for an armistice." The following day the Soviet Government addressed a proposal to the representatives of neutral countries to inform the governments of the hostile countries officially of its readiness

to conclude an armistice without delay and to take up peace negotiations.

The agreement of the German Commander in Chief was received on November 27, assenting to a conference on an armistice. The Council of People's Commissars turned at once to the Allies with the question whether they were prepared to begin peace discussions on December 1 with the four Central Powers.

Krylenko, heading a squad of sailors, went simultaneously to Mogilev, where Headquarters were located, to raid them decisively. His squad occupied Headquarters on December 3. General Dukhonin was brutally murdered by sailors as he was entering the train which was to have carried him to Petrograd. On December 5 an agreement was signed in Brest-Litovsk halting military activities between Russia and the Austro-German forces for ten days. Peace discussions were renewed on December 13; and on December 15 there was signed an agreement with the Central Powers for an armistice until January 14, 1918.

4.

IN his speech at the session of the Petrograd Soviet on the very day of the overthrow of the Provisional Government on November 7, Lenin said: "The old governmental system will be shattered to the roots, and there will be established a new apparatus of administration in the form of Soviet organizations."

The first task of the Bolsheviks was to gain command of the agencies of central administration of the previous *bourgeois* system, the ministerial departments. Although the Bolsheviks had to deal with strikes of the

civil servants, they were able generally to put down the resistance of the older employees quickly enough or else to select new ones to fill their places. Certain special tasks were soon accomplished; thus, for example, within a few days Trotsky succeeded as Commissar of Foreign Affairs, with the aid of the sailor Markin, in discovering the texts of the secret treaties with the Allies in the old Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and they were then published. But of course the agencies of central administration, in the midst of the prevailing economic and administrative chaos, could not maintain even a semblance of their former significance in the country.

More important than the seizure of the ministerial chancelleries was the seizure of the banks. A whole series of officials in the Ministry of Finance, and first the director of the State Bank, Shipov, were discharged on November 24. The Communist, Obolensky, was appointed as Supreme Commissar of the State Bank. In protest against this act, there was a strike of the officials of the central State Bank which caused in turn a temporary stoppage of the bank's activity; then, with their reserves used up, the private banks also closed temporarily. By the middle of December the operation of the central State Bank was revived. The union of private banks was allowed to withdraw fifty million rubles from their current accounts within a week.

In the chaos of partisan conflict and economic disorganization, breaking down what remained of the former system of military and civic organizations, Lenin began very quickly to forge a new weapon for the defense of his power. This was the political police, that had been abolished under the Provisional Government. Lenin found ways rapidly to reconstitute not only the political

police force of the Tsarist *régime* but also to render it incomparably more menacing and active than it had ever been under the Tsars. The difference from the former political police system lay in the fact that now an important part of the mass of the population, the working proletariat, was attracted to the support of the police. The very system that the old Police Department had merely attempted to bring into being, through the organization of contact with groups of workers favored by Zubatov, and through the Union of the Russian People, Lenin was able to set up on very broad lines. He put the conflict with his political antagonists on a basis of class warfare, accusing all his opponents of sabotage and speculation.

Lenin issued an appeal to the people on November 18, summoning all the workers to rally around the Soviets, to introduce a strict control over the production and distribution of necessities, and also to arrest and commit to the revolutionary tribunals every person detected in hampering production or concealing supplies of bread and other foodstuffs. His grim intolerance now began to show itself in every direction; the earlier polemics of the political sectarian began to be transformed into governmental decrees. Once having seized power, Lenin instantly became imbued with the ways of thinking of the most merciless dictator, and all political opponents began to seem to him criminals simply because they thought differently. Lenin, who had protested in July, 1917, against persecution of agents of the Bolshevik party by the Provisional Government without adequate grounds, now began to shout right and left from the eminence of his post as dictator, of the treachery of Kaledin and the implication with him of the leaders of

the *bourgeois* party—despite the fact that Kaledin, a Don Cossack ataman, had in view at the time only the establishment of autonomy for the Don troops, independent of the Bolshevik power, and had not indicated any aggressive intentions, and also despite the fact that the chief *bourgeois* party of the Kadets was still resting all its hopes on the Constituent Assembly and on parliamentary methods of fighting the Bolsheviks.

Lenin issued a decree on December 11, 1917, declaring the Kadets "a party of enemies of the people." The directing members of the party became liable under this decree to trial by the revolutionary tribunals. Lenin then wrote a memorandum, on December 19 or 20, to F. E. Dzerzhinsky, containing the draft of a general decree for combating counter-revolution and sabotage. He suggested that the Commissariat of the Interior should with the aid of house committees assume supervision of all the *bourgeoisie*, the landowners, and the wealthier classes. In the category of persons belonging to the wealthier classes was included everyone with an income of five hundred rubles (\$250) a month, or more, or who possessed town property, securities, or money to the amount of more than a thousand rubles (\$500). Such persons, and also all employees in banks, investment firms, and other institutions, were required to submit to the house committees information concerning their incomes and occupations.

On the basis of this memorandum of Lenin there was established the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission (later notorious under the name of the *Cheka*, coined by combining the initials of the Russian words meaning Extraordinary Commission) under the direction of

Dzerzhinsky. He not only proved himself a worthy successor of Beletsky, but soon surpassed his model.

5.

MORE than once before the Bolshevik overthrow of the Provisional Government, as has been seen, Lenin declared the necessity of summoning a Constituent Assembly as quickly as possible, and even accused the Provisional Government of purposely delaying it. He made a declaration in the same spirit at the very moment of the seizure of power. In his commentary on November 8 accompanying the decree concerning the land, Lenin mentioned the fact that the order for the agrarian reform had been compiled by the Social Revolutionaries: "And if the peasants themselves go further with the Social Revolutionaries and give them a majority at the Constituent Assembly, we still will say, 'So let it be.' "

Elections for the Constituent Assembly were set in accordance with a resolution of the Provisional Government of August 22, 1917, for November 25, and the day appointed for the meeting of the Assembly was December 11, 1917. On November 10, that is, at the time when conversations were going on with the Railway Union Committee, the Council of People's Commissars adopted a resolution for the summoning of the Constituent Assembly at the proper time. Elections for the Assembly actually took place almost everywhere on the day set, November 25, 1917. The returns were a staggering shock for the Bolsheviks. Of the 715 members elected to the Assembly, 412 were Social Revolutionaries, the great majority of them belonging to the right

wing; 183 were Bolsheviks, 17 Mensheviks, and 16 Kadets.

No sooner were the results of the elections known than Lenin began to take measures to "rectify" them. The All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Soviets confirmed on December 4 a decree assigning to the people the right to recall members of the Constituent Assembly. On the basis of this decree, the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and also the Soviets of Peasants' Deputies of every district were authorized, at their own discretion, to arrange new elections to all town, agrarian, and representative institutions, including the Constituent Assembly. Meanwhile, the convocation of the Assembly was postponed.

The Council of People's Commissars passed a decree on December 9 that the first session of the Constituent Assembly should open upon notice from the Commissar on Elections to the Constituent Assembly, after the arrival in Petrograd of more than four hundred members of the Assembly. The Bolshevik, Uritsky, had been appointed as Commissar on Elections. On December 11, 1917, the day set earlier by the Provisional Government for the opening of the Assembly, Social Revolutionaries and Kadets organized a street demonstration in Petrograd in its defense. Social Revolutionary and Kadet Deputies who had arrived at the time tried to enter the Tauride Palace and to open the sessions of the Assembly without Bolshevik authorization. But by order of the Council of People's Commissars, bands of Red Guards occupied the building, and the attempt did not succeed. On the evening of that same day, Lenin declared the Kadet party to be enemies of the people; he

did not decide to take such an attitude at the time toward the Social Revolutionaries.

A few Kadet members of the Constituent Assembly were arrested and imprisoned in the SS. Peter and Paul Fortress. In the middle of January two of them, Shingarev and Kokoshkin, were transferred on account of illness to one of the municipal hospitals, and there they were murdered by a mob of sailors and Red Guards who forced their way in.

The left-wing Social Revolutionary faction presented an inquiry in the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, on December 14, as to the basis on which members of the Constituent Assembly had been arrested, when as members of the supreme organ of the power of the people they should have enjoyed the right of inviolability. In response, Lenin said:

We are being asked to summon the Constituent Assembly as it was planned. Begging your pardon—No. It was designed against the people. We overthrew the Government in order to have a guarantee that the Constituent Assembly would not be utilized against the people, and in order to hold this guarantee in the hands of the Government.

By a majority of 150 against 98, with three refraining from voting, the Central Executive Committee passed a resolution approving the actions of the Council of People's Commissars and affirming the necessity of determined combat with the counter-revolutionary *bourgeoisie*.

The Social Revolutionaries tried to make a demonstration against the Soviet Government at the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Peasants' Deputies, which opened on December 9. After a long and stormy

debate, however, this Congress split up. The right-wing Social Revolutionaries bolted it, and held separate sessions. The left-wing Social Revolutionaries approved the policy of the Council of People's Commissars, with reservations, and elected an All-Russian Executive Committee of the Soviets of Peasants' Deputies consisting of eighty-one left-wing Social Revolutionaries and twenty Bolsheviks. On December 22 the Congress ended. After this, Lenin considered the ground sufficiently prepared for a direct conflict with the Constituent Assembly. He compiled on December 24 his theses concerning the Constituent Assembly, according to which it might be permitted only on condition of agreement to the right of new elections of members by local Soviets upon request and also on condition of unreserved recognition of the Soviet authority. Soon afterward there was published an order of the Council of People's Commissars for the convocation of the Constituent Assembly on January 18.

Two days before the proposed opening of the Assembly, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Soviets adopted at Lenin's proposal a resolution to the effect that all power in the Russian republic was vested in the Soviets and in the Soviet institutions. So any attempt, from any quarter whatsoever or by any institution, to acquire any functions of governmental authority was to be regarded as counter-revolutionary activity.

This resolution was obviously directed against the Constituent Assembly. In contradiction to it, the Social Revolutionaries and the Kadets proclaimed the slogan: "All power to the Constituent Assembly." In support of this slogan there was organized in Petrograd on January

18, the day of the opening of the Constituent Assembly, a street demonstration which Red Guards broke up. Nevertheless the session of the Assembly was opened. The leader of the Social Revolutionary party, Chernov, was chosen as its chairman, receiving 244 votes against 151. After this and after refusal by the Assembly to proceed according to the program proposed by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, the Bolsheviks quit the gathering. The left-wing Social Revolutionaries followed them out. During the night of January 19-20, after hearing a report by Lenin, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee passed a decree dissolving the Assembly. A patrol squad of sailors then closed its sessions. The Bolshevik and left Social Revolutionary members of the convention were included in the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of Soviets. The other members of the Assembly slowly left Petrograd, either to disappear entirely from the political arena or to enter into direct conflict with the Soviet *régime*.

6.

THE strongest point of support for the Soviet Government during all the first months of its existence after the transfer of power had apparently to be found in the working class. The basic measure in favor of the workers, according to the plan that had already been worked out before the overthrow of the Provisional Government, was the introduction of workers' control of production and consumption. The draft of a resolution on workers' control was written by Lenin immediately after the change of power and was published on November 16 in the *Pravda*. It provided the foundation for

a decree issued on November 28 by the Council of People's Commissars.

According to this proposal of November 28,

in all industrial, labor, financial, agricultural, transportation, coöperative, and similar enterprises, employing wage workers or contracting for work to be done at home, there is introduced workers' control of production, of the purchase and sale of products and raw materials, of their storage, and also of the financial management of enterprises. The workers in any given enterprise shall establish workers' control through their elected agencies, such as the mill and factory committees, shop foremen's councils, and the like, with the condition that representatives of the employees and the technical staff shall be included in the membership of these agencies.

The workers' control bodies shall have the right to supervise production, and to set a minimum output for each enterprise.

The workers' control bodies have the right of controlling all the business correspondence of any enterprise, and for withholding correspondence the proprietors shall be liable to trial. . . . Commercial secrecy is abolished.

Workers' control consequently did not signalize either nationalization of the factories nor abolition of the rights of proprietors to private ownership of factories. The whole affair was actually a halfway measure. A dual authority of the *bourgeoisie* and proletariat was introduced in the factories, like that which had existed in the sphere of politics from March to November, 1917. So the dictatorship of the proletariat was more cautious and reserved in its action in exactly that field which most directly involved the interests of the proletariat. The reason for this lay partly in Lenin's anxiety that the workers might not be able technically to take command of production. Another partial reason for his caution was his lack of complete confidence in the working class and his wish first to get the organization

THE BOLSHEVIK SEIZURE OF POWER 197

of the workers' trades-unions into the hands of the Government, so that no opposition from their side would have to be anticipated. The point was that in the trades-union movement the Mensheviks had a much stronger hold than they had in politics generally at that time. Such influential unions as the All-Russian Executive Committee of Railway Workers, the typographical workers, the employees in commercial and industrial concerns, sympathized with the Mensheviks. In the higher circles of the labor-union movement, the Mensheviks had begun to strengthen themselves generally as early as the summer of 1917, but gradually these leaders of the trades-unions found the ground slipping away from under their feet. The members who began to join the unions after the change of power were inclined to favor the Bolsheviks.

In January, 1918, there assembled the First Congress of Trades-Unions, at which the Bolsheviks held an absolute majority of 273 out of a total of 416 delegates. The Mensheviks formed a strong opposition party. A furious discussion arose, during which the Mensheviks advocated the idea of independence of the trades-unions from governmental authority, while the Bolsheviks insisted that since governmental authority had passed to the Soviets the trades-unions must become agencies of the governmental power. The point of view of the Bolsheviks of course prevailed. They showed themselves to be the masters of the situation also in the new All-Russian Central Council of Trades-Unions. The earlier division in the trades-union movement* was ended: the factory and mill committees became the primary cells in the trades-union organization, in in-

* See chap. v, sec. 5.

dividual enterprises. The All-Russian Central Council of Trades-Unions was thus made the agency of the factory committees.

7.

LENIN had already worked out at the time of the First Congress of Trades-Unions a general plan for the socialization of Russian economic life. On December 14, 1917, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee had adopted a resolution for the establishment of the Supreme Council of National Economy.

In the discussion of this project in the Central Executive Committee, Lenin indicated that this Council would not be a parliament but a fighting agency for combat with the capitalists and landowners in the economic sphere just as the Council of People's Commissars was in politics. At the first session of the Bureau of the Supreme Council of National Economy, about December 27, 1917, Lenin introduced a draft decree concerning the socialization of the national economic system. It included points dealing with the nationalization of all stock-share enterprises and banks, the annulling of all governmental loans, both foreign and domestic, the introduction of the universal obligation of labor, and a system for strict control of the distribution of all food products and necessities of life by cards.

This project of Lenin's the Bureau of the Supreme Council of National Economy adopted as a general program for the development of its activities, and it assigned to its members the task of working out the individual points in the form of decrees. Without delay, the point in Lenin's program concerning nationalization of the banks was put into effect. All banks and

credit institutions in Petrograd were occupied by squads of Red Guards, and the directors were arrested and transported to Smolny Institute.

A further measure was the decree concerning communes of consumers, compiled by Lenin at the beginning of January and published in the middle of January with the signature of the People's Commissar of Supplies, A. G. Schlichter. According to this decree:

All citizens of the state must belong to a local consumers' society (either a village society, or one uniting several small villages, or comprising a definite section of a town, or section of a street, or the like). . . . All existing consumers' societies are nationalized, with the obligation to include in their membership the entire population of the locality concerned. Not less than two-thirds of the number of families in every consumers' society, according to this decree, must belong to the poorer classes, that is to the workers or to peasants not hiring any laborers, and the like.

A little later, on February 8, 1918, there was published the decree annulling all national loans, adopted by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee on February 3, 1918.

8.

ONE of the chief accusations that Lenin had hurled at the Provisional Government before its overthrow, was that it was impotent to cope with the general economic crisis, and particularly the food shortage.

Now, after two months of power during which he gradually surmounted political and military difficulties, Lenin himself was in no better position than the Provisional Government had been. Despite all the plans of economic reform that had been drafted out on paper, the economic system of the country was actually going

to pieces faster and faster. Factories and mills, not nationalized, yet at the same time taken out of the hands of their former proprietors, had almost ceased to produce. The railways were every day less and less capable of transportation. The food shortage grew worse. The value of paper currency dropped unrestrainably, and the villages were already beginning almost to refuse to accept it in exchange for wheat and the other products of village industry which were essential to the towns. So the towns found themselves facing the threat of famine. In January, 1918, the bread ration of even the best-cared-for revolutionary soldier of the Red Guard in Petrograd amounted to one quarter of a pound a day for each man.

Lenin presented at a session of the presidium of the Petrograd Soviet, on January 27, 1918, a proposal for extraordinary measures to save the situation. He suggested: "Food speculators should be shot on the spot. . . . The more well-to-do part of the population must be left for three days without a bread ration, since they possess reserve stocks and other products and they can also buy at high prices from the speculators"—the very speculators that, as he had just said, Lenin himself proposed to shoot without trial.

It is indispensable [said Lenin] to summon a plenary session of the Soviet and to order mass searches in Petrograd and at all freight stations on the railways. For such searches every factory and every military company should assign squads, and in such searches there should be included not simply volunteers, but everyone under compulsion of the threat of being deprived of a bread card. . . .

The only expedient to save the cities seemed further to be the dispatch of special squads of workers to the

villages for food supplies. But the villages might not yield up their stock of grain; it was necessary to take into account the possibility that grain might have to be seized by force. So it was essential to weaken the resistance of the villages in advance. At this point Lenin set in action his old idea of organizing the poorer peasants.*

In a speech to Bolshevik agitators at the beginning of February, 1918, as they were being sent out into the provinces, Lenin said that "strife between the rich peasants and the hard-working peasants is beginning to flame up, and we must help the poorer peasants. . . . We did not take the land away from the estate-holders in order to have it fall into the hands of the rich peasants."

"We are confident," he said a few days later at a conference of peasant deputies and agrarian committees, "that the hard-working peasantry will declare relentless war against its oppressors, the rich peasants."

These were, however, only trial balloons. Officially, Lenin's point of view had not yet been adopted in Bolshevik legislation. On February 19, 1918, there was published the law for the socialization of the land, adopted a month earlier by the Third Congress of Soviets, which had been worked out by the left-wing Social Revolutionaries on the basis of the idea of equal division of the land among the peasants and also of the peasant commune as the organic unit.

That spring, throughout Russia, the peasants divided all the land in equal shares, both that of village communes and that of private owners, without knowledge of the maturing schemes of the Red dictator.

* See chap. i, sec. 5.

9.

PEACE negotiations were renewed on December 22, 1918, between the Soviet Government and the Central Powers. The chief of the German delegation, Kühlmann, agreed on December 25 to make the Soviet decree concerning peace without annexations or indemnities the basis of discussions, on condition that the states of the *Entente* should unite in accepting this principle. The peace conferences at Brest-Litovsk were adjourned on December 28 for ten days. The Soviet delegation went to Petrograd. At the same time there opened in Petrograd an army congress on demobilization. Out of the 234 delegates at the Congress, 199 were Bolsheviki. The Congress confirmed the absolute incapacity of the Russian army to carry on the War. After the destruction of the Staff Headquarters, the disorganization of the army and the elemental movement of voluntary demobilization were in full swing. Soldiers in throngs were leaving their regiments without permission, selling off army property and munitions, horses and guns, and rushing to the railroad stations. They took cars by assault, ejected the *bourgeois* passengers, filled the roofs and platforms of the cars, and compelled railroad agents and engineers by threats to start trains regardless of schedule, and beat or shot those who demurred.

Krylenko rendered a report on the situation on December 31, 1917, to the Council of People's Commissars. Upon its order, work was started at once for the formation of volunteer sections of a "socialistic army" to replace the detachments leaving the front. At the same time, Lenin bluntly put the question in Bolshevik circles of the necessity to conclude peace immediately with the Central Powers. On January 2, 1918, the Soviet Govern-

ment made its last effort to give the negotiations with the Germans an international character by proposing to transfer the Peace Conference from Brest-Litovsk to Stockholm. But the Germans rejected this demand. Conversations had to be taken up again in Brest-Litovsk, where a delegation had also arrived from the Ukrainian Central Rada, a national socialistic government which had seized power in Kiev. Germany recognized the Ukraine as a treaty-making power. The Bolsheviks faced the direct question of making a separate peace with Germany. No retreat was open any longer. And now the fact was disclosed that among the Bolsheviks there were groups who, although they had repeated after Lenin since the spring of 1917 his phrases about the necessity for an immediate democratic peace, were so naïve that they were not ready, as Lenin was, for the thought of a separate peace with Germany.

An opposition to Lenin consequently arose in the Communist party, calling itself the left Communistic wing. At the head of this movement stood Bukharin, who had expressed himself earlier in the World War, as has been seen,* against the unconcealed defeatist policy of Lenin. The Moscow Bolshevik Bureau adopted a resolution on January 10, 1918, demanding cessation of the peace parleys with the imperialists of Germany, and also the breaking-off of diplomatic relations with the "imperialistic bandits of all countries." The Bureau demanded that a party conference be summoned to determine the question of peace. In the same spirit was a resolution passed by the Petrograd Committee. Then Trotsky advanced his compromise proposal: "We will not sign peace, but we will declare the war ended."

* See chap. iv, sec. 7.

The formation of a left-wing movement in the Communist party against a separate peace had the more political significance because among the left-wing Social Revolutionaries there also prevailed a sentiment against peace with Germany.

A Bolshevik party conference was set for January 21, to discuss the question of peace. For it Lenin prepared his theses advocating the immediate conclusion of a separate peace conceding annexations. His basic justification was summed up as follows: "It is indispensable to conclude peace with the Germans in order to unbind our hands for victory over the *bourgeoisie* first in our own country and for the facilitation of a broad and deep program of mass organization." He advanced the same argument a few days later at a session of the Central Committee of the Bolsheviks on January 24: ". . . of course the peace that we shall conclude will be a shameful peace, but we must have a respite to introduce social reforms. . . . We must finish strangling the *bourgeoisie*, and for this we must have both hands free."

Lenin, however, found himself in the minority in the party conference of January 21. Out of the sixty-three members present, thirty-two declared themselves in favor of revolutionary war with Germany, sixteen in favor of Trotsky's idea of neither war nor peace, and only fifteen in favor of Lenin. Three days later, on January 24, the question was transferred to the session of the Bolshevik Central Committee. Lenin now introduced a compromise resolution for the prolongation of peace discussions. This proposal secured more votes in the Central Committee than Trotsky's proposal; but

on the following day, January 25, Trotsky's position was approved in a joint session of the Central Committees of both the Bolsheviks and the left-wing Social Revolutionaries.

So it was Trotsky, and not Lenin, who appeared in the capacity of reporter on the question of war or peace at the Third Congress of Soviets, which met in Petrograd from January 23 to 31, 1918. This Congress delegated the broadest plenary powers to the Council of People's Commissars. Then the group of left-wing Communists, headed by Bukharin, presented in the Bolshevik Central Committee a declaration of the necessity of summoning an extraordinary party conference and convention to determine the policy on peace. The conference was called for February 3, and the convention was set for March 5.

In the discussion of peace, the voices of the members of the conference were hopelessly divided among several groups. No decision could be secured. However, on February 3 a decree was published providing for the organization of a Red army, on a voluntary basis, developing further the measures that had been taken earlier for the formation of volunteer detachments of a socialistic army. Meanwhile the conversations with the Germans at Brest-Litovsk had reached such a point that it was necessary either to sign the German conditions or renounce peace.

Trotsky, as head of the Soviet Peace Delegation, announced in Brest-Litovsk on February 10 that the Soviet Government refused to sign the peace terms, but at the same time declared the War terminated and was demobilizing its army.

10.

THE German Government was not content with this double-meaning formula of Trotsky's. It required a legal and formally signed treaty of peace.*

The German army command declared on February 16 that the armistice would end at noon on February 18. This news shocked the Soviet leaders; the majority of them had not expected it. A session of the Bolshevik Central Committee was called in haste on February 17. Lenin introduced a resolution for an immediate new proposal of peace to Germany. But it was rejected by six votes against five.

The following day the German advance began. The next morning Lenin again introduced a proposal to telegraph at once to Germany another peace offer. His proposal was again rejected by a majority of seven votes against six. During the day of February 18, telegraphic dispatches began to arrive from the front telling of the panic-stricken flight of the demoralized remnants of the army before the Germans. Whole regiments refused to defend their positions, and did not even execute orders for the destruction of supplies and munitions before retreating. The decay of the old army had infected the newly formed battalions of the socialistic or Red army.

On the evening of February 18 the Bolshevik Central Committee once more discussed the question of peace. Addressing himself to Bukharin and the other advocates

* If the hypothesis of a preliminary agreement between Lenin and the German Government is to be admitted, then in these circumstances the German Government could now consider that Lenin had not fulfilled the agreement. As has been seen in the preceding section, Lenin personally did everything he could to persuade his sympathizers to sign peace formally, but, during January and the beginning of February, 1918, he remained constantly in the minority in all conferences on the question of peace.

of a revolutionary war, Lenin flung at them the cynical, and of course fully deserved reproach: "If it was to be war, then we should not have demobilized."

The majority of the Central Committee this time were on the side of Lenin. The proposal was adopted by seven votes against six, with one refraining from voting. Trotsky now cast his ballot with Lenin. That night, early on February 19, a telegram was dispatched on behalf of the Council of People's Commissars, agreeing to accept the German conditions for peace. But the telegram did not bring any immediate results. The German advance continued.

The Germans were hastening to consolidate a more secure and strategic frontier in Soviet Russia. The mood in what was left of the Russian army Lenin characterized in the following words: "Flight, chaos, helplessness, loutishness."

Panic seized the leaders. Bukharin's program of revolutionary war naturally came up for action. It was at this moment that for the first time, after the Bolshevik seizure of power, Lenin began seriously to think of fighting Germany.* On February 21 the Council of People's Commissars passed a decree to the effect that "the socialistic fatherland is in danger."

At the same time the Bolshevik Central Committee, and then the Council of People's Commissars, declared themselves, at the instigation of Lenin and Trotsky, in favor of accepting aid from the "bandits of Anglo-French imperialism," that is to say, from the Allies. The

* Once again, if the hypothesis of a preliminary agreement between Lenin and Germany be admitted, at this moment Lenin could consider the conditions of the agreement entirely violated on the part of Germany, and so see himself justified in assuming complete freedom of action.

French Ambassador to Russia, Noulens, and after him the head of the French military mission, General Nissel, expressed on behalf of France readiness to assist the Soviet Government against Germany. But this help was not required.

At half-past ten on the morning of February 23, the Council of People's Commissars received the text of the new German conditions of peace. These conditions were more burdensome than the earlier ones had been. Russia was called upon to give up the Ukraine, Lifland, and Estonia, and to conclude peace with the *bourgeois* government of Finland. These new conditions were discussed without delay in the Bolshevik Central Committee, and by a majority of seven votes against four, with four refraining from voting, the decision was made to accept them.

The question was then discussed in a joint session of the Bolshevik and left-wing Social Revolutionary Central Committees. During the night of February 23-24, there was held a session of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, and in the early morning of February 24 this Committee, by a majority of 116 votes against 85, with 26 refraining from voting, decided to accept the German conditions of peace, and this news was at once transmitted to the Central Powers.

The Soviet Peace Delegation immediately left for Brest-Litovsk, but Chicherin now took Trotsky's place. The peace discussions were renewed on March 1. The last attempt at resistance by the Soviet Government was made in connection with the Ukrainian question. In this matter Germany was acting through the delegation of the Government of the Ukrainian National Rada, with which the Central Powers had signed a peace treaty on

February 9. But this Government was not actually effective any longer in the Ukraine, since Kiev had been occupied on February 8 by Soviet troops. The Government of Soviet Russia therefore tried to introduce at Brest-Litovsk a delegation representing Soviet Ukraine.

The Germans held up this delegation at the border, and would not permit it to reach Brest-Litovsk. On March 3, 1918, the Soviet delegation signed the peace treaty, yielding to the German demands.

11.

PEACE was signed, but it still remained to be ratified. This had to be done formally by the highest organ of power in the Soviet State, the Congress of Soviets, and steps were taken at once to summon it.

Actually, however, the Bolshevik Party Convention, and not the Congress of Soviets, wielded the decisive influence. The party Convention, according to a decision taken earlier, was to have gathered on March 5. The assembly, constituting the Seventh Convention of the party, was held in Moscow on March 6-8, 1918. Forty-six delegates with deciding votes, and twenty-four with advisory votes, were present; and it was estimated that they represented altogether about three hundred thousand party members.

Lenin appeared in the capacity of reporter for the Central Committee. He submitted a resolution on the necessity of ratifying the peace treaty. It was adopted by twenty-eight votes against nine, with one refraining from voting.

A week later there gathered in Moscow the Fourth Extraordinary All-Russian Congress of Soviets, which held sessions from March 14 to 16, 1918. In the Con-

gress there participated 1,204 delegates with deciding votes, among whom were 795 Bolsheviks and 284 left-wing Social Revolutionaries, 38 Mensheviks of various shades of opinion, and 29 Social Revolutionaries of the center group. The remainder were anarchists and non-partisans. Lenin himself presented the report as to the necessity of ratifying the Brest-Litovsk peace, while the left-wing Social Revolutionaries advanced Kamkov as a coreporter who took a position against ratifying the treaty. Lenin spoke quietly, almost without gestures, in an apparently unemotional matter-of-fact tone, but advancing his case insistently and inexorably by relentless cold logic.² He described the positions of the German armies and the menace of quick attack on Petrograd and Moscow. And with a characteristic turn, he argued that signature and ratification of the treaty would really mean nothing but a necessary breathing space, since world revolution could be expected to cancel all such imperialistic arrangements.

The resolution for the ratification of the peace treaty was adopted by a majority of 724 votes against 276, with 118 refraining from voting.

In connection with the question of peace with Germany, the Congress had to discuss another question in the sphere of international relations—a message from President Wilson of the United States of America. This message read as follows:

May I not take advantage of the meeting of the Congress of the Soviets to express the sincere sympathy which the people of the United States feel for the Russian people at this moment when the German power has been thrust in to interrupt and turn back the whole struggle for freedom and substitute the wishes of Germany for the purpose of the people of Russia?

Although the Government of the United States is, unhappily, not now in a position to render a direct and effective aid it would wish to render, I beg to assure the people of Russia through the Congress that it will avail itself of every opportunity to secure for Russia once more complete sovereignty and independence in her own affairs, and full restoration to her great rôle in the life of Europe and the modern world.

The whole heart of the people of the United States is with the people of Russia in the attempts to free themselves forever from autocratic government and become the masters of their own life.^a

Wilson's message was obviously composed under the influence of dispatches from American representatives in Russia concerning the decision of the Soviet Government to carry on the War against Germany, taken in the period of the German advance of February 18-23. But it was addressed to the very Congress of Soviets that had been summoned to ratify peace with Germany.

In response to President Wilson, the Soviet Congress adopted a resolution compiled by Lenin, expressing to the American people appreciation of the sympathy Wilson had voiced, "and primarily to the laboring and exploited classes" of the United States of America, and further declaring the conviction that it could not be long before "that happy time when the working masses of all the *bourgeois* countries will cast off the yoke of capital and establish a socialistic order of society."

VII

From the Brest-Litovsk Peace to the End of the World War

1.

IN the interval between the signing and the ratification of the peace treaty with Germany, the Soviet Government shifted its residence on March 11, 1918, from Petrograd to Moscow. The Fourth Congress of Soviets declared Moscow to be the capital of the Soviet Republic. The outward change was full of inner meaning. From that time began a new phase in the life of the Soviet Government. In truth it was only then that Lenin began to feel himself master of the situation in Russia. And from this fact there followed extremely important conclusions for his whole policy.

Lenin formulated the "three historic tasks of the Bolshevik party" in an article on the tasks of the Soviet power that he wrote in March or April, 1918, as follows: "First, to convince the majority of the people of the correctness of its program and tactics. . . . Second, to conquer political power and put down the opposition of the exploiters. . . . Third, to organize the administration of Russia."

In Lenin's opinion, the first two tasks were accomplished in the period from November 7, 1917, to February, 1918. Now, in April, 1918, there came up the third task: "We, as the Bolshevik party, convinced Russia. We conquered Russia from the rich for the poor, from the exploiters for the workers. We must now direct Russia." The new task, the solid organization

of the administrative and economic life of Russia, was set forth by Lenin at the Fourth Soviet Congress.

The resolution for ratification of the Brest-Litovsk treaty, adopted by this Congress, said among other things:

This Congress urges most emphatically upon all workers, soldiers, and peasants, upon all the laboring and oppressed masses, the most important and essential tasks now in order at the present moment: the increase of effort and self-discipline among the workers, the creation everywhere of strong and well-ordered organizations including in their scope so far as possible all the processes of production and distribution, relentless war against the chaos, disorganization, and destruction . . . which obstruct the cause of the final triumph of socialism and the consolidation of a socialistic order of society.

In his article on the tasks of the Soviet power, Lenin wrote:

Yesterday the crux of the moment was the problem of acting as quickly as possible to nationalize and confiscate property and to break up and completely shatter the *bourgeoisie* and to smash sabotage. Today only the blind can fail to see that we have nationalized, confiscated, broken up, and smashed more than we could estimate.

Lenin began to demand from his party the adoption of energetic measures to raise the productivity of labor:

The Russian is a poor workman in comparison with those of the leading countries. And this could not be otherwise under the *régime* of Tsarism while remnants of serfdom were still in existence. To learn how to labor—this is the task that the Soviet power must set before the people, in its whole scope.

We must confirm what we have won, decreed, legalized, discussed, and indicated—confirm it in the strong form of daily working discipline.

Lenin was now asking of the workers a complete

change in their mental habits, desiring that they should be imbued with a master's feeling for his task. As early as the spring of 1918, he had begun to preach the doctrine of those *bourgeois* economic virtues which, in the spring of 1921, he embodied in the New Economic Policy.

Keep an accurate and honest account of money; manage economically; do not be a loafer; do not steal; maintain rigid discipline in labor—the very same slogans at which the revolutionary proletarians rightly laughed when the *bourgeoisie* screamed its overlordship as an exploiting class in such speeches, have become now after the overthrow of the *bourgeoisie* the chief slogans that are in order for the moment.

In Lenin's speeches there began to appear touches of patriotism that would have been unthinkable earlier. As a heading for his article, "The Chief Task in Our Times," written on March 11, the day that the Soviet Government was transferred to Moscow, Lenin chose the words of Nekrasov:

Wretched art thou, and abundant,
Mighty art thou, and impotent,
O Mother Russia!

Lenin appealed for an unwavering determination to achieve at all costs the goal "that Russia may cease to be wretched and impotent, that she may become in the full sense of the words mighty and abundant."

Such Russia can be, for we have enough room and natural riches to supply each and every one, if not abundantly, at least sufficiently with the means of life. We have materials in our natural wealth, in our reserves of human energy, and in our splendid expanses, which the great revolution has given to the creative power of the people, for the establishment of a truly mighty and abundant Russia.

2.

So long as Lenin was talking of the necessity of improving the administrative and economic system of the Soviet Government and of tightening up labor discipline, his party sympathizers went along with him, reluctantly. But Lenin drew from his own words much bolder conclusions. He was not afraid to declare that it was necessary to take a step backward from the communistic idea. He began to talk of the necessity of "state capitalism." In this sense he suggested, as early as the spring of 1918, the introduction of the New Economic Policy which was actually put in force three years later. In April, 1918, he declared that socialism must learn from the trust organizers. "Socialism is unthinkable without the technique of large scale capitalism, organized in accordance with the last word of the most up-to-date science." Lenin proposed that the methods of such state capitalism should be learned in Germany, referring to the example of Peter the Great, who adapted the capitalistic technique of the West. In this connection, Lenin first voiced the idea of a plan, which he regarded as indispensable, for the electrification of Russia. He did this in response to an offer made in April, 1918, by the Academy of Sciences to place its resources of learning at the disposal of the Soviet power.

Lenin's inclination toward state capitalism aroused strong opposition within the Communist party. Against him rose the so-called left-wing Communists of the Bukharin group, who not long before had protested against the Brest-Litovsk peace. They carried on an animated campaign of agitation against Lenin at party meetings and in the party press. In May, 1918, they demanded

the summoning of a new party congress, with a threat of formal division. But matters did not reach the point of a split in the party. For this once Lenin had to yield. He could not go to the extreme of a division in the party because, from May, 1918, on, the party was compelled to fight for its own existence against a rising civil war. So a compromise was discovered. As has been seen, the factories and workshops were not nationalized at once after the Revolution. Only a system of workers' control was introduced in them. In order to bring about state capitalism, it was necessary first to nationalize the larger-scale industrial enterprises. In this lies the difference between the situation in the spring of 1918 and that in the spring of 1921. In order to set up a system of state capitalism, in 1921, it was necessary to free industry from the control of governmental agencies and to transfer all enterprises to an economic basis, that is to say, to take an open step backward, from the point of view of the communistic ideal. But to nationalize industry in the spring of 1918 appeared unavoidable both to those favoring state capitalism and to those in favor of pure communism. That was why both groups in the Communist party were able to agree on the decree for the nationalization of large-scale industry, published on June 28, 1918.* This decree was issued, however, under circumstances which amounted to a complete renunciation by Lenin of the idea of state capitalism. Bukharin triumphed at the time when the decree was made public. So this act of June 28, 1918, proved to be not the beginning of an era of state capitalism, but the end of all talk of it.

* Small-scale industry was nationalized considerably later; see chap. viii, sec. 11.

The direction of nationalized industry was organized not in accordance with the capitalistic method of economic accounting, but with the bureaucratic method of communistic management. For the supervision of industry there were established purely bureaucratic agencies, or so-called Chief Committees.

3.

ELECTRIFICATION of Russia was, in the spring of 1918, only a fantastic vision. In actuality the economic life of the country was falling more and more to pieces. It was necessary to invent ways to improve even slightly what really did exist, even if improvement extended only to the railways. Lenin himself understood this, and on April 29, 1918, he announced in the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, "Without railways there will not only be no socialism, but people will all die like dogs from hunger with grain near at hand."

An order assigning to the People's Commissar of Food Supply full powers to combat the village *bourgeoisie* was published on May 9, 1918, with a view to ending concealment of stocks of grain and speculation in them that was rife. This order became notorious under the name of the decree for a food dictatorship. In crude terms, the task was this:

Since the Soviet Government had neither money nor manufactured products in sufficient amount to furnish a basis of exchange with the villages for grain, it was necessary to requisition grain from the peasants by force. As early as January, 1918, Lenin had arrived at the point of proposing to send workers' food-supply squads out into the villages to secure grain. The scheme took form in the spring of that year; and on May 20,

under the auspices of the People's Commissariat of Food Supply, there was established an office of the Chief Commissar and Military Commander of all food-supply squads. Lenin sent a telegram to the workers of Petrograd on May 21, in which among other things he said: "Comrade workers! Remember that the situation of the revolution is critical. Remember that only you can save the revolution, and no one else." He further declared that "a crusade is needed against speculators in grain, against the rich peasants, against the devourers of peace and the disorganizers." A few days later, he said again:

The Crusades were a movement in which there was added to physical force a faith in those things that tortures compelled people centuries ago to regard as sacred. But we desire and think, we believe and know, that the leaders of the workers and the leaders of the peasants from among the poorer peasantry now hold sacred the preservation of their power over the landowners and capitalists.

Hence Lenin drew the conclusion: the only just means of increasing the bread ration is the decision of the Council of People's Commissars to seize grain by force from the rich peasants and give it to the poor of the towns and villages.

Lenin's government had to break down the inevitable resistance of the villages to the grain-requisitioning squads. So as early as May 20, 1918, the Central Executive Committee adopted a resolution appealing in accordance with the ideas that Lenin had long held for the consolidation of the poorer villagers. A decree for the organization of village Committees of the Poor followed on June 11; and on this basis there were to be organized in every village of Soviet Russia committees



A Squad of Guards Starting for Duty



"Workers, Peasants, and Soldiers"



consisting of such peasants and hired farm laborers. The chief task of the committees was to afford aid to the local food-supply agencies in finding and seizing reserve stocks of grain held by the richer peasants.

The Committees of the Poor acted as organs of the proletarian dictatorship in the villages. Each village ceased to be a unit; and in every one there began a fierce internal conflict. The slogan, "Loot the looters," that Lenin had proclaimed earlier in regard to the town *bourgeoisie* and the estate holders, was now flung into the villages against the richer peasants. Any peasant possessing a supply of grain hid it from his neighbors, for he knew that otherwise it would be confiscated. In order to avoid the seizure of extra cattle, a peasant would slaughter any cows of his own that could be spared. Neighbor spied and reported upon neighbor. Poorer peasants helped the food-supply squads in searching for grain and seizing it from the richer peasants. The decree setting up these committees ruined the Russian villages, or "rid them of the rich," according to the Bolshevik phrase. But at the same time it saved the Soviet Government from a general uprising of the peasants throughout the country. Every village was torn by inner struggle, and this blocked any general movement of the peasants against the Soviet Government.

4.

THE growing food crisis and the burden of economic ruin were obvious signs of the bankruptcy of the Bolshevik program. In 1917 the Bolsheviks had promised the people peace and bread. Peace outside the frontiers had been concluded, but so far as bread was concerned

the situation was becoming steadily worse. For the failure of his policy Lenin blamed not himself, but those from whom he had taken away control of the country.

"Romanov and Kerensky," wrote Lenin to the workers of Petrograd on May 22, 1918, "left to the working class as an inheritance a land absolutely exhausted by their criminal and oppressive war of plunder, a land robbed clean by Russian and foreign imperialists." And as the chief culprits in this emergency of harsh trial in Russia, Lenin pointed at the *bourgeoisie* with its "mad resistance to the working class." He was constantly appealing to all his followers to combat *bourgeois* counter-revolution.

From the first moment when, in November, 1917, the Bolsheviks seized power, Lenin frightened the masses of the Russian people with the specter of a "Kadet and Kaledin counter-revolution." The struggle against this supposed counter-revolution was intended to justify all of the fierce measures taken by his Government, including the establishment of the Extraordinary Commission to Combat Counter-Revolution. But in fact there was no organized counter-revolution in the country in the autumn of 1917. Armed resistance to the Bolsheviks in the first week after the shift of power constituted an attempt to defend the former Provisional Government from the Bolshevik counter-revolution. After that, for several months the Bolsheviks met with no armed opposition. Kaledin was occupied with the internal affairs of the Cossack organization on the Don, and was chiefly concerned with insuring the autonomy of the Don against interference by the central Bolshevik Government. The Kadets and Social Revolutionaries continued up to the very time of the dispersal of the Constituent Assembly

to stake their hopes on parliamentary methods of conflict. The *bourgeoisie*, which Lenin's words would indicate to have pulled together like one man against the Bolsheviks, actually showed complete inertia.

The moving spirits in the anti-Bolshevik army-to-be were a few scattered officers in the rapidly disintegrating Russian army. The primary motive for their protest against the Bolsheviks was the feeling of national humiliation, painfully aroused by the Bolshevik peace negotiations with the Germans, and further there was their hostility to the peace treaty itself. Their great dream was the restoration of the Russian army. From the autumn of 1917 on, individual officers or small groups of them began to make their way to the Don from the front, from Petrograd, from Moscow. They hoped that there on the Don there would be no Bolshevism, and so it might be more easily possible to organize an armed force for battle. The former Commanders in Chief of the Russian army, Generals Alexeiev and Kornilov, also reached the Don. They had few men and even less money at their disposal, since the *bourgeoisie* generally maintained a passive attitude and rendered little financial aid. The restriction of the activity of the banks, introduced by the Soviet Government, further stood in the way of financing through the resources of the city *bourgeoisie* the Volunteer army that had arisen on the Don. This force took organized form only in January, 1918, a week before the dispersal of the Constituent Assembly. On January 7, 1918, General Kornilov assumed command of the "army" consisting in all of four thousand men. But the Volunteer army soon had to quit the Don, since Bolshevik sentiment was beginning to spread also among the Cossacks. General Kaledin shot himself.

General Kornilov led the army away to the Kuban region, where a revolt of the Kuban Cossacks against the Bolsheviks had begun. All during the spring and summer of 1918, the Volunteer army was engaged in fierce conflict with the Bolsheviks in the northern Caucasus and on the Don. General Kornilov was killed by a shell in an early battle, and he was succeeded by General Denikin. The struggle was at first chiefly local. The Volunteer army in 1918 constituted as yet no menace to the Bolshevik power in central Russia, and so the Soviet Government attributed to it no serious significance.

5.

THE dispersal of the Constituent Assembly by the Bolsheviks forced its supporters to prepare for armed conflict, and this was particularly true of the party representing the majority in the Convention, the right-wing Social Revolutionaries. In May, 1918, the plan for organization of an uprising was confirmed by the Social Revolutionary Party Council, but even before that certain Social Revolutionaries had begun to form bands of officers. The chief organizer of this *bloc* was Savinkov, who acted often at his own risk without the party's agreement and knowledge as to his plans.

The main slogan of the Social Revolutionaries was the reconconvocation of the Constituent Assembly. Since in their minds the Bolsheviks were very closely associated with the Germans, the revolt planned by the Social Revolutionaries was at the same time hostile to the Germans and consequently, by implication, friendly to the Allies. A feeling of resentment against the friendliness of the Bolsheviks with the Germans induced the left-wing Social Revolutionaries at the same time to con-

spire against Lenin. Like the left-wing Communists, they had opposed the conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty. After its ratification by the Fourth Congress of Soviets on March 16, the left-wing Social Revolutionary members quit the Council of People's Commissars. Lenin's policy of splitting up the villages, which was completely contrary to the program and sentiments of the left-wing Social Revolutionaries, finally separated them from him. So threatening clouds were gathering from various quarters over the Soviet Government. The Mensheviks, also assembling in a conference at the end of May, 1918, delivered cutting speeches against the Soviet authority. By the summer of 1918 the Bolsheviks found themselves politically isolated. Economically their situation appeared desperate.

Foreseeing an early collapse [said the Menshevik, Cherevanin, at the May conference of the faction], the Soviet authority is making its last spasmodic attempts to save itself. How else can be interpreted the dispatch of food requisitioning squads to the villages and finally the famous crusade for grain, to which Lenin is calling the workers.

6.

THE revolution from within which was rising against the Communist *régime* was complicated by the problem of foreign relations. Once having concluded the Brest-Litovsk peace, Lenin thought that he had got Russia out of the World War. But it soon became clear that the effects of the War were continuing to influence the course of affairs inside Russia.

Germany's attitude toward the Communist Government was two-faced. Germany carried on a direct war against communism in the Ukraine, which was speedily

occupied by Austrian and German troops. General Skoropadsky, who was proclaimed as "Hetman of All-Ukraine," was used entirely as a puppet in the hands of the Germans. Germany also supported the Don Cossacks, as whose chief General Krasnov was elected in May, 1918, to campaign against the Bolsheviks. She likewise subsidized attempts to form companies of monarchist officers in southern Russia.

The Ukraine had, however, been separated from Russia, according to the terms of the Brest-Litovsk peace, and so the German policy there did not formally concern the Soviet Government. In Soviet Russia itself the Germans maintained a friendly attitude to the administration of Lenin that had concluded the peace treaty.

The German ambassador, Count Mirbach, arrived in Moscow on April 23, 1918, probably having been assigned the double task of aiding the Soviet Government against the *Entente*, and at the same time of keeping watch on the Government and to some extent guiding its activities. Any attempt at counter-revolution in Soviet Russia was obviously unfavorable to German interests and an advantage to the *Entente*. So *Entente* military circles began to cherish the thought of restoring the eastern front against Germany, and for this purpose an uprising against Lenin within Russia and intervention by Allied troops were essential.

Intervention seemed indispensable to protect both from Germans and Bolsheviks the immense stores of war munitions which had been furnished to Russia from the *Entente* countries before the Revolution. Great reserve stocks lay both in Murmansk and in Vladivostok. English and Japanese expeditionary forces landed in Vladivostok on April 5.

Both the Russians who were planning for revolution against the Bolsheviks and the foreign agents of intervention tried to establish contact with each other. So the majority of the Russian conspirators against Lenin were friendly to the Allies. But in the south of Russia, in the zone of German occupation, the Russian enemies of the Bolsheviks were friendly to the Germans, from whom they hoped for aid. Only the Volunteer army in the northern Caucasus was disposed to sharp hostility toward Germany. As has been seen, resentment against the Brest-Litovsk peace was the animating motive in the formation of the Volunteer army. In the spring of 1918, it should be added, this army had almost no contact with the Allies and no assistance from them. The Allies, like the Bolsheviks, at that time attributed no special significance to the Volunteer army.

7.

IN his report on the foreign policy at the joint assembly of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Moscow Soviet on May 14, 1918, Lenin gave an account of the complicated international situation and its effects on the political life of Russia.

"The roaring waves of imperialistic reaction," said Lenin, "thunder on the tiny island of the Socialistic Soviet Republic . . . at the point, it would seem, of submerging it, and yet they prove to break each other up." He saw two main conflicts going on within the ranks of the international *bourgeoisie*: first, the conflict between England and Germany; second, the rivalry between Japan and America. "Our task," he continued, "consists in restraint and caution, we must maneuver and retreat."

Preparing Soviet public opinion for resistance to

counter-revolution from within and international intervention from without, Lenin appealed to the citizens of the Soviet state for defense of their fatherland. "We became advocates of defense after October 25,* 1917," declared Lenin. "We conquered the right to defend the fatherland . . . and know how to protect it . . . for Socialism, for the working class, for the exploited laborer, the right of defense of his country exists." Already the Fourth Congress of Soviets, in its resolution ratifying the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty, it must be noted, had adopted at Lenin's suggestion a belligerent pose, in the event of an attack by the *Entente* on Russia. The part of the resolution dealing with this point read thus: "The Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic, unanimously condemning wars of plunder, at this time declares its right and its duty to defend the socialistic fatherland against any possible attacks on the part of any of the imperialistic powers." Now Lenin could turn against his antagonists the same reproaches of carrying on relations with foreigners and of advocating defeat, which they had hurled at him in 1917:

The Russian *bourgeoisie* wobbles from friendliness toward the French to friendliness toward the Germans. . . . For a long time recently, indeed for several years, they branded as traitors to their mother country all those who condemned the imperialistic war and opened their eyes to facts, but now they are prepared after two weeks to alter their political belief and to shift from alliance with the English bandits to alliance with the German bandits against the Soviet power.

Lenin was to work up these themes further during the whole civil war, accusing his foes of having been "bought" or "hired" by the "international *bourgeoisie*."

* October 25 according to the Julian Calendar; i.e., November 7, Gregorian Calendar, the date of the Bolshevik seizure of power.

8.

ONE of the plans for restoration of the eastern front against Germany contemplated the admission of Japanese troops to Russia and their transportation from the Far East to the Volga. This plan was advanced in French circles. But the United States opposed it. Here apparently was evidence of that rivalry between the United States and Japan of which Lenin had talked. Expressions of antagonism to the plan of Japanese intervention were voiced also among Russians. So the proposal to transport a Japanese army to the Volga was discarded.

In actuality, however, the Allies already had some troops on the Volga in the spring of 1918—the Czechoslovak Legion. This had been recruited from former Austrian prisoners of war in Russia, who volunteered to take part again in the war against the Central Powers. The mobilization of Czech regiments had begun before the Revolution and was completed under the Kerensky government. They took part in the so-called “Kerensky advance” of July, 1917. After the Brest-Litovsk peace these Czechoslovak troops, numbering about forty thousand, received permission to leave Russia by way of Siberia and Vladivostok for the western front in France. Naturally there arose in *Entente* circles the idea of making use of them as a fighting force for the reestablishment of a front against Germany in Russia. The Germans, on their side, were of course made uneasy by the presence of armed forces of the *Entente* in Russia.

Either at the instigation of the German Ambassador in Moscow, Count Mirbach, or else upon the initiative of the Soviet Government itself, an order was issued on

May 25, 1918, to disarm the Czechoslovaks. But this very order acted as a signal for open conflict between the Czechs and the Bolsheviks. With the support of the Social Revolutionaries and the local population, the Czechs were able to overthrow at one stroke the Bolshevik power along the whole line of the railway over which the Czechoslovak detachments were distributed, all the way from the Volga to Vladivostok.

Under the protection of these Czechoslovak troops, governments opposed to the Bolsheviks arose on the Volga and in Siberia. These governments at once began to mobilize Russian forces of their own. The Volga Government was based on a committee of members of the Constituent Assembly, who had gone to Samara, consisting of a part of the right-wing Social Revolutionary faction in the Assembly that had been dispersed in January by Lenin. The Siberian Government was closely related to the leaders of the peasant coöperative movement, most of whom also were right-wing Social Revolutionaries. The Ural and Orenburg Cossacks also revolted against the Bolsheviks. So all eastern and south-eastern Russia quickly broke away from the control of the Soviet Government. A little later similar events took place in northern Russia. The Allies landed troops at Murmansk on June 27, 1918, and then on August 2 at Archangel. Under the protection of this Allied expedition, an anti-Bolshevik government of a right-wing Social Revolutionary tendency was likewise organized in northern Russia.

9.

To carry on war with the Czechoslovaks and with the Russian anti-Bolshevik forces was of course a far less

serious task than war with Germany. Nevertheless, it called for great exertions. The vital point was that even before the time of the Czechoslovak uprising the Soviet Government had at its disposal an organized army. This Red army, as has been noted, was formed before the conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty, by a decree of the Council of People's Commissars published on February 3, 1918.*

After the Brest-Litovsk treaty, the organization of the Red army was continued, obviously in anticipation of a conflict with counter-revolution and with the *Entente*. In April, 1918, there were issued a series of important decrees, laying the basis for the firm establishment of the Red army. Everywhere throughout Russia there were set up branches of the Commissariat of War, and there was also reestablished the principle of appointment of the commanding staff of officers in place of election by the soldiers as in the first months of the Revolution. Trotsky was named as Commissar of War, since he had displayed great energy in the organization of army affairs.

Officers of the old imperial army were appointed both to the chief headquarters staff of the Red army and to almost all posts of command. Some of them took up their duties voluntarily, returning to their customary professional occupation; others returned because of need, lacking the means of existence, or under the threat of penalties. In supervision of the commanding staff of officers there was set up a staff of political directors consisting of Communist party members. Later on, during the period of civil war, relatives of officers

* See chap. vi, sec. 9.

who were not Communists were regarded by the Government as hostages for the prevention of treachery on the part of these officers. In every section of the army there was formed a "Communist cell" to watch the soldiers who were not Communists and to reinforce discipline. By May, 1918, the total enrolment in the Red army had reached the number of 300,000 men. Upon receipt of news of the Czechoslovak uprising, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee adopted an order for compulsory enlistment in the Red army. The first call for workers to join the Red army was issued in Moscow on June 17 and in Petrograd on June 29. As Commander in Chief of the Red army forces on the Czechoslovak front there was appointed the left-wing Social Revolutionary, Muraviev, who had formerly been a colonel in the imperial Russian army. His appointment was explained by the fact that his had been the most important and best-known military name during the first months of the Bolshevik Revolution. He had commanded the troops of the Petrograd Military District during the advance of Krasnov and Kerensky on Petrograd. In February, 1918, he had commanded the Bolshevik troops on the Ukrainian front in action against the troops of the Ukrainian Rada. At that time he was able to drive the Ukrainians out of Kiev and to occupy the city. It was the Germans who in turn squeezed the Bolsheviks out of Kiev.

10.

THE Fifth Congress of Soviets opened on July 4, 1918, in Moscow. One of its tasks was the confirmation of a draft constitution for the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic, which had been worked out with the

collaboration of Lenin. But the Congress was not able to take up at once the work of peaceful legislation.

This Congress assembled in the alarming atmosphere of civil war. Lenin thought to ward off opposition at the Congress by excluding from the Soviets, on June 14, both Mensheviks and right-wing Social Revolutionaries. But this did not lessen hostile sentiment; it was expressed now by the left-wing Social Revolutionaries, who at the very time of the Congress were preparing a plot against Lenin. Left-wing Social Revolutionaries made up the minority of the delegates at the Congress, numbering 352 against 745 Bolsheviks, but according to the declaration of their leader, Kamkov, the Congress had been artificially packed by the Bolsheviks. From its opening session it was clear that two main questions were creating friction between the Bolsheviks and the left-wing Social Revolutionaries: relations with Germany, and the formation of the Committees of the Poor. Basing their stand on the declaration of the delegates from the Ukraine region occupied by the Germans, the left-wing Social Revolutionaries made furious demands that diplomatic relations with Germany be broken off and that Count Mirbach be expelled from Moscow. And no less furiously they assailed the Committees of the Poor, which they called a weapon for war against the peasants.

Lenin protested against these charges, declaring that "the Committees of the Poor represent a fight to preserve socialism and to distribute bread in Russia justly": he voiced his regret that "the Committees of the Poor were set up half a year after the Soviet power arose, and not within half a week." Lenin's speech was constantly interrupted by uproar and cries.

"We declare openly," said Kamkov, speaking for the left-wing Social Revolutionaries, "that we will take both your food requisitioning squads and your Committees of the Poor by the collars and throw them outdoors."

As a matter of fact, the left-wing Social Revolutionaries had got everything ready for the overthrow of Lenin's government. Their plan was to start an armed uprising against the Bolsheviks and simultaneously to direct terroristic attempts against the chief German representatives in Russia. As some of the left-wing Social Revolutionaries held positions with the *Cheka*, they succeeded in making arrangements without arousing the suspicions of this body. On July 6 Blumkin, a left-wing Social Revolutionary, called on Count Mirbach on some allegedly urgent matter. As he had credentials from the *Cheka* he was received by the German Ambassador. In regard to his credentials it is not amiss to mention that the signature of the head of the *Cheka*, Dzerzhinsky, was forged; the credentials were, however, sealed by a genuine seal of the *Cheka* which was procured by its assistant head, Alexandrovich, who was a left-wing Social Revolutionary as well. As soon as Blumkin was admitted to Count Mirbach he tried to shoot him with a revolver, but missed; then he threw a bomb which reached his aim. Mirbach was killed; Blumkin succeeded in escaping.* Immediately after the assassination the left-wing Social Revolutionaries started an armed uprising in Moscow. They had several partisan squads under their control as well as one of the *Cheka*

* Although some days later the Soviet Government executed a few left-wing Social Revolutionaries in order to appease the Germans, the real murderer, Blumkin, was then not touched. It was only a decade later that, according to information in the press, he was arrested and executed for being an agent of Trotsky, then in exile.

detachments. They succeeded in seizing a few government buildings, among others the Moscow telegraph office. Telegrams were rushed out over the whole country urging the people not to obey Lenin. Meanwhile several Bolshevik leaders were arrested, among them the head of the *Cheka*, Dzerzhinsky. The situation was critical for the Bolsheviks. Lenin, however, did not lose energy. He had still at his disposal the telephone system, over which he immediately ordered a mobilization of Communist workers in the city of Moscow. Part of the Red army soldiers of the Moscow garrison, namely the Letts, could also be depended upon. The commander of the Lettish regiment, Vatsetis, who had been an officer in the imperial army, proved to be a very energetic man and organized a successful counter-attack on the rebel forces. On July 7 the uprising was put down. The ring-leaders of the plot were arrested. Sessions of the Congress of Soviets were resumed, of course without the majority of the left-wing Social Revolutionaries. The minority of this faction repudiated their leaders, formed a new group of "Revolutionary Communists," and were admitted to the Soviets. The Congress then confirmed the draft that had been submitted for a constitution of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic.

The situation of the Soviet Government, however, was far from secure. The left-wing Social Revolutionaries had been put down in Moscow, but their organizations in the provinces still existed. Further, the command of troops on the front was in their hands. The Commander in Chief of the Red army, Muraviev, sent a telegram on July 11, 1918, to the German Government, declaring war, and at the same time issued an order for an advance by the Red troops upon Moscow

against the Soviet Government. But Muraviev was killed at once by one of the Bolshevik agents watching him. With his death the whole venture of the left-wing Social Revolutionaries fell to pieces. Their conqueror in Moscow, Vatsetis, was appointed Commander in Chief in place of Muraviev. He was able to keep the Red army on the front facing the Czechs.

Soon afterward an uprising of officers against the Bolsheviks, organized by the right-wing Social Revolutionaries in the town of Yaroslavl, about one hundred and fifty miles from Moscow, was broken up. This movement had begun on July 5, and at first the balance of strength was in favor of the officers. But on July 8 a company of German war prisoners in Yaroslavl took a hand in the affair on the side of the Bolsheviks; and with their help the uprising was put down. On July 21 the rebel officers surrendered to the German War Prisoners' Commission No. 4. The Germans pledged themselves to regard the surrendering officers as prisoners of war of the German Empire, but in fact they turned them over to the Bolsheviks.¹

11.

THE assassination of Count Mirbach almost brought Lenin to the point of breaking off relations with Germany. On July 14 there was received a note from the German Government, demanding the admission to Moscow of a battalion of German soldiers in army uniforms to guard the German Embassy. Lenin categorically refused to execute this request. The following day, July 15, he made an appropriate declaration before the All-Russian Central Executive Committee: "We cannot satisfy any such desire, in any case or under any circum-

stances, for it would constitute actually the beginning of an occupation of Russia by alien forces."

Lenin estimated the international situation correctly. It was not advantageous to Germany to break off relations with the Soviet Government. A general advance by the Germans on the western front in France had just begun—their last attempt to win the War. Germany was not in a position to send any considerable forces into Russia. Moreover, Lenin understood that—as in February, 1918—if he should resume war with Germany he could again count upon support from the Allies. In such an event, the Allies would have ceased to aid any uprising against Lenin. A break with Germany might therefore prove advantageous to Lenin. And the Germans could hardly fail to understand this. Germany gave way.

During these days when conflict with Germany was imminent, there was decided the fate of the former Tsar, Nicholas II. At the time of the Bolshevik seizure of power, he and his family were imprisoned in Tobolsk, Siberia. In May, 1918, at the outbreak of civil warfare, the Bolsheviks moved the imperial family to Ekaterinburg. There the entire family was brutally murdered by local Bolsheviks, upon a telegraphic order sent from Moscow by Sverdlov. To let Nicholas II remain alive was perilous to the Bolsheviks, because Russian counter-revolutionaries might liberate him. It is possible that during the days of the July difficulties with Germany there was added to this anxiety a new worry lest Germany might take advantage of the existence and the title of the former Emperor in the event of an open break with the Soviet Government.

12.

AFTER the July conspiracies had been put down, Lenin turned with even greater energy to the prosecution of the civil war. The Fifth Congress of Soviets adopted on July 10, 1918, the principle of obligatory military service for laborers; those elements in the population not belonging to the working class were to be attached to the army for service in the rear. On July 29 there was published a decree for the listing of the entire population that was liable to military service, between the ages of eighteen and forty years. Despite the great proportion of deserters and of men refusing to respond to the call for enlistment, the aggregate number of soldiers in the Red army had reached by the middle of September, 1918, a total of 400,000 men. A Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, to direct the army, was set up on September 2, unifying the military and political commanding staffs; in it participated both those Bolsheviks who were devoting their time to military affairs, among them Trotsky, and generals of the old imperial army. Sergius Kamenev, who had been an officer in the General Staff of the imperial army, was appointed as Commander in Chief on the eastern front, in place of Vatsetis who was suspected of Napoleonic ambitions. Kamenev was able to give the eastern army an aspect of better organization and not only to halt the enemy but even to begin an advance against the Czechoslovak and Social Revolutionary forces.

For the Soviet Government, however, the conflict was far from ending with military operations. The greatest difficulties in this period were in the sphere of organization in the rear of the army. Civil war and armed uprisings had intensified the economic crisis in Soviet Rus-

sia, and particularly the food shortage. Lenin tried at first to cope with the emergency by continuing to insist on a rigid system of distributing bread and other food products. At the very beginning of August he wrote an appeal to the workers under the heading: "Comrade workers! We are entering the last decisive fight." He summoned the workers to support the communistic food rationing system. "Relentless war against the rich peasants!" cries Lenin. "Death to them!" But the Communist system of food supply was on the point of collapse. Lenin did not actually publish his decree to the workers; on the contrary he had to make concessions. In the matter of providing supplies of grain, he had to give up the idea of putting the villages under the complete control of the Committees of the Poor. He was forced to take into account the interests of the majority of the peasant population, the so-called "middle peasants." In their favor, and actually in favor of the rich peasants also, Lenin consented on August 8 to treble the fixed prices for grain that had been set, a measure for which he himself, a short time before, had furiously reproached the Provisional Government.

Yielding to the insistent necessity of the workers in the cities, he was further forced to agree to a partial abolition of the grain monopoly. The Moscow Soviet, in exception to the food-supply regulations of the Council of People's Commissars, extended to the workers of Moscow, on August 24, the right of free transport of one and one-half *puds* (a little less than sixty pounds) of foodstuffs per person, from the southern provinces; and such supplies could obviously be procured only by the illegal method of free purchase. After about ten days the Petrograd Soviet adopted a similar decision. These

measures were called forth by the beginning of famine among the workers. Yet the workers were in a better situation, comparatively, than the other classes of the city population. Starting with August 23 there was openly established in Moscow a system of "class rationing." Workers had the right to procure a larger amount of food supplies than other citizens.

Once having given way in the matter of food rationing, the Council of People's Commissars tried to reinforce the other side of its system of communistic distribution of products. A decree was adopted on August 27 for the listing and control of textiles.

13.

LIFE for the population in Soviet Russia in the summer of 1918 was dreary. In the cities there was the shortage of food, in the villages the fear that neighbors might report the concealment of food supplies; and everywhere there was felt the heavy lash of the communistic administration and a gloomy rage of each man against every other. The July uprisings both of the left-wing and right-wing Social Revolutionaries ended in failure; but that did not signify that the majority of the population was in favor of the Bolsheviks. It was in a state of apathy. The call to enlist in the Red army was intended to rally 800,000 recruits. In actual fact, as has been seen, only about half of that number were gathered. The other half ran away, in spite of threats of frightful penalties.

The prevailing unrest served as an excuse for acts of terrorism against the leaders of the Soviet Government. In July, 1918, the right-wing Social Revolutionaries began to lay plans for an attack on Lenin. It was decided

to kill him as he was leaving some assembly where he was in the habit at that time of appearing frequently. Four agents for different parts of Moscow were appointed for the attempt.

On the evening of August 3 Lenin delivered a speech at a meeting of the workers of the former Michelson factory. As he was starting out at the end of the meeting, a Social Revolutionary, Fanny Kaplan, fired a revolver at him three times. He fell wounded. She was arrested, and on the following day was executed by a firing squad. But the Soviet Government did not content itself with the punishment of the one person immediately involved in the attempt on Lenin's life, or of its backers.

A "mass Red Terror" directed against the *bourgeoisie* and its agents was the response of the Soviet Government to Fanny Kaplan's act. The All-Russian Central Executive Committee adopted on September 2 a resolution to this effect.

The Red Terror began actually with the first days of the Soviet *régime*, and as early as December, 1917, there had been established the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission to Combat Counter-revolution. Now the Red Terror assumed a mass character. On the basis of the resolution of the Central Executive Committee, scores of thousands of people throughout Russia were arrested as hostages. Persons were seized without any investigation as to whether they had actually taken part in an anti-Soviet movement, but for the most part in accordance with the class principle that persons not belonging to the Communist party, to the working class, or to the poorer peasantry, faced the risk of such seizure. Thousands, if not tens of thousands, were soon shot;

others were held for execution in the event of further attempts on the life of Lenin or of any other Bolshevik leader.

14.

LENIN lay ill for about ten days. During the first of these days there were fears for his life. But his robust physical organism withstood the shock. In answer to the assault on him, both Lenin and the Central Committee of the Communist party received packages full of resolutions from the laborers of various cities throughout Russia expressing sympathy and horror. Some of these resolutions were of course sincere. But there were also many official resolutions which did not correspond to the actual feelings of the people. Thanks to his secret police, Lenin was in a position to know how far he could really count on the loyalty of the population. He could rely unreservedly upon the support of the town workers. They could only welcome further measures designed to frighten the *bourgeoisie*, that is, all the town dwellers not belonging to the ranks of the workers.

On October 5 the Council of People's Commissars passed a decree establishing a system of workers' books for all town residents—a long-standing plan of Lenin's.*

A decree imposing an extraordinary tax on the *bourgeoisie* was passed on October 3 by the Central Executive Committee.

If it was possible to intensify pressure on the *bourgeoisie* in the towns it was nevertheless impossible in the villages. There despite Lenin's various concessions which had been discussed, sentiment continued to be

* See chap. v, sec. 9; chap. vi, sec. 4.

enraged against the Soviet authority. He consequently decided to grant something further to the peasantry. With his active participation, the Council of People's Commissars began in the latter half of September to discuss the publication of a measure which would probably satisfy the peasantry—the introduction of a tax in kind on grain in place of unrestricted requisitioning. This was the very measure that later on, in the spring of 1921, marked the beginning of the New Economic Policy.*

This decree for a tax in kind was adopted on October 30 by the Council of People's Commissars. But actually, as will be seen, it was not made effective until the inauguration of the New Economic Policy. It remained simply as evidence of that tendency to compromise with the peasants, which at the time dominated Lenin. This inclination was expressed in a number of other measures of the period, dealing with the peasant problem.

A decree for the establishment of a special fund to aid agriculture was passed on December 2 by the Council of People's Commissars. Further, at the Sixth Congress of Soviets which was called to celebrate the first anniversary of the November Revolution, there was adopted on November 9, 1918, a resolution for the formation of township and village Soviets throughout the country, in place of the Committees of the Poor; but the elections to the new Soviets were, in fact, placed under the supervision of these same Committees.

* See later, chap. ix, sec. 4.

VIII

From the End of the World War to the New Economic Policy

1.

THE armistice of November 11, 1918, had important consequences both in the internal life of Russia and in the course of the civil war. The Soviet Government henceforth no longer had to reckon with Germany as an imperialistic power. Lenin at once drew his conclusion from the change in the international situation. At his proposal, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee adopted on November 13 a resolution annulling the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty.

The end of the World War entirely altered the attitude of the Allies toward the civil war in Russia. Immediately after the armistice it seemed that the collapse of Germany could only increase the pressure of Allied intervention in Russia. According to Lenin's anticipations, the Allies must endeavor to strangle the Soviet state, because of the class hatred of the *bourgeois* imperialists for the proletarian order.

The antagonists of the Bolsheviks in Russia hoped that the Allies would want to overthrow the Bolsheviks because they had signed a separate peace with the Germans before the end of the World War and so had betrayed the Allies.

The armistice freed the immense fighting forces of the Allies and made available a huge amount of unutilized war munitions. Both to the Bolsheviks and the anti-

Bolsheviks in Russia it seemed natural to expect that the Allies would now send men and munitions into Russia to the civil-war front, in order to settle the Bolsheviks with one quick blow.

Actually, in both France and England, influential government leaders favored energetic intervention. But it soon became clear that contrary forces were urging the policy of the Allies in another direction.

Both the masses of the people and the soldiers of the Allied Powers were weary of war and were dreaming of an immediate return to conditions of peace. To begin a new war was psychologically impossible. Allied support to the anti-Bolshevik movement in Russia, up to November, 1918, was explained in large degree by the necessities of the World War. The Allies wanted to build a barrier against the attempt of Germany to utilize Russia as a base for prolongation of the War. So intervention in Russia was comprehensible to every soldier of the *Entente*, as one of the steps being taken against Germany. Now, after the capitulation of Germany, these ideas had lost their force, and to large groups among the Allies the outcome of Russian quarrels had become a matter of complete indifference. Only because of inertia did the Allies continue at all their support of the Russian White armies.

2.

THE defeat of Germany directly concerned the Ukraine first of all, since the Germans occupied that territory. According to the conditions of the armistice, Germany was obligated to evacuate the Ukraine and all other occupied regions in eastern Europe. The withdrawal of German troops doomed the Ukraine to chaos, since the

Germans did not permit the government of Skoropadsky to form any military force of its own during the period of occupation. So all the anti-Bolshevik groups in southern Russia concerned themselves with urging the Allies to occupy the Ukrainian cities by sending troops of their own immediately to follow up the departure of the Germans.

This, however, was not done. Further, the German troops were swept off their feet by Bolshevik propaganda and quickly scattered, leaving the Ukraine in a completely disorganized state which intensified the prevailing anarchy. French troops were disembarked in Odessa in the course of a month after the Germans left. The Ukraine was at that time an arena of civil war. First Ukrainian Socialists, directed by Petliura, overthrew the government of Skoropadsky. Southern Ukraine was soon overwhelmed by an anarchistic peasant rebellion, headed by an able leader, Nestor Makhno. The Makhno bands fought against every attempt to subordinate the peasants to any central government, from whatever quarter it might proceed. They fought at the same time against the followers of Petliura and also the Reds and the Whites.

3.

THE winter of 1919 brought no solution of the situation on the civil-war front. The Soviet armies mastered the Ukraine. On the Don and in the Kuban there was fierce fighting with success now on one side, now on the other. With the autumn of 1918 the English and French fleets secured access to the Black Sea. The English and the French divided between them zones of influence in southern Russia. The French controlled the shores of the

Sea of Azov and of the Black Sea to the west of the mouth of the Don River, and the English took the shore of the Black Sea eastward from the Don. In doing this, the Allies were moved partly by economic considerations. The English were interested in the petroleum of the Caucasus, the French in the south Russian iron and coal industry. To southern Russia the English sent small expeditionary forces of their troops, which occupied the trans-Caucasian region. Further, the English aided Denikin substantially by transporting military supplies and munitions on the Black Sea. In the late autumn of 1918 the French landed a force in Odessa, consisting of one French division and two Greek divisions. Every sign indicated that they were preparing a large-scale attack against the Bolsheviks. But soon there occurred disturbances among their troops in Odessa, partly due to Bolshevik propaganda but chiefly to the absence of the psychological motives which would have urged a French soldier into a new war. So the situation on the southern front during the winter of 1918-19 did not cause the Bolsheviks any special concern.

Beginning with the autumn of 1918, the Soviet Government gave the greater share of its attention to the eastern front. In September and October, the Red troops were able to press the Czechs back from the Volga to the Ural Mountains. The People's army, organized by the Committee of the Constituent Assembly, was broken up by the Reds. These failures led to the unification of military and civil power in the east in the hands of Admiral Kolchak, who was proclaimed in Omsk on November 18, 1918, as Supreme Ruler of Russia. His staff committed a fatal strategic error in choosing a northern objective, the city of Perm, at which to strike its main

blow. The advocates of a campaign in this direction were looking forward to union with the forces of the Allies in the northern region around Archangel. But these were insignificant and very remote from the center of struggle. Further, the northern movement deprived Kolchak of every hope of getting in touch with Denikin, not to mention the fact that it weakened the center of his own front.

The indecisive character of military operations in the winter of 1918-19 led the Allies to try to settle matters by diplomatic negotiations. Wilson and Lloyd George sent a wireless message on January 23, 1919, to all the warring armies in Russia, proposing that they send Russian envoys to a peace conference at Prinkipo (or Prince's) Islands near Constantinople.

This step on the part of the Allies shattered the hopes of the leaders of the anti-Bolshevik movement in Russia, by showing them that it had ceased to enjoy the sympathy and support of the Allies. All the chiefs of the various White armies refused to enter a conference with Lenin. He, on the contrary, assented on February 4 to the proposal. It opened up to him the chance of a breathing space for further organization to carry on warfare. Furthermore, it was the first sign of the collapse of Allied intervention. The attempt had no practical significance, in view of the refusal of the Whites. But after this first swallow there soon flew a second. In February, 1919, an American named Bullitt appeared in Moscow to sound out the possible grounds of agreement on a peace treaty between the Allies and Lenin. Bullitt compiled a draft peace treaty with Lenin on March 12, 1919, but it proved to be a scrap of paper since there again prevailed for the time among the Allies—partly in con-

nection with successes achieved by Kolchak and Denikin—a fresh mood in favor of intervention.

4.

LENIN's domestic policy during the winter of 1918-19 was completely subordinated to the interests of the front. The Council of Labor and Defense was formed in Moscow on November 30, 1918, with Lenin at its head. Soviet Russia was declared to be a military camp. Lenin concentrated in his hands action on all questions concerning the defense of the country, unifying the work of all the departments of the Soviet Government. He understood that victory required the most intense exertion of all the forces of the nation and intimate contact between the army at the front and the people. The man who had advocated defeat in the epoch of the World War was now transformed into the most extreme militarist.

All other tasks and concerns [affirmed Lenin] everything not connected with the military cause and with food supply and transport, must be postponed. Everything for food supply and for transport. We are winning and we shall win because we have solidly organized support in the rear of the army on which it can rely.

Lenin had not ceased to be an Internationalist, but he nevertheless strove now to utilize the patriotic sentiments of the Russian people for his own ends. By his own admission, the July conspiracy of the left-wing Social Revolutionaries had made a strong impression on Lenin, for he could not but consider some of these men sincere and convinced Socialists. He had not anticipated that even in the minds of such genuine Socialists patriot-

ism had such deep roots. And now the connection of the *bourgeoisie* with Allied intervention gave Lenin an opportunity to pipe a patriotic tune. He declared that "the monarchistic Kadets are offering Russia for sale to Anglo-American capital." In his words, "in order to strangle the Soviet Government, the *bourgeoisie* is prepared to betray Russia to anyone."

From this Lenin drew the conclusion "Russia cannot and will not be independent unless the Soviet power is firmly established."

"History has developed in such a way," he solemnly declared, "that patriotism now turns to our side." His plan consisted in endeavoring to cause discord in anti-Soviet circles.

We must act without mercy [said Lenin] taking over the property of the *bourgeoisie* and the landowners, but attracting to us the Democrats of the petty *bourgeoisie*. Our earlier slogans of the period of the revolution that has passed must be changed, in order to be in accord with the present phase when the turning point is reached.

So at the very time when terrorism against the *bourgeoisie* and the former landowners was being intensified, there began a period of temporizing with the middle-class Democrats and the "middle peasants." Toward the *bourgeoisie* there were adopted new stern measures. Against the event of counter-revolutionary demonstrations by this class and its adherents, there were established specially appointed Communist police squads from the cities. In *bourgeois* homes there were constant raids and searches in force. But at the same time Lenin began to issue declarations as to the indispensability of denationalizing the coöperatives, the impossibility of combining the trades-unions immediately with agencies

of governmental authority, and a policy of working agreement with the "middle peasants."

Representatives of the middle peasants were now admitted to membership in the village Soviets, on the basis of a regulation issued by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee on December 21, 1918, as suggested by the Sixth Congress of Soviets. But the only measure which could actually satisfy the demands of the middle peasants, the introduction of a tax in kind instead of grain requisitions, remained merely on paper. The continuing food crisis and the declining output of industry made it impossible for the Soviet Government to accept limitations on its freedom to dispose of the peasants' grain.

Without formally abolishing the decree concerning a tax in kind, the Council of People's Commissars passed on January 11, 1919, another decree dealing with the levy of food grains and fodder. According to it, there was allotted to each peasant only the amount of grain and fodder necessary to feed his family and his cattle. All that remained was to be handed over to the state. Thus the decree legalized the requisitioning of grain from the peasants and transformed it into a permanently active arrangement. As a consequence, all the peasants except the poorest ones continued hostile to the Soviet power. Their opposition sometimes remained hidden, but it sometimes broke through to the surface in the form of peasant riots.

5.

CIRCUMSTANCES had made Lenin the head of an isolated state. To protect it, as has been seen, he had to play upon the patriotic feelings of the Russian people.

This was not in line with Lenin's theoretical views, but contrary to them. By conviction, he had never ceased to be an Internationalist. He regarded the Russian Revolution only as a prologue to world revolution. The triumph of a socialist order in Russia, according to his views in 1917-19, could be guaranteed only by an outbreak of revolution on a world-wide scale. Through all the speeches of Lenin and of the Bolshevik leaders at that time there ran like a red thread the assurance to their hearers that the hour of this world revolution was near at hand.

Russia offered Lenin a convenient drill ground on which to organize and make ready for revolution on a world-wide scale. No matter how trying was the position of Lenin and of the Soviet Government in Russia during the years of civil war, he thought constantly of fostering revolution beyond the borders of the Russian Soviet Republic.

To do anything practical toward the organization of revolution in Europe became possible only with the ending of the World War. Speaking on the international situation before the Sixth Congress of Soviets, at the beginning of November, 1918, a few days before the armistice, Lenin expressed his confidence in the force of Bolshevik propaganda. "The bacillus of Bolshevism will pass through barriers and infect the workers of all countries."

For the triumph of revolution on an international scale there was required an appropriate revolutionary organization and a revolutionary army. The army was already at hand—the Russian Red army. And as early as October, 1918, upon the first news of the revolution that was beginning in Germany, Lenin decided to en-

large the Red army, to bring it by the spring of 1919 up to three million men "for aid to the German workers."

As for an international revolutionary organization, its kernel had been formed by Lenin earlier, before the Russian Revolution. In 1914,* he declared the necessity to organize a Communist Third International against the Socialist Second International.

The "Zimmerwald Left," organized in 1915, proved to be the nucleus of the Third International. After the Russian Revolution Lenin organized propaganda for Communist ideas among German and Austro-Hungarian prisoners of war in Russia. The end of the World War gave him an opportunity to carry the propaganda beyond the borders of Russia. At the end of January, 1919, and at the same time that the invitation of the Allies to a peace conference at Prinkipo was received, Lenin sent out jointly with Trotsky to members of the "Zimmerwald Left" and to other Communist leaders in various countries an invitation to the First Congress of the Communist International. This gathering assembled in Moscow on March 2, 1919, and continued its meetings for five days. In addition to the Russian Communist party, there were representatives at the Congress from Communist groups in Germany, Austria, Hungary, Switzerland, the Scandinavian and Balkan countries, Poland, Finland, a combined group of oriental nationalities in Russia, and also the American Socialist Labor party. With authority from the Central Committee of the Russian Communist party, Lenin personally opened the sessions.

Our Congress has world-wide historical significance [declared Lenin in his opening address]. It proves that all the illusions

* See chap. iv, sec. 4.

of the *bourgeois* democracies have collapsed, not alone in Russia, but in the more highly developed capitalistic countries of Europe, as for example Germany. Civil war has become a fact.

Lenin submitted to the Congress a report on *bourgeois* democracy and proletarian dictatorship. In it he undertook to show that the "much bepraised democracy" under capitalism is an illusion. The only possible choice lies between dictatorship by the *bourgeoisie* and dictatorship by the proletariat. He appealed for the establishment of a dictatorship by the proletariat throughout the world. The sessions of the Congress were held in a mood of great exaltation. Communist revolution in Europe seemed imminent. The general enthusiasm was expressed by Lenin in his concluding words:

Let the *bourgeoisie* of the whole world continue to rage, let it drive out, imprison, even kill the Spartacists and Bolsheviks; this will not aid it. This will serve only to enlighten the masses to free them from their old *bourgeois* democratic prejudices, and to temper them for combat. The victory of the proletarian revolution throughout the world is assured. There is dawning the creation of the International Soviet Republic.

6.

SOON after the First Congress of the Communist International in Moscow there was held the Eighth Convention of the Russian Communist party. At the time of its meeting, on March 22, there was received a wireless message with news of a Soviet revolution in Hungary. This dispatch served as the occasion for an outburst of enthusiasm among the delegates. But if the international state of affairs was advantageous for the Soviet *régime*, this could not be said of its position in its own

country. With the approach of spring it was necessary to contemplate a new campaign in the civil war. The Bolsheviks were particularly uneasy about the situation on the Kolchak front. Lenin wanted to reinforce the Red army through the support of moral influences throughout the country. This was the reason that the Eighth Convention of the party devoted so much time to the question that was so troublesome to the Bolsheviks—a working agreement with the "middle peasants." Since the food shortage did not allow the compulsory division of grain and other supplies to be terminated, a solution of the problem concerning the middle peasants was somewhat in the nature of squaring the circle. Nevertheless, both Lenin himself and the Eighth Convention of the party as a whole wasted a good deal of energy on the task. One speech after another was delivered, and one resolution after another was written. Lenin's plan for dealing with the question was as follows:

We have no blessings to bestow upon the "middle peasant," but he is a materialist, a practical man who desires concrete material blessings; these we cannot give him at the moment, and the country must do without them, perhaps for many months of a burdensome conflict that now holds out the promise of complete victory. But we can accomplish a great deal in our administrative methods: we can improve our apparatus, correct a great number of abuses. We can and we must level off and rectify the lines of policy of our party, which has not gone far enough toward alliance, toward a working agreement with the "middle peasants."

The resolution on this question proposed by Lenin and adopted by the Congress comprised a series of clauses promising such a rectification of lines of policy. A determination was taken "to develop aid on the broadest possible scale" to the peasantry, by a program

consisting mainly in supplying the "middle peasants" with the manufactured products of town industries and particularly with improved agricultural implements and machinery, seeds, and other materials requisite for the improvement of agriculture. For all these purposes the party decided to appropriate a large state fund. All these resolutions looked well on paper. To put them into effect on any sort of wide scale was of course impossible at the moment. As a sort of moral consolation for the "middle peasants" there was elected as the new chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, the post corresponding to the position of president of a republic, the peasant, Kalinin, in place of the Jewish druggist, Sverdlov, who had died.

A second question to which the Eighth Convention of the party paid a good deal of attention was that of nationalities. This problem had now become vital, for one consequence of the civil war was that Soviet Russia had been reduced almost to the frontiers of the Great Russian state of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. This Great Russian center of the Soviet Republic was surrounded by territories, some of which Lenin had to find ways to keep on his side, such as the Ukraine, while he had to conquer others, such as the Russian Orient. In these circumstances he found it necessary to attract to the Soviet Government the sympathies of the various nationalities in Russia and of the border peoples. He had begun to take an interest in the problem of nationalities during the World War. Even then he sensed the strength latent in the national movements of oppressed and backward peoples, which could be utilized in the conflict against the "imperialism" of the leading capitalistic countries. Advocating defeat for Russia, Lenin at

the same time championed the national rights of the smaller peoples. In the spirit of this ideal, he recognized in November, 1917, the independence of Finland. The same conception underlay the settlement of the Ukrainian question in 1918-19, when there was established a Ukrainian Soviet Republic. At the Eighth Convention of the party, Bukharin attacked Lenin's policy, inquiring ironically whether autonomy should also be accorded to the Bushmen and the Hottentots. Lenin retorted:

There are no Bushmen in Russia, and I never heard of any Hottentots . . . but there are Bashkirs, Kirghizes, Sarts, and a whole series of other nationalities, and we cannot refuse to recognize them. We cannot deny this to any one of the nationalities dwelling within the territories of the former Russian Empire.

Lenin's point of view prevailed. The All-Russian Central Executive Committee recognized the autonomy of the Bashkir Republic. In the new program of the Russian Communist party, adopted by the Eighth Convention, there were inserted clauses expressed in terms of the spirit of Lenin's ideas, concerning the rights of nationalities, which acknowledged the desirability of a "Federative Union of States" organized on the Soviet model.

The Convention confirmed the existence of the Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania, and White Russia, as separate Soviet republics. But at the same time it ordered that the Russian Communist party should maintain a single centralized organization. All decisions by the party and its guiding agencies were unconditionally obligatory for all sections of the party, regardless of their national composition.

So national autonomy was only a new façade for the state structure. The foundation remained as it had been.

7.

HARDLY two weeks had passed after the Eighth Convention of the Russian Communist party before a Soviet revolution broke out in Bavaria.

In Moscow the leaders thought that the hour of world revolution had struck. The Soviet Government began with delirious enthusiasm to make ready to aid Communistic revolution in Europe with the forces of the Red army. So in the spring of 1919 the southwestern front acquired for the Soviet Government a particular importance. The chief menace on this front was the French and Greek expeditionary force in Odessa. After a few preliminary skirmishes with the advance guards of the Red army, the French troops began to retreat. This was due to the previously described disorganization within their ranks.

The French Government then decided to bring the dangerous game to an end by calling back its troops from southern Russia. Odessa and the other cities along the Black Sea that had been occupied by the French were evacuated in May, 1919. The withdrawal of the French forces freed the hands of the Soviet command for intervention in the European situation. It was too late to aid Soviet Bavaria, since the Soviet structure there had collapsed on May 5. But it was still possible to help Soviet Hungary. At the very beginning of May, the Hungarian army had succeeded in stopping the first drive of forces of intervention sent by the Rumanians and Czechoslovaks. The Soviet command then decided to move troops of the Russian Red army from the

southwestern front into Hungary. But its plans were blocked by two sets of circumstances unforeseen by the Bolsheviks: the mutiny headed by Ataman Grigoriev and then the advance of Denikin. Grigoriev, who had formerly been an officer in the imperial army, was one of the Red army commanders on the southwestern front. In his revolt against the Soviet Government he took advantage, like Makhno, of the anarchistic movement among the peasants. Subsequently a quarrel arose between these two men, and Grigoriev was treacherously assassinated by partisans of Makhno. Nevertheless the uprising headed by Grigoriev had important consequences. It almost brought about a catastrophe for the Soviet power, since at the same time Denikin's advance started from the southeast. The movement directed by Denikin developed with threatening speed. By the middle of the summer he had occupied almost the entire Ukraine. His approach put the Red army between two fires, since the western front had been broken by Grigoriev, while on the eastern front another Red army was engaged in fighting Kolchak. By the end of May the Red troops had succeeded in halting Kolchak's drive, and soon afterward they passed to the counter-attack.

The mutiny of Grigoriev and the advance of Denikin prevented a march of the Red army into Europe. Without its aid, the Soviet Government in Hungary could not hold on. By the end of July, Rumanian troops had reached Budapest. On August 4, 1919, the Soviet *régime* in Hungary was brought to an end.

For Lenin's foreign policy this was a fearful blow. And within Russia as well, in the summer of 1919, things were going badly for him. The Soviet Govern-

ment was indeed saved chiefly by strategic errors of Denikin's staff. Instead of centering all his forces in one drive toward Moscow, Denikin scattered them, diverting one part to the Ukraine, far to the west of his main objective. The Volunteer army entered into a conflict with the supporters of Petliura, capturing Kiev from them. But although they won that city, the forces of the Volunteer army lost the chance of a quick attack on Moscow.

Another far from unimportant circumstance that spoiled the prospects of the Volunteer army was peasant opposition. The leaders did not know how to develop good relations with the peasants. Denikin's government promised to pass a new land law, favorable to their interests, but action was delayed. In the meanwhile some of the big landowners who had been driven away by the Bolsheviks returned to their properties. This caused irritation among the peasants, which was intensified by the frequent occasions of requisitioning food supplies despite the fact that according to a law published by the Denikin government the peasantry was liable only to the imposition of a tax in kind on grain. Finally, anarchistic tendencies developed strongly among the peasants of south Russia, which were utilized by Makhno and which were directed against any central authority whatever, whether White or Red. Soon Denikin, like the Bolsheviks before him, had to meet a peasant anarchist movement. The necessity of diverting a part of his forces for fighting in the rear greatly weakened the strength of the Volunteer army on the front. In the summer of 1919, Kamenev, the Commander in Chief of the Soviet forces, threw his main strength from the Kolchak front against Denikin.

Kamenev had to send a part of his troops to the north-west, to defend Petrograd against the raid led by General Yudenich from Estonia. Kolchak was no longer dangerous. His army had been broken and was retreating in disorder.

In November, 1919, the Volunteer army occupied Orel. But this was the extreme limit of its achievement. Afterward there began a retreat which became a rout. In January, 1920, Red troops were already driving the forces of Denikin out of Rostov on the Don. By the end of March, Red Soldiers had occupied Novorossiisk. The remnants of the Volunteer army and the Cossack armies of the Don and Kuban were evacuated to the Crimea, which had not yet been occupied by the Red army.

A month earlier Kolchak's fate had been decided. With the approval of the French General, Janin, the Czechs surrendered Kolchak to a Social Revolutionary Committee which had seized power in the rear of his army at Irkutsk. He was executed on February 7, 1920, by a firing squad. Two weeks later, Irkutsk was occupied by a Red army. The remnants of Kolchak's troops managed to make their way out to the Far East.

The defeat of the White armies compelled the *Entente* to revise its policy toward the Bolsheviks. The Expeditionary Forces in the north of Russia were withdrawn. Then, in January, 1920, the Supreme War Council of the Allies decided to terminate the blockade of Soviet Russia.

8.

THE end of the civil war was foreshadowed quite clearly by December, 1919. Complete triumph for the Soviet Government appeared already near at hand.

On December 6 there assembled in Moscow the Seventh Congress of Soviets, to which were admitted the so-called "petty *bourgeoisie*" parties, that is, the socialistic parties, such as the Mensheviks, the Bund, and the Social Revolutionaries known as the "*Narod*" or "People's" group. An immense majority of the delegates were, of course, Communists. Lenin announced the approaching termination of warfare and the necessity of turning attention now chiefly to economic problems.

"The road of peaceful constructive effort is opening before us," declared Lenin. All the further activity of the Soviet Government during the winter of 1919-20 was concerned with tasks of economic reconstruction. The most revealing gesture, in this connection, was the establishment on February 7, 1920, of a Commission for the Electrification of Russia.

Economic restoration, according to the views of Lenin and the other leaders of the Communist party, must not in any instance involve a concession to the *bourgeois* system. Neither Lenin himself nor any of the other leaders, with the sole exception of Trotsky, had any thought at the time of a "new economic policy." Trotsky introduced in the Central Committee in February, 1920, a proposal for various changes in the economic system similar to those which later were termed the New Economic Policy. But he did not lay any special emphasis on the suggestions, and they were not even considered in the Central Committee, not to mention the party at large.¹

So the end of the civil war did not bring with it any renunciation of the system of war communism. On the contrary, the Communist leaders held that favorable conditions had just arisen for the realization of a sys-



International News Photos, Inc.

Lenin in the Council of People's Commissars

Standing, behind his seat at the head of the table, are Rykov (later Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars) and Kameney; seated at the table, left, second from the head, Ordzhonikidze; right, second from the head, Sokolnikov; third, Krassin; fifth, Trotsky; third row back, from bottom, at end, Pokrovsky.



tem of pure Communism. In their minds, the whole matter was summed up in the problem of correcting the defects in the functioning of the administrative and economic agencies of government, caused by the War, and in the task of extending the governmental system and intensifying labor discipline.

One characteristic scheme of that winter was the formation of "labor armies." An order of the Council of Labor and Defense of January 15, 1920, called for the reorganization of one of the armies on the eastern front as the first labor army. This force was sent to the Ural region for work in the reestablishment of railway transportation, the mining of coal, and the cutting of timber. A second labor army, formed in March, was hurried to the Donets Basin coal mines. The system of communistic economics formed the basis of the orders issued by the Russian Communist party at its assembly at the end of March, 1920.

The Ninth Convention of the party recognized the necessity of bringing a general economic plan into effect in the country, and of mobilizing all qualified workers and forming new labor armies. Its resolution concerning the trades-unions contemplated their complete subordination to the governmental authorities.

The trades-unions, in proportion as communistic consciousness and the creative powers of the masses develop, must gradually be transformed into auxiliary agencies of the proletarian state. The tasks of the trades-unions lie chiefly in the field of economic organization and education.

With like definiteness, the coöperative societies were deprived of their independence and subjected wholly to the power of the Government. The agencies of the consumers' coöperative societies were transformed into

subdivisions of the People's Commissariat of Food Supply. "Consumers' coöperation, both in the capital and in towns and villages, under the direction of the People's Commissariat of Food Supply, will execute technical economic functions in accordance with its instructions and subject to its control." As for the agricultural and industrial coöperative agencies, they were transferred to the supervision of the All-Russian Economic Council and the People's Commissariat of Agriculture, and all their local institutions were made bureaux under these departments.

So the Ninth Convention of the party laid the foundation for a system of pure Communism.

9.

LENIN's expectation of an end of civil war proved, however, premature. In the summer of 1920, the Soviet Government again had to carry on large-scale military operations, and on two fronts, against General Wrangel in the South and against Poland. The remnants of the Volunteer army and of the Cossack armies gathered in the spring of that year in the Crimea. Their secure geographical position on a peninsula gave the Whites a little breathing space. General Wrangel now became their leader, taking the place of Denikin who had resigned after the failure of his movement. Wrangel's chief political advisor was the former Marxist and one-time colleague of Lenin, Struve. Wrangel was able to take advantage of the respite to reorganize an army and so decided upon one last venture. Wrangel and Struve tried to avoid the political mistakes that Denikin had made. A new agrarian law was published, guaranteeing to the peasants ownership of land. A new

policy of working agreements with separate nationalities and with the Cossack governments was also proclaimed. In June, 1920, Wrangel's army broke through the Red lines on the neck of the isthmus of the Crimea and got out into the northern Tauride region. The Soviet Government was not able to throw any strong force against Wrangel at the time, since it was engaged in war with Poland.

There had long been in the air a lowering threat of conflict between Soviet Russia and Poland. Throughout 1919, conferences went on between the Soviet Government and the Polish Government concerning frontiers, and these were interrupted from time to time by local military clashes. But in 1919, while the Soviet struggle with Denikin was still under way, the Poles did not definitely break off relations with the Soviet Government. A victory for Denikin would have meant to the Poles the restoration of the nationalistic Russia that they hated. So they did not wish to hamper the Soviet Government in its fight with him. By the spring of 1920 his cause appeared decisively lost. Only then did the Poles begin an advance against Soviet Russia, on April 25, 1920, which at first developed successfully. In the beginning of May, Polish troops occupied Kiev.

The menace of the Polish march rearoused patriotic sentiments among the Russian people. Many officers and soldiers who had entered the ranks of the Red army earlier with reluctance and against their will, now went into battle with enthusiasm. A former Supreme Commander in Chief of the Russian army, who had held the post under the Provisional Government but had maintained a neutral attitude toward the Soviet Government, General Brusilov, now consented to enter the

Revolutionary War Council and issued an appeal to all former officers of the Russian army to combat the Poles.

For Lenin, the war with the Poles meant a continuation of war against imperialistic intervention. He strove to give to the conflict social as well as national significance. The war against Poland was proclaimed to be a Red war against the "White Poles." Its aim was not the subjugation of Poland but the establishment there of a communistic order or society and the formation of a Polish Soviet Republic. An appeal issued by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee said: "The war with Poland is a war of the workers and peasants for the independence of Socialistic Russia and for its union with a Socialistic Poland, as with the proletarians of Europe and of the whole world." Lenin called for the exertion of the full energies of the Soviet state: "We must act so that here in the rear there shall remain only those who are absolutely incapable of being at the front."

The chief difficulty consisted in the complete disorganization of the transport system. In the summer of 1920 there might almost have been expected an absolute stoppage of the railways. By means of fearful exertions and of the installation on the Soviet railways of a system of harsh military discipline, introduced by Trotsky, the Soviet Government was actually able to achieve by the summer, some improvement in transportation. On May 14, the Red army launched a counter-attack, which began to develop successfully. The Poles started a retreat along their whole line. The Red army advanced in two main masses. The northern section led by Tukhachevsky went around Warsaw to the

north; the southern section led by Budenny attacked Lvov. The fall of Warsaw seemed imminent and inevitable. A Provisional Revolutionary Committee of Poland, consisting of Polish Communists, was formed on July 31 under the chairmanship of Dzerzhinsky. But in the middle of August a change began to occur. Several causes underlay it. First, a part of the Red army forces was diverted from the Polish front to the Tauride region in southern Russia, because of the menace of Wrangel. Then, there was a lack of accord between the campaigns of Tukhachevsky and Budenny. Instead of going around Warsaw from the south and so catching the Polish army between the claws of two Russian armies, Budenny, whose political advisor was Stalin, paid no attention to the central command, marched farther to the west—apparently under the sway of jealousy of Tukhachevsky—and attempted to capture Lvov before Tukhachevsky could capture Warsaw. Between the northern and southern fronts of the Red armies there appeared a break. The French General, Weigand, who had been hurriedly summoned to rescue Poland, took advantage of this opportunity to strike a blow at the weak point where the fronts joined. The result was a frightful catastrophe. The Red armies were forced to retreat hastily, losing a mass of prisoners and a great deal of artillery. Part of the troops in the northern section were compelled to cross the frontier of East Prussia and were interned. By the beginning of October, the Red armies had retreated to a line leading through Naroch, Molodechno, and Minsk.

An agreement for an armistice with the Poles was signed on October 12 by the Soviet Government. Then it was possible to turn full attention to Wrangel. After

fierce battles, the Red armies captured Perekop, on the isthmus connecting the Crimean peninsula with the mainland, and broke through into the Crimea.

Wrangel's army and a part of the civilian officials in his Government, with their families, embarked on ships and left for Constantinople.

10.

IN the glare of the war with Poland there gathered the Second Congress of the Communist International. There were delegates of Communist and left-wing Socialist parties from thirty-seven countries. Not only Europe and America were represented, as at the first Congress of the International, but also Asia and Australia. The opening session was held on June 19, in Petrograd, in the palace named after the Bolshevik Uritsky, formerly known as the Tauride Palace, where the Imperial Duma and the Constituent Assembly had met. Then the activities of the Congress were shifted to Moscow, where they continued until August 6. This Second Congress of the Communist International was of immense significance for the whole future history of the movement. While the First Congress, held in 1919, had been summoned hastily, without sufficient preparation, Lenin submitted to the Second Congress a program for Communist tactics throughout the world which had been thought through and worked out in detail. It formed the basis of the theses adopted by the Congress.

The essential part of Lenin's program consisted in the transfer to the sphere of world politics of the same principle to which he had held earlier in his attitude toward Russia under the parliamentary *régime* of Stolypin. This was the principle of combining legal with

illegal activity. Communists throughout the world were to form secret centers in order to prepare for revolution, and at the same time, subject to the orders of these secret centers, they were to enter the legal institutions of the *bourgeois* countries, and primarily the parliaments. But to every parliament, in any country, the Communists were to take the same attitude that they had taken toward the Imperial Duma in its time.*

"No parliament can in any circumstances be for Communists an arena of struggle for reforms, for betterment of the situation of the working class. . . . The only question can be that of utilizing *bourgeois* state institutions for their own destruction."²

Communitic deputies in national parliaments were to act as spies in the center of the *bourgeois* system. Their aim throughout the world was to be to overthrow the *bourgeoisie* and destroy its overlordship. "Proletarian dictatorship must deprive the *bourgeoisie* of such mighty weapons of resistance as the press, the schools, the parliaments, the churches, the machinery of administration, etc." A decision was taken to devote special attention to the organization of the Communist International itself, as the general staff for international civil war. Strict rules were worked out for admission of members, the so-called "twenty-one conditions." The only acceptable organizations were those that adopted all the points in the program and all the tactics of revolutionary communism. Particular emphasis in the practical strategy of the Communist International was laid on the problems of the colonial and semicolonial peoples. Appropriate theses were based on Lenin's work *Imperialism as the Highest Phase of Capitalism*, written

* See chap. ii, sec. 6; chap. iii, secs. 1 and 3.

in 1916.* According to this book, one characteristic peculiarity of the contemporary imperialist order consisted in the fact that the capitalist monopolies of the imperialistic countries could exist and develop only through exploitation of the colonial and semicolonial countries of Asia, Africa, and South America. These ideas of Lenin induced the Second Congress of the Communist International to adopt special theses on the questions of nationalities and of colonies. The second of these read: "European capitalism draws its chief strength not from the industrial countries of Europe, but from its colonial possessions. For its existence it must have control over the great colonial markets and a broad field for exploitation." The third thesis read: "The surplus income received from colonies is the chief source of the wealth of contemporary capitalism. The European working class will only be able to overthrow the capitalistic system when this source has finally dried up."

The policy of the Communist International on the questions of nationalities and of colonies corresponded to the program of the Eighth Convention of the Russian Communist party. This had been a sort of flank movement, intended to aid the direct attack on the capitalistic strongholds which was being carried on even at that time; it will be recalled that the Second Congress of the Communist International held its sessions when the operations of the Red army in Poland were developing successfully.

As may be inferred from the theses on the question of colonies, propaganda in the Orient acquired special significance for the Soviet Government. Lenin needed

* See chap. iv, sec. 10.

to arouse against the imperialistic powers the people of India, China, Persia, Turkey, and other oriental countries. The national autonomy of the eastern peoples of Russia proclaimed by the Eighth Convention of the Russian Communist party therefore had an importance for Soviet Russia which was not merely domestic but world-wide. It was a step toward liberation of all of the peoples of the East from "the imperialist yoke."

11.

THE end of the war with Poland and the victory over Wrangel signalized the end of large-scale military operations in the civil war. The Soviet Government was able once more to turn to the work of crowning the structure of peaceful economic restoration, which had been begun at the Eighth Convention of the Russian Communist party.

A corresponding program was expounded by Lenin at the Eighth Congress of Soviets which took place at the end of December, 1920.

The crux of the political situation at the moment consists in the fact that we are passing through a period of crumbling and transition, a sort of zigzag, a phase in which we are shifting from warfare to economic reconstruction. . . . Our party program cannot remain merely a party plan—it must be transformed into our program of economic restoration, or else it is useless even as a program for the party.

It would be a mistake to think, however, that in the minds of Lenin and the other Communist leaders this move for economic reconstruction signified any renunciation of the system of pure Communism. Like the breathing space of the winter of 1919–20, the end of the War, in Lenin's opinion, could only be of advantage

in the reinforcement of the Communist economic system and in the elimination of its defects. Once again there began to be heard speeches like those of a year before, on the necessity of intensified labor discipline, of reforming the machinery of administration, and of improving the technical basis of industry. And once again there began talk about electrification. At the Eighth Congress of Soviets Lenin declared: "Communism is the Soviet power plus the electrification of the whole country." On the plan of electrification he rested very great hopes.

"The enemy within," said Lenin, "lives by small scale enterprises, and to dislodge him there is only one means—the transfer of the economic system of the country, including agriculture, to a new technical basis, to the technical basis of contemporary large scale industry. Such a basis is afforded only by electricity." Without actually waiting for the process of electrification, the Soviet Government began to push on the Communist program.

The Presidium of the Supreme Council of National Economy declared in a decree of November 29, 1920, the nationalization of all industrial enterprises in which the number of workers was more than five when mechanical apparatus was used, or more than ten when no machinery was used. According to this decree, all village industries, regardless of the number of workers employed in them, were compelled to operate exclusively under control of the Central Board of village industry and were deprived of the right to dispose of their wares in the open market. "The conflict with the private dealer" was carried on not only in the sphere of industry but also of trade. Before the Eighth Con-

gress of Soviets was held, the Moscow Soviet closed the Sukharevka, the great bazaar in Moscow which had continued to exist until that time despite legal prohibitions.

One of the basic questions in Communist economics concerned the incentives to the people for the effort of hard labor, once motives of personal gain had been eliminated. Lenin called upon Communistic patriotism: "We must achieve the goal of making everyone [peasants and workers] understand that Russia belongs to us, that we, the masses of workers and peasants, by our activity, by our own stern labor discipline, can alone transform the old economic conditions and bring into being the great economic plan." In fact, it was necessary to intensify measures of coercion, by introducing obligatory labor.

The law for compulsory labor was intended to apply not only to the town population but also to the peasant. Lenin insisted that the peasants must be convinced of the necessity of compulsory state labor. At his instigation, a whole series of decrees were issued for state regulation of peasant economy. A plan was set up for the obligatory cultivation and sowing of fields. The peasant was turned into a serf of the Soviet power.

So the first months of peace only facilitated a new outburst of so-called "war Communism," yet in truth it was not war Communism but militant Communism prepared to act in the same way whether there was war or peace.

IX

The New Economic Policy

1.

DURING the hard years of civil war, Lenin explained all economic difficulties and food shortages at Soviet meetings and in the press by the fact that the White armies had cut Soviet Russia off from the grain-growing regions and that the Allies were confining Russia within an economic blockade. He also attributed Soviet troubles to speculation and to sabotage on the part of the *bourgeoisie* and the richer peasants.

Now that the civil war had ended, the blockade had been lifted by the Allies, and both the *bourgeoisie* and the richer peasants had been put down, the Soviet Government announced that it would take up a program of peaceful economic construction.

Nevertheless the economic situation in the country grew worse and worse. Nationalized industry was crumbling in spite of all the efforts of the Soviet Government. Labor discipline declined steadily. In the great metallurgical plants failure to report for work in 1921 reached the proportion of 30 per cent to 50 per cent. Productivity of labor grew less with every year. In the Donets coal basin, for example, the monthly output for each worker amounted in 1916 to 800 puds (one pud equals about thirty-six pounds), while in 1922 the monthly average was 200 puds. This decrease in the standard of production was brought partly by the great lowering of wages, and by the difficulty of procuring

food at any price in the prevailing shortage. The workers began to quit the towns in masses to return to the villages. In the Ural region, during 1920, some 37 per cent of the total number of workers drifted away in this fashion. Under such conditions, it was not surprising that the general output of industry was falling constantly lower. The gross production of coal in 1916, within the limits that corresponded later to the Union of Soviet Republics, was more than two billion puds; in 1918 it was 731,000,000 puds; in 1919, 504,000,000 puds; in 1920, 464,000,000 puds. The smelting of pig iron in southern Russia amounted in 1916 to a total of 176,000,000 puds; in 1918, 12,000,000 puds; in 1919, 1,700,000; in 1920, 900,000 puds. Production in other branches of industry shrank in about the same proportion. There was like disorganization and ruin in the transportation system. In 1918, 40 per cent of the locomotives were disabled and in 1920, 56 per cent.

In connection with all these developments, there took place a mad rise of prices on manufactured goods. Further, on January 1, 1920, the value of the paper currency had fallen so far that one gold ruble would have been worth 3,136 paper rubles; on January 1, 1921, a gold ruble would have been worth 26,529 paper rubles.

The collapse of village industry and agriculture was of still more threatening import. A terrific blow had been dealt to agricultural productivity in 1918 by the destruction of large-scale farming enterprises, first those of the owners of large estates and then, in the period of the Committees of the Poor, those of the so-called "rich peasants." And it was these very owners of large estates and rich peasants who had shipped farm prod-

ucts to market. The enterprises of the "middle peasants" yielded only a negligible surplus above the amount necessary to satisfy their own needs, and the poorer peasants did not produce enough even for themselves. To this basic cause were added the ceaseless requisitionings of grain, and sometimes of stock, by the Central Government and by workers' raiding squads. During the year 1917-18, the Soviet authorities seized in the villages 40,000,000 puds of grain; in 1918-19, 80,000,000 puds; in 1919-20, 180,000,000 puds. Peasant herds of cattle decreased rapidly. In 1916 there were in Russia, according to estimates, 31,000,000 horses; in 1920, 24,000,000 in all. Horned cattle numbered in 1916, 50,000,000 heads; in 1920, 36,000,000. The area of plowed land became smaller every year, partly in consequence of the slaughtering of plow animals, but chiefly because the peasant saw no incentive to produce anything more than his own family needed so long as any surplus was to be taken away from him by the Soviet Government. As a result of the collapse of industry, the Soviet power lost any chance to offer to the peasants compensation, in the form of manufactured goods, for requisitioned grain. By 1921 the area of land under cultivation had been reduced to 62 per cent of the pre-war area, with a harvest yield of only 37.3 per cent. In the same year the country was facing the peril of complete stoppage of industry and of famine.

2.

THE Communist economic system placed the country in the spring of 1921 in the peril of another civil war.

The new conflict was the more dangerous for the Bolsheviks since it started as an elemental movement

among the masses of peasants and sailors, without any relation to the organized centers of counter-revolution or to foreign intervention. With the autumn of 1920 there began a peasant rebellion in several central provinces of Russia—Tambov, Saratov, and Ryazan. Its chief center was in the province of Tambov; and its leader was a peasant, Antonov. By the spring of 1921 it had acquired a threatening character. The aroused peasants had organized an actual army of 20,000 men. The Soviet Government was forced to establish a new internal front, under the command of Tukhachevsky. The uprising was put down with terrifying harshness, whole villages being subjected to artillery fire. Nevertheless it did not subside, but continued to spread.

In the spring of 1921, the Soviet Government had to deal not only with this movement, headed by Antonov, but also with a mutiny of sailors at Kronstadt. The masses of the sailors had much closer contacts and community of interests with the peasants than with the factory workers. The mutiny at Kronstadt was partly a response to the Antonov revolt, and partly a reaction to the catastrophic management of economic affairs by the Communist authorities. A meeting was held on March 1, 1921, in Kronstadt, in which about fifteen thousand men took part. The majority adopted a resolution for new elections to the Soviets and for the admission of anarchists and left-wing Socialist parties to membership. On the evening of March 2, Kronstadt was in the hands of a revolutionary committee consisting of delegates chosen from the various sections of the fleet. Assemblies of delegates began to form in the brigades of ships of the line. The resolutions passed at the sailors' meetings and assemblies of delegates pre-

sented the following demands: (1) immediate new elections for the Soviets by secret ballot; (2) freedom of speech and the press for anarchists and left-wing Socialist parties; (3) freedom of assembly for trade-unions and peasant organizations; (4) the summoning of a nonpartisan conference representing the Petrograd province not later than March 10; (5) abolition of the Communist political agencies with the army and navy detachments; (6) immediate withdrawal of all grain requisitioning squads and reestablishment of freedom of trade; (7) dispersal of the Communist fighting squads existing in all sections of the marine forces; (8) freedom of action for the peasants on the land, according to their own desires.

Early on March 3, during the night, the revolutionary committee named General Kozlovsky as commander of defense. The movement had now swept within its scope all the sailors in Kronstadt, and only the school of Red Military Cadets training at Kronstadt, refused to join in the mutiny and to a man marched away across the ice to Oranienbaum. Sections of the Red army were moved up toward Kronstadt. The advance took several days. It was only by the middle of March that the Red army had occupied the Kronstadt area. The suppression of the uprising was announced officially on March 17. The ringleaders who were caught alive were shot. A large number of the sailors were arrested and sent into exile in remote parts of Russia.

3.

THE Kronstadt uprising proved to be the last drop that caused the cup to run over. It forced Lenin to change his tactics and to introduce the New Economic Policy.

Signs of this shift had appeared, however, several months before. The burdens of the economic crisis, the beginning of famine, the growing peasant rebellion were all reasons that, without the Kronstadt mutiny, rendered the New Economic Policy as indispensable as bread. The first indications of the change became apparent, to an observer of the period, in the political action of the Soviet Government beginning with the autumn of 1920, that is to say, in the very heat of the experiment in thoroughgoing Communism.

The first augury of the New Economic Policy was the law of November 23, 1920, for the granting of concessions to foreigners to develop the natural resources of Russia. Lenin had considered the possibility of concessions to foreigners long before that; he offered them in the midst of the civil war, in his response to the invitation issued by the Allies to attend a peace conference at Prinkipo in February, 1919, and also in his draft for a treaty compiled with Bullitt in March, 1919.* It became practical to think of granting foreign concessions after Soviet Russia entered the phase of concluding peace treaties with other nations, that is, after the summer of 1920. Such a treaty had been concluded in March of that year with Estonia, and in the summer and autumn there followed treaties with Lithuania, Latvia, Finland, and also a preliminary treaty of peace with Poland. In the course of a month after the conclusion of peace with Finland and Poland, there was published a law on concessions. Although Lenin said that concessions meant a continuation of war with the capitalists, it was evident that they really represented a beginning of a compromise with capitalism, although not with domestic but

* See chap. viii, sec. 3.

with foreign capital. The law on concessions caused considerable dissatisfaction among various groups of Russian Communists, and also among workers and peasants. At the Eighth Congress of Soviets in December, 1920, Lenin said:

Recently we were informed that in the Arzamas district convention of Soviets of the Nizhni Novgorod province, one non-partisan peasant delegate declared on the subject of concessions: "Comrades, we send you to the All-Russian Congress, declaring that we, the peasants, are ready to go hungry and cold and to render army service for three years more, if only you do not bargain away Mother Russia in concessions."

Lenin responded that concessions

have nothing to do with bargaining Russia away, but do represent a certain economic compromise with the capitalists in order to secure an opportunity of obtaining as soon as possible the indispensable machinery and locomotives without which we cannot accomplish the restoration of our economic system.

The offer of concessions to foreigners could hardly be imagined without certain changes in the general economic system which had been established by the Soviet state itself. And beginning with the same autumn of 1920, cracks did actually begin to show in the structure of doctrinaire Communism. Doubts as to the validity of the whole system of Communist economics were not yet expressed directly and openly. But the stream of living thought found its way around institutions that had been set up according to dogma.

Fierce debates began over questions which seemed not to have any direct connection with the general principles of Communist economics. Nevertheless, these debates shook the intellectual stronghold of communistic doctrine, so that in March, 1921, it fell the more easily.

The controversy was the so-called "discussion of trades-unions," which arose at the Fifth All-Russian Conference of Trades-Unions at the beginning of November, 1920. The Ninth Convention of the Russian Communist party had adopted a resolution for the transformation of trades-unions into agencies subordinated to the Soviet administration. To put this resolution in effect was not easy for the trades-unions were after all the last bulwark of the workers as a social group, and it was not a simple matter to destroy the remnants of their independence. At the Fifth Conference of Trades-Unions there were disclosed two extreme tendencies. One sought the restoration of complete liberty of action to the trades-unions, the other their final subjection.

Trotsky, with the presumptions of a military dictator that he had acquired during the years of civil war, demanded a reorganization and new education of trades-unions which would really have amounted to militarizing them. Lenin took a middle position. In one of his speeches at this time, he expressed himself thus: "The trades-unions hold a position in the system of dictatorship by the proletariat, if one may say so, intermediary between the party and governmental power." His program became known as the "platform of ten" because nine other members of the Central Committee of the party signed it in addition to himself, and it was designed to preserve the appearance of pure Communist doctrine while actually it amounted to a retreat from the resolutions of the Ninth Convention of the party.

The decision to restore some independence to the workers' trades-unions of course did not by itself signify an entry on behalf of *bourgeois* democracy and liberties. But in the circumstances of a burdensome economic

crisis, and in connection with the idea of offering concessions to capitalists, even though foreign capitalists, Lenin's new program in the matter of the trades-unions indubitably pointed to the beginning of a change of policy.

4.

At the very time when the Kronstadt revolt was in full flare, there gathered in Moscow on March 8, 1921, the Tenth Convention of the Russian Communist party.

Lenin's words, in his opening address, to the effect that the country had emerged from civil war, must consequently have sounded like faint consolation. He said: "For the first time we are assembled in convention under circumstances in which there are no hostile troops supported by the capitalists and imperialists of the whole world, anywhere in the territory of the Soviet Republic."

It was not in Lenin's character, however, to give himself over to self-reassurance and self-deception. In the threatening hour of danger, he knew how to look the truth squarely in the face. Concerning the Kronstadt uprising, he declared in his first report to the Convention:

It is indispensable to draw circumstantial lessons in politics and economics from these events. We must observe this petty *bourgeois* counter-revolution attentively, with its slogan of freedom of trade. What does this slogan, advanced by petty *bourgeois* elements, mean? It shows that in the sphere of relations between the proletariat and the small farmers there are tasks which we have not yet discharged. The peril of this slogan is not in the fact that it shields White Guard and Menshevik endeavors, but in the fact that it may spread in spite of the hatred of the peasant masses for the White Guards.

In fact the time had arrived to take into account the

hatred of the peasant masses not for the White Guards but for the Soviet Government. Lenin could not fail to recognize that the main cause of the crisis in peasant agriculture was the food-supply policy of the Soviet power, the compulsory levy of food reserves:

Further, as matters have worked out, we have gathered increased stocks of food supplies from the provinces that had smaller harvests . . . while on the other hand we were under such pressure in the emergency that we had no choice. A country which, after a ruinous imperialistic war, had endured also such an experience as a civil war lasting for many years, of course cannot exist except by dedicating all its forces to the service of the front. And also, being ruined, the country cannot act otherwise than to take any surplus food stocks from the peasants even though it cannot compensate them in exchange with any other means of life. This was unavoidable, in order to preserve the country, the army, and the workers' and peasants' authority. We said to the peasants: Of course, you are giving your grain to the workers' and peasants' state as a loan, but in any other way you cannot save your own state from the landowners and the capitalists. We could not act otherwise in the circumstances that the imperialists and capitalists have imposed on us by their war.

Lenin acknowledged the abnormality of the peasants' position:

Under conditions of crisis, when his stock is suffering from inadequate feed and from distemper, the peasant has to extend credit to the Soviet Government, for the aid of large scale industry from which as yet he is receiving nothing.

What conclusion did Lenin draw from this fact? It was the necessity of renouncing the policy of pure Communism. Lenin now recognized that the line of action indicated by pure Communism would have been correct only in the event of world revolution coming to the aid

of the Russian working class. But this revolution was slow in coming. ✓

We have learned in three years to understand that to stake our hopes on an international revolution does not mean reckoning on any definite period of time, that the pace of its development becomes more and more rapid and may bring about a revolution in the spring, but also may not bring it about, and therefore we must find the way to adjust our own action in the field of class relations within our own country and in other countries so that we shall be in a position for a long time to maintain the dictatorship of the proletariat and to remedy, even though gradually, all the evils and difficulties that are descending upon us.

While the hope of immediate intervention through world revolution was deferred, it was necessary to give up pure Communistic doctrine:

Only a working agreement with the peasantry can save the socialistic revolution in Russia, so long as revolution in other countries has not begun. We find ourselves in circumstances of such impoverishment, disorder, fatigue, and exhaustion of our chief productive forces—the peasants and the workers—that everything else must be subordinated to the basic idea of increasing the amount of manufactured products at any cost.

We must understand that in the critical emergency in peasant industry we cannot continue to exist except by appealing to this peasant industry for help to the towns and villages.

The small landholder can be satisfied on the essential point by two things: first, a certain freedom of exchange is necessary, freedom for the honest small proprietor; and second, it is necessary to supply manufactured wares and products.

Reassuring his listeners, Lenin said:

If we were in a position to obtain even a small amount of manufactured wares and could hold them in the control of the state, in the hands of the proletariat possessing the political

ESTABLISHED
N.E.P. BECAUSE
of this

power, we should add as a state an economic power to our political power.

As a first measure in aid of the peasants, Lenin proposed a limited tax in kind in place of the compulsory levy of food reserves which took away from the peasant everything above the least requirements for his own family. Lenin said:

Seizure of surplus supplies from the peasants was a measure imposed upon us by absolute necessity because of military circumstances, but not in any degree appropriate under peaceful conditions of existence for peasant industry. The peasant requires the assurance that he will only have to give up a definite amount, and that he can use a definite amount for his own small scale exchange.

Lenin then indicated the bases of the policy which later became known under the name of the New Economic Policy:

The proletarian power can guarantee to itself contact with the leading capitalistic countries by means of concessions, and on this contact depends that intensive development of our own industry without which we cannot progress toward the communistic system, while on the other hand, in this period of transition, in a peasant country, we must find ways to adopt measures for the economic insurance of the peasantry, the greatest possible degree of provision for the betterment of its economic situation. So long as we have not transformed this great machine, so long as it does not exist in its new form, we must secure for it the chance to operate freely.

Lenin represented this New Economic Policy, both to himself and to his hearers, not as a change for a short time but as a lasting and serious move in a new direction:

The task of transforming the small landholder, of altering his

habits of thought and all his customs, is one requiring generations. To solve this problem in relation to the small landholder, so to speak to make healthy again his whole psychological organism, is something that can only be done with a material basis, with technique, with the adoption of tractors and agricultural machinery on a large scale, and with electrification also on a large scale. These are the things that would change the small landholder, to the roots of his being, with immense swiftness.

Once again to reassure his hearers, Lenin exclaimed:

If I say that generations are required, that does not mean that centuries are necessary. But you understand very well that to procure tractors and agricultural machinery and to electrify a huge country is an affair to be measured, in any event, by decades.

It was impossible to introduce a tax in kind, as a separate measure, without taking up immediately general social and economic reforms. Lenin consequently proposed to the party Convention the repeal of the resolution dealing with the coöperative movement, passed by the preceding Ninth Convention.*

Obviously the coöperative movement, like the trades-unions, had to receive again some measures of limited freedom of action. The Convention assented to all of Lenin's proposals. The All-Russian Central Executive Committee, in accordance with the resolutions of the Convention, formally adopted on March 16 a decision for taxes in kind.

The Tenth Congress of the party thus laid the foundations for the New Economic Policy. It likewise passed other resolutions of significance in the further life of the Soviet Government. Any more "discussions," such as the "discussion on the trades-unions," and any fac-

* See chap. viii, sec. 8.

tional groupings within the party, were prohibited. A new general secretary of the party was also elected; this was Stalin.

5.

THE New Economic Policy constituted, officially, only a change in the immediate tactics of the Communist party. The more remote goals and ideals of Communism remained unaltered.

More than once in his political career, Lenin had executed quick shifts in policy. His change of attitude toward the boycott of the Imperial Duma in 1906 and 1907* may be recalled. Further he did not fear actual concessions and compromises in dealing with his enemies; two examples were his readiness to conclude an alliance on February 18, 1918, with "the bandits of Anglo-French Imperialism" and to arrange peace at Brest-Litovsk on March 3 of that year with the Germans. In his speeches on the New Economic Policy at the Tenth Convention of the Communist party, and later, many indications can be found that Lenin justified the policy to his hearers primarily as a tactical expedient. But it may be assumed that this was only an instance of his customary method of adapting political terms. The transition to the New Economic Policy meant a great deal more in principle for Lenin than his earlier deviations from his line of tactics.

When Lenin proposed to give up the boycott of elections to the Imperial Duma and to enter it, this did not mean that he had begun to attribute any fundamental value to the Duma and that he had gone over to a program of peaceful organized parliamentary activity.

* See chap. ii, sec. 6; chap. iii, sec. 1.

Even after 1907, he continued to maintain an attitude of contempt for all parliamentary activity. For him the Duma was only a platform for propaganda. The New Economic Policy was a quite different matter. For Lenin it meant not merely a means of close working relations with the peasants. The New Economic Policy stood rather for a value and a purpose of its own. It became to him a sort of guaranty of development of the economic instincts of the people. Deeply rooted in Lenin himself there was a sound economic sense, coexisting in strange contrast with instincts for destruction. Beginning with the Brest-Litovsk peace, Lenin consistently developed his endeavors to improve the economic system of Russia, even talking as early as the spring of 1918 of a retreat from the line of pure Communistic doctrine and of salvation through state capitalism.*

The collapse of industry, the necessity to supply the workers with food, and then the civil war, compelled Lenin to cease thinking of state capitalism and to erect a system of militant Communism, based on compulsory labor and division of stocks of food supplies. During the interval of the civil war, in the winter of 1919-20, and after the end of the war, in the winter of 1920-21, he attempted to reconcile the introduction of rational economic methods with the communistic system. Now this system was falling to pieces. And so Lenin could release his own economic impulses.

6.

THE introduction of a tax in kind, in place of a compulsory levy of food reserves, was the first measure

* See chap. vii, sec. 2.

taken under the New Economic Policy, and in the course of the next few months there followed a series of others. By the end of 1921, the economic aspect of Russia had completely changed.

Decrees followed one after another, abolishing the restrictions on economic life introduced in the period of war Communism. Any further nationalization of industrial enterprises was stopped; small-scale enterprises were returned to their proprietors. Freedom of trade within Russia was revived; this was a natural consequence of the decree setting up taxation in kind which was passed so that the peasants might be able to dispose freely of their harvest surplus. The management of the large-scale nationalized factories and mills was reformed. In place of the bureaucratic Chief Committees* there was established a system of state trusts. In Soviet terms, trusts meant a group of factories operating on a combined basis for the sake of its commercial advantage.

Measures for the reestablishment of a properly functioning financial system were also taken. The State Bank was reestablished. It had been reduced during the time of the civil war, under the title of the People's Bank, to the status of a department of the Commissariat of Finance.

An impetuous revival of pre-communistic institutions, in the economic sphere, went on with the complete approval of Lenin, who declared in November, 1921, that the limits of the retreat on the economic front could not be foreseen. Returning to his ideas of the spring of 1918, he preached the necessity of a system of state capitalism relying on the coöperative movement for its contact with the peasants.

* See chap. vii, sec. 2.

The inevitability of state capitalism, according to Lenin, was created by the backwardness of Russia in general economic development. For the first time in his whole career of political activity, lasting through many years, Lenin now seemed seriously to envisage this problem. He had, of course, often talked about it earlier, but now he opened his eyes to it afresh. He drew a gloomy picture of the cultural crudeness of the Russian villages and of peasant isolation:

Everywhere that ten versts' travel, or rather ten versts' lack of roads, separates a village from a railway, that is to say from physical contact with cultural forces, with capitalism, with large-sphere industry, and with the great cities, is it not true that the patriarchal system, the spirit of apathy and semi-savagery prevail?

Lenin's conclusion was that for the time not socialism but state capitalism was necessary for Russia. "Capitalism is an evil in comparison with socialism. Capitalism is a blessing in comparison with the Middle Ages."

"We must not be afraid to admit," Lenin hinted, "that we can and must learn a great deal from capitalism." So he arrived at the very slogan, "Let us enter the school of capitalism," with which the "legal Marxist," Struve, had once begun his political career.*

It was the irony of fate that Lenin should now put this advice into practice when Struve himself was in exile after his participation in the government of General Wrangel, in 1920; among those whom Lenin dubbed "the sharks of international imperialism."

Lenin now applied all his energies to the task of arousing a new economic spirit among his own Communists. He suggested to them that "in view of our na-

* See chap. i, sec. 2.

tional lack of culture, we cannot bring about the doom of capitalism by a frontal attack. . . . Military warfare is a much simpler business than the conflicts of socialism with capitalism." The struggle to achieve socialism Lenin compared with the siege of the fortress of Port Arthur by the Japanese during the Russo-Japanese War. An attack by storm was first attempted, ending in failure. This phase of unsuccessful storm attack Lenin likened to a phase of war Communism. Then there followed a long siege, carried out according to plan, which led to final success. To this phase must be compared the phase of state capitalism. Therefore the whole system of thought must be adapted to its conditions.

"The proletarian administration," said Lenin in October, 1921, "must become a cautious, calculating, clever manager, a careful wholesale merchant." He appealed to the Communists to "learn how to be salesmen," saying, "To gain an understanding of commercial relations and trade is our duty."

Lenin tried to animate his followers with the spirit of good management. "Be good managers, all of you," he cried at the Second Convention of the Committees of Political Education, in the autumn of 1921. A little later at the Ninth Congress of Soviets, he said, "There is no need to be afraid to learn business from the merchants."

The envenomed Communists did not listen to Lenin's appeals without some suppressed mutterings of discontent. More than one old Communist, who had spent his whole life in political conflict for the abstract ideals of socialism, was insulted by the advice to "learn from the merchants," those very same merchants whom Lenin had trained him to regard as *bourgeois* exploiters. Lenin was relentless toward these Communist idealists who

wrapped themselves in the purity of their doctrine. He compared them with the geese in the familiar Russian fable of Krylov, that bragged of how their ancestors had saved Rome.* "Rome," that is to say, the Revolution, was an affair of the past. Now it was necessary to work for the future. "Let your forefathers rest in peace; what have you done yourselves?" asked Lenin in the words of Krylov, and he warned the unyielding Communists that, as in the fable, the peasants would drive them out with switches.

7.

SUMMING up the results of 1921, in December, Lenin was able to point already to noticeable progress in economic activity under the influence of the New Economic Policy. He could indicate the improvement in the operation of the transport system, in trade, in the mining of coal, in the smelting of iron, and in various other branches of industry. For example, for the second half of 1921, 184,000,000 puds of coal were mined, in place of the estimated amount of 143,000,000 puds. The smelting of iron during the first half of 1921 reached a total of 70,000 puds a month; in October, 1921, it rose to 130,000 puds; and in November, to 270,000 puds.

Even these figures were of course extremely modest in contrast both with production before the War and with what Russia was able to accomplish under the New Economic Policy in the course of the next few years. The important thing was the fact that an increase in production had begun, and that its pace was rapid.

* There is an excellent English translation of this fable. See Krylov's *Fables*, translated into English verse, with a preface, by Bernard Pares (London: Jonathan Cape, 1926), pp. 107-108.

The economic system in Russia was beginning gradually to heave itself up from the depths to which it had sunk. But the chasm was still yawning, and the most terrific thing to be faced was famine. Drought and crop failure in the most fertile provinces led to a catastrophe because peasant agriculture and industry had been completely exhausted by the earlier communistic policy. The population no longer had any supplies in reserve; everything had been requisitioned. Hunger spread through a region in which lived 35,000,000 people. In the two years of 1921 and 1922, according to later estimates, there perished either from starvation or its immediate consequences about five million people. The effects of the famine would have been still more frightful if it had not been for benevolent aid from abroad, chiefly from the United States, under the direction of the American Relief Administration headed by Herbert Hoover.

Russia in the autumn of 1921, in the grip of hunger and poverty, presented a sorrowful picture, which was described by one of the agents of the American Relief Administration, the late Professor Golder.¹ Towns stood with their buildings half wrecked by civil war; the equipment of the railways was broken and smashed; the level of factory production, in absolute figures, was negligible; the villages were still inflamed with rage against the central authority;* railway stations in south-eastern Russia were filled with migrating people who were dying of hunger. Nevertheless this attentive observer could discern some signs of improvement in the working of the transportation system and the factories,

* Although peasant uprisings had already ended by the autumn of 1921.

the first results of the transition to a system of economic accounting. With this view Lenin's conclusion presented at the Ninth Congress of Soviets is in agreement:

Burdensome as the year 1921 has been, extraordinary as the hardships that have fallen upon the working class and the peasants have been, we are nevertheless getting to our feet, we are starting on the right road, and by exerting all our energies we may hope that the improvement will be greater and greater.

8.

WHEN the New Economic Policy was getting under way in the summer of 1921, the Third Congress of the Communist International gathered in Moscow. It held sessions from June 22 to July 12; and in it there took part 603 delegates from fifty-eight countries. The chief question before the Congress was the attitude to be taken toward the New Economic Policy and the influence that this policy might have on the program of the Communist International.

Lenin appeared before the Congress as chief reporter on the question of the program to be adopted in relation to the New Economic Policy. His basic proposition was: "The development of international revolution, which we predicted, is progressing. But this advancing movement is not as direct as we had expected. . . ." At the same time so far as the international situation of the Soviet Republic was concerned, "the fact must be taken into account, that now unquestionably there has been reached a certain balance of forces."

"Consequently we must take advantage of this brief breathing space," reported Lenin, "in order to adapt our tactics to this sort of zigzag of historical development."

The New Economic Policy was such a tactical adjustment:

We are not alone in the world. We exist in a chain of capitalist states, as one link in the world economic system. On the one side there are the colonial countries, and they cannot help us yet; on the other side there are the capitalistic countries, and they are our enemies. The result is a certain balance of forces. True, it is a very poor balance. But we must nevertheless take the fact into account. We must not close our eyes to it, if we wish to continue to exist. Either immediate victory over the whole *bourgeoisie*, or payment of tribute. We acknowledge openly, we do not try to hide the fact, that concessions under a system of state capitalism mean tribute to capitalism. But we gain time, and this means to gain everything, particularly in a period of balance of forces.

Lenin defined the New Economic Policy practically as a union of the proletariat with the peasantry. Economic union constituted a pledge of military union between these two forces. Lenin recommended that this formula created by Russian conditions, the formula of union between the proletariat and peasantry, should be made the basis for the future world policy of the Communist International. He considered it specially important for revolutionary agitation in colonial countries. The peasantry is the foundation of nationalism in such countries. So Lenin developed and amplified at the Third Congress of the Communist International the formula for revolution in colonial countries which had been adopted by the Second Congress.

In regard to the leading capitalistic countries, Lenin emphasized at the Third Congress the Communist problem of seizing direction of the trade-union movement. The establishment of a Red International of Trades-

Unions consequently was very important to him, and a convention inaugurating this movement was held in Moscow from July 3 to 19, 1921, that is, almost at the same time as the Third Congress of the Communist International.

9.

FOR the foreign program of the Soviet Republic, as a national state, the New Economic Policy had even more significance than it had for the plan of action of the Communist International.

Lenin had tried as early as the autumn of 1920 to set up economic relations with other countries by means of offering concessions. Under the conditions of war Communism, however, it was difficult to contemplate any broad development of a system of concessions. Trade relations between Russia and other countries practically ceased during the civil war.

The New Economic Policy basically altered the situation. So it was symbolic that on the same day when the All-Russian Central Committee adopted the decree for taxation in kind, March 16, 1921, there was signed the commercial treaty which Krassin had arranged with England. The same day a treaty was also concluded with Turkey, and two days later peace was made with Poland.

The foundation for the New Economic Policy in the sphere of foreign relations was prepared. In accordance with the general spirit of the new policy, Lenin now took a predominant interest in trade relations with the *bourgeois* world outside. Foreign commerce, according to the ideas of Lenin and Krassin, was to be made a state monopoly. Lenin was in a position to boast as early

as the autumn of 1921, before the Ninth Congress of Soviets, of successes in foreign trade. Imports from abroad for the three years of 1918, 1919, and 1920, he stated, hardly exceeded 17,000,000 puds, while for the one year of 1921 they reached 50,000,000 puds. Exports for the same three years from 1918 to 1920 amounted to 2,500,000 puds, and for the year 1921 to 11,000,000 puds.

"This figure is insignificant, pitiful, laughably paltry," Lenin added. "This figure, every informed person will say at once, means poverty . . . but just the same it is a beginning."

Lenin was not alone in staking his hopes on an increase in Russian commercial exchange. Various leaders in capitalistic countries, and primarily Lloyd George, were making a similar wager, considering the revival of relations with Russia as the sole means of halting the economic crisis that they faced at home. The Supreme Council of the Allies adopted at Cannes, in January, 1922, a decision to invite representatives of Soviet Russia to an International Economic Conference in Genoa. Briand, as chairman of the Supreme Council, officially informed the Soviet Government of this decision. Further, the British and Italian Prime Ministers addressed personal messages to Lenin, "with the friendly counsel to accept the invitation and come to Genoa."

Lenin prepared to follow the advice of his new and rather unexpected friends. At a session of the Communist faction of the All-Russian Congress of Metal Workers, on March 6, 1922, he said:

We declare at the outset, that we welcome the Genoa Conference and will attend it; we have understood perfectly and have not concealed in any way the fact that we shall go to it as

traders, because commerce with the capitalistic countries, so long as they have not collapsed, is unconditionally necessary, and that we go to it in order to discuss more correctly and more advantageously the appropriate political conditions for such commerce.

Lenin repeated this thought at the Eleventh Convention of the party: "We are going to Genoa with a practical purpose—to extend trade and to create conditions under which it can develop more successfully."

At the Metal Workers' Congress, Lenin announced that he hoped to talk in Genoa personally with Lloyd George on all these subjects. In regard to warnings that the Allies were counting on a diplomatic encirclement of the Soviet representatives at Genoa, which would force them to be moderate and conciliatory, Lenin retorted to Lloyd George: "It is no use trying to frighten us with empty words." He further expressed doubt that the Allies would be able to come to an agreement among themselves, "as they have already shown the whole world."

In the end, however, Lenin did not go to Genoa when the Conference opened there on April 10, 1922. In his place, the head of the Russian delegation was Chicherin. No definite result was reached at the Conference, partly because of the very differences between the individual nations of the *Entente* that Lenin had predicted.

The main reason that compelled Lenin to give up the trip was the bad state of his health. The fatal day of May 25, 1922, was near at hand.

10.

LENIN's health had begun to fail as early as the autumn of 1921. Trotsky writes of this:

Lenin himself was considered a man of robust health, and this health seemed to be one of the indestructible pillars of the revolution. He was always active, alert, even-tempered, and gay. Only occasionally did I notice alarming symptoms. During the First Congress of the Communist International, he surprised me with his tired look, the unevenness of his voice, and his sick man's smile. More than once I told him that he was spending himself on matters of secondary importance. He agreed, but said that he couldn't do otherwise. Sometimes he complained of headaches, always casually and with a little embarrassment. But two or three weeks of rest sufficed to restore him. It seemed as if Lenin would never wear out.²

The state of his health grew worse toward the end of 1921. On December 7 he informed the members of the Political Bureau, in a memorandum: "I am going away today. Despite the reduction of my share of work and the increase of my time for rest in recent days, insomnia has increased devilishly. I am afraid that I cannot present any reports either at the party Convention or at the Congress of Soviets." Lenin began to pass a considerable part of his time in a village near Moscow.

From the time of the Ninth Congress of Soviets in December, 1921, until the Metal Workers' Congress in March, 1922, Lenin did not appear at any large meetings. The active program of the Soviet Government continued along the lines of the New Economic Policy laid down by him. But at the Metal Workers' Congress, Lenin expressed confidence that the next Convention of the party would find that the end of the economic retreat had been reached. He explained this opinion on the grounds that the New Economic Policy had achieved the required results, particularly in the sphere of foreign affairs. In this connection he declared:

We know that in the desperate famine and in the existing state

of industry, we could not hold all the positions taken from 1917 to 1921. We had to give up the whole series of them. But now we can say that this retreat, in the sense of making more compromises with the capitalists, is ended. We have balanced our powers with the powers of the capitalists. We have under way a whole series of model investigatory experiments in the form of agreements concluded with Russian and foreign capitalists.

At Lenin's instigation the Eleventh Convention of the Communist party which took place at the end of March and the beginning of April, 1922, did actually declare the retreat stopped. This did not mean that the compromises under the New Economic Policy were canceled. It only signified that Lenin wanted to avert a complete return to the *bourgeois* order and to keep in the hands of the Soviet Government the "commanding heights"—primarily the nationalized large-scale industries. From the basic principles of the New Economic Policy he had no idea of retreating. On the contrary, he called for a deepening of the operation of the policy. At the Eleventh Convention of the party he said:

The juncture with the peasant economic system, which we tried to make, has not existed up to now. Does it exist now? Not yet. We have only approached it. The whole significance of the new economic and political program that writers in our press are still continuing to seek everywhere except where it is, lies in this: to find such a juncture for the new economic plan which we are developing with such great efforts. . . . It is necessary to reveal this point of juncture, so that we can all see it clearly, so that the whole people can see it, so that the whole mass of the peasants can see that between its burdensome, unbelievably shattered, unbelievably impoverished, torturesome life now and that work which is being carried on for the sake of remote socialistic ideals, there is a connection.

Our aim is to restore this juncture of interest, to prove to the

peasant by deeds that we are beginning with things that he understands and knows and can obtain even in all his present poverty, and not with anything far away and fantastic from his point of view, to prove to him that we know how to help him, that in this moment when the peasant small-farmer is in an overburdened state of ruin, impoverishment, suffering, and famine, the Communists are actually aiding him. Either we will prove that to him or he will tell us to go to all the devils. This is unavoidable. The capitalist was able to supply products. He did it badly, he did it extortionately, he insulted us, he robbed us. Simple workers and peasants know this, who have no ideas about Communism, because they do not know what sort of thing that may be.

Nevertheless the capitalists were able to supply products—and can you? That is the kind of cries that were raised in the spring of last year. They were not always clearly heard, but they formed the groundwork of the whole spring crisis of the year that is gone. You are an excellent people; but this business, this economic affair, that you have taken in hand, you do not know how to discharge.

Lenin further declared that after the New Economic Policy the peasantry agreed to grant the Soviet Government both an extension of time and credit and, so to speak, accepted Soviet notes. He voiced a reminder, however, of the fact that for them no term was indicated.

You can find out nothing by an examination of text as to when they are to be presented for payment. That is the danger, that is the peculiarity that differentiates these political promissory notes from ordinary commercial notes. It is to this that we have to direct all our attention, and not soothe ourselves with the fact that everywhere in the state trusts and joint societies there are the best and most reliable Communists; there is no point in that, because they do not know how to manage affairs and are worse than an ordinary capitalistic clerk who has passed through the training school of a large factory and a big busi-

ness firm. This we do not admit, and this—to speak plain Russian—has been the Communist way of bragging. The Communist may be a fine fellow, conscientiously honest and devoted to the cause, who has endured prison labor and shown no fear of death, but he does not know how to carry on commerce because he is not a business man and because he has not learned and does not want to learn business and does not understand that he ought to study it beginning with the A B C. He is a Communist, a revolutionary, who has created the greatest revolution in the history of the world, and he—to whom people have looked, if not from forty pyramids, then from forty European nations, with hope for their emancipation from capitalism—he must take lessons from an ordinary clerk who has run around in a flour store for decades and understands this business, while he, the responsible Communist and consecrated revolutionary, not only does not understand it but does not even know that he does not understand it. . . . And so we, comrades, must leave this Convention with the conviction that we have not understood this business and must learn it from the beginning.

At the end Lenin gave one more warning to the overfiery Communists: "Among the masses of the people we are just drops in the ocean, and we can run affairs only when we express correctly what the people feel. Without this the whole machine will fall to pieces."

X

Lenin's Illness and Death

1.

LENIN rightly estimated the great significance of the New Economic Policy in the revival of Russian economic life. Year by year its results showed in manufacturing, trade, and farm industry. By 1928 production in Russia had well-nigh reached the level of the years before the War. But Lenin did not live to see that time. His appearance at the Eleventh Convention of the Russian Communist party proved to be his last. Probably the exertion called for by the part that he then took hastened the catastrophe. In April he suffered more and more intense headaches. In Trotsky's words: "The doctors found no organic disorders, however, and prescribed a prolonged rest. Lenin settled down permanently in a Moscow village."¹

Here in the village of Gorki came his first stroke. This was on May 25, 1922. Temporarily Lenin lost the power to move or to speak. His illness spread panic among the Soviet leaders.

Although the governmental machine had been adjusted by Lenin and had been set on the rails of the New Economic Policy, and although he had in fact half withdrawn from constructive work as early as the winter of 1921-22, nevertheless administration of the country without him seemed at the first moment unthinkable, so great at that time was his authority in the party and in circles outside it. The name of Lenin was a sort of connecting link between the party and the country.

The distraught state of the Soviet leaders showed itself, among other ways, in the fact that they informed Trotsky, who was lying sick at the time, of the stroke Lenin had suffered only on the third day after it occurred. Trotsky himself, it should be noted, attributed this fact not to distraction but to the intrigues of his quite healthy colleagues.

Above the motionless form of Lenin there began the quarrel of the so-called Epigones. A triumvirate of Stalin, Zinoviev, and Kamenev was indicated, in opposition to Trotsky. But all such combinations were premature. After a little while, Lenin began to recover. His physician, Guetier, explained his condition to Trotsky as follows: "The tendency to fatigue would increase, there would not be the former clarity in work, but a virtuoso would remain a virtuoso."

This prediction began to be realized. Inner anxiety, however, continued for a long time to affect Lenin. "You understand," he said to Trotsky, according to the latter's reminiscences, "I could not even speak or write, and I had to learn everything all over again."

2.

IN the autumn of 1922 Lenin was able to turn once more to political work. But he was not the Lenin of old. In the words of Trotsky:

In the interval between his first and second strokes, Lenin could work only half as much as before. Slight but none the less ominous warnings from his blood-vessels reached him off and on throughout this period. At one of the meetings of the Politbureau as he got up to hand some one a note—Lenin always exchanged notes this way to speed up the work—he reeled a



From Lenin's Collected Works, Vol. I, 2d ed. Published by State Printing Office, Moscow.

At the height of his power



International News Photos, Inc.

Recovering from illness

Two Aspects of Lenin



little. I noticed it only because his face changed expression instantly. This was one of many warnings from his vital centers.

In another place in his memoirs Trotsky says:

Toward the end of the meetings of the Politbureau Lenin gave one the impression of being a hopelessly tired man. All the muscles of his face sagged, the gleam went out of his eyes, and even his formidable forehead seemed to shrink, while his shoulders drooped heavily. The expression of his face and of his entire figure might have been summed up in a word: tired. At such ghastly moments, Lenin seemed to me a doomed man. But with a good night's sleep he would recover his power of thought. The articles written in the interval between his two strokes hold their own with his best work. The fluid of the source was the same, but the flow was growing less.

In the autumn of 1922 Lenin appeared twice before crowded and important political gatherings: in October at a regular session of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, and in November at the Fourth Congress of the Communist International. His speeches maintained the same line of the New Economic Policy and were imbued with the same ideas as the addresses he had delivered before his illness. But his earlier vigor and intensity were lacking. Lenin himself recognized this. At the Fourth Congress of the Communist International he said: "You comprehend that after my long illness I cannot make a lengthy report, and I must present only an introduction to the questions to be considered."

He devoted his speech at the Fourth Congress almost exclusively to Russian affairs connected with the New Economic Policy. "This is the most important question of the present time," he said, "at least the most important for me, for I am working on it."

With feelings of satisfaction, he was able to point to the results of the New Economic Policy during a year and a half. "We have achieved the satisfaction of the peasantry and the revival of industry and trade." But at the same time he pointed out that the party leaders were not always animated by the spirit of the New Economic Policy.

Undoubtedly, we have committed and are still committing a colossal number of stupidities. [His conclusion was:] The most important task now for us is to learn and to learn . . . there are disputes whether this is a matter of proletarian or of *bourgeois* culture. As to that I do not know but in any event I say: we must first learn to read, to write, and to understand what we have read.

3.

LENIN felt that he could no longer rely upon his own health and that he could not count upon any prolonged political activities. The party leaders about him felt the same thing. Unknown to anyone, he began, in the autumn of 1922, to ponder the question as to whom to will his political inheritance. The other leaders, keeping the secret from Lenin, also considered how this inheritance should be received and who should receive it. The choice could fall only on one of two men—Trotsky or Stalin.

Trotsky was the more prominent and effective revolutionary figure. His talent as an orator had made him known widely both inside and outside the party. His triumphant and ostentatious rôle during the days of the November Revolution and the years of civil war also, it would seem, ought to swing the balance in his favor. But further developments showed that in the decisive

moment Trotsky had neither the genuine ability to hold power nor the readiness to risk himself.

Stalin was much less in the forefront than Trotsky. Outside party circles, at that time his name was little known. But party members knew him well. Moreover, around his head was the aureole of an old active party leader, who had carried on his own shoulders no small share of the burden of underground work in the darkest days of party life under Tsarism. Trotsky had comparatively recently become a Bolshevik, having adhered to the party only since 1917. From the moment that Stalin was elected as General Secretary of the party, at its Tenth Convention, he held in his hands all the threads of control.

The post of Secretary of the Bolshevik party was always a very important one. The influence that Sverdlov had exercised, as Secretary of the Central Committee of the party, in the most stormy years of the Revolution, will be recalled. Now with the beginning of Lenin's illness—and as has been seen, he began to be ailing about half a year after the Tenth Convention—the rôle of the General Secretary of the party naturally gained still more importance. Yet Stalin was not at the time a sufficiently prominent personality to count surely on playing the part of sole dictator. So it was necessary for him to seek allies among the other party leaders; and thus there came to be outlined the combination of "The Three," Stalin, Zinoviev, and Kamenev.

But Lenin was still alive. Against his will and without his knowledge, no one would yet determine openly to divide the inheritance. What were his own plans? Lenin was in a tragic situation. Not one of the leaders

around him, evidently, did he consider capable of managing affairs after him.

Trotsky, in his reminiscences, which of course cannot be regarded as an unbiased historical document, describes the situation so as to give the impression that Lenin felt confidence in no one else save him.

This last hypothesis can hardly be considered correct. However Trotsky explains the fact that Lenin did not appoint him as alternate chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, the fact remains. As his alternates in the chairmanship, Lenin during his life appointed Rykov, Tsuriupa, and Kamenev.

The chairmanship of the Council of People's Commissars, moreover, did not carry with it the actual leadership of the party. This was the question that remained open. Lenin's lack of confidence in his closest colleagues was clearly expressed in the "will" that he wrote on December 25, 1922, without the knowledge of his co-workers around him, to guide the activities of the Central Committee of the party after his death.²

In his will Lenin said that the party could stay in power only on two conditions: first, under a union of the proletariat with the peasantry; and second, subject to the preservation of absolute unity within the party. Lenin worried over the possibility that this unity might be shattered in case of a conflict for power between Stalin and Trotsky. In this connection he wrote brief characterizations of the leading members of the Central Committee—Stalin, Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Bukharin, and Piatakov. These personal sketches make it apparent that Lenin did not regard any one of his colleagues as qualified for the rôle of single director of the party or the country.

4.

LENIN wrote on January 4, 1923, a codicil to his will.⁸ In the main text of the will, he made no final choice between Stalin and Trotsky. Now, in the codicil, he declared himself against Stalin somewhat more definitely. Lenin wrote that Stalin was too crude and that he must therefore be removed from the post of General Secretary. Lenin's thinking may be explained thus: endeavoring at any cost to forestall a dictatorship by one person in the party, Lenin had to declare himself against Stalin as soon as he understood definitely that Stalin had a better chance than Trotsky to become dictator. According to Trotsky's testimony, Lenin began from that moment to prepare for "the removal of Stalin from the post of General Secretary" at the next Convention of the party, which was to assemble in April, 1923. Lenin also strove apparently to break up the relationship between Stalin and Kamenev, and, to offset it, tried to facilitate a closer association between Kamenev and Trotsky. Trotsky drew from this the conclusion, stated in his reminiscences, that Lenin was ready to intrust to him the chief direction of the party. But from what is known of Lenin's actions and words at the time, Trotsky's inference must be questioned. In accordance with the tendency of his ideas, Lenin naturally had to endeavor to begin to withdraw the most important party affairs from Stalin's supervision and to intrust them to other persons, particularly to Trotsky. But it by no means follows that Lenin considered Trotsky fully and generally qualified for the sole guidance of the party cause.

One of the responsible tasks that Lenin wished to assign to Trotsky was the establishment of normal work-

ing relations between the central party administration in Russia and local party circles in Georgia, in the Caucasus. "During the first days of March, 1923," Trotsky relates, "Lenin lay in his chamber in the great building of the Tribunals of Justice. His second stroke was approaching, preceded by a series of slight shocks." Since Trotsky also was lying ill at the time with lumbago, in another building in the Kremlin, formerly assigned to the Knights' Corps, and since telephone conversations were forbidden to both of them, Lenin's two secretaries, Fotieva and Glasser, served as intermediaries between them.

Lenin sent a note to Trotsky on March 5, 1923, requesting him to take the Georgian matter into his hands and to make Kamenev an associate in it with him.

When Trotsky talked this over with Kamenev, the latter became greatly embarrassed. Apparently Kamenev was hesitating between Stalin and Trotsky, or rather, the wish of Lenin. And Lenin's desires were doomed to have daily less decisive weight in the estimation of the Soviet courtiers, as Lenin himself became weaker. So here was Kamenev wavering and fearing that he might make a mistake in judgment.

Kamenev was only ready to talk to Trotsky willingly after Krupskaya, Lenin's wife, had told him that the leader "had just dictated to a stenographer a letter to Stalin breaking off all relations with him."

Lenin might be able to carry his threat into effect, it could be imagined, and to overwhelm Stalin in the opinion of the party before the occurrence of a new crisis in his illness. This conjecture evidently lessened in Kamenev's mind the value of friendship with Stalin, and on the other hand made alliance with Trotsky seem

more attractive. After his conversation with Trotsky, Kamenev left for Tiflis, promising to abide by Lenin's instructions. But, according to Trotsky's affirmation,

on his way to Tiflis, or immediately after his arrival, Kamenev received from Stalin a telegram in code telling him that Lenin was paralyzed again, and unable to speak or write. At the Georgian conference, Kamenev carried out Stalin's policy against Lenin's. Cemented by personal treachery, the trio had become a fact.

5.

LENIN suffered his second stroke on March 23, 1923. In the words of Trotsky, "Even after this second stroke Guetier did not take away all hope. But his reports continued to grow more pessimistic." After this second stroke, Lenin neither wrote nor dictated anything more. There could be no question, of course, of his participation in political affairs. He was not able to carry into execution any of his plans of organization. The work of the Twelfth Convention of the party, which took place in Moscow from April 17 to 25, 1923, was directed entirely by the Triumvirate. And the sole personal dictatorship of Stalin was not far beyond view.

6.

LENIN's spiritual state after his second stroke must have been agonizing. Networks of intrigue were being woven more and more strongly around him, and he could not fail to perceive this even when he was powerless to do anything about it. Once again in the words of Trotsky:

He must have felt it intolerably humiliating to be so utterly helpless, and especially to lose his power of speech while he was fully conscious. He grew unable to endure the patronizing

tone of the doctors, their banal jokes and their false encouragements. While he was still able to speak, he casually put test questions to the doctors, caught them unawares in contradictions, insisted on additional explanations, and dipped into the medical books himself. In this case as in everything else, he was striving most of all for clarity.

Concerning Lenin's deeper thoughts during these most torturous months of his life, nothing can be known.

He died on January 21, 1924. As Trotsky wrote, "Death was for him merely a deliverance from physical and moral suffering."

7.

LENIN exercised decisive authority and influence in both party and national affairs from the beginning of the November Revolution to the very days of his illness. It was not in his character, however, to love outward pomp and he never permitted any noisy manifestations of his power. Yet after his death, the Soviet Government missed no chance for any possible expression of the sorrow of the party and of the people. It also took pains to give to the mourning for him an international class character. The governmental announcement of the death of Lenin read thus:

The heaviest blow dealt to the workers of the Soviet Union and of the whole world, since the time of the conquest of power by the workers and peasants of Russia, will profoundly shock every worker and every peasant not only in our Republic but in every country.

Memorial meetings in honor of Lenin, attended by thousands, took place not only within the Soviet Union but also outside it, on every continent, and in most of the nations of the earth.



Underwood & Underwood.

The Tomb of Lenin

Dedication of the permanent mausoleum before the Kremlin in the Red Square, Moscow, on the Thirteenth Anniversary of the November Revolution, in 1930.



Lenin's body was embalmed and was placed in a mausoleum erected in the Red Square in Moscow. Lenin dead proved to be more useful to his successors than Lenin half alive during his last months. His body was for them an immense asset. And they knew how to utilize it excellently for their own purposes and their own triumph.

People came by scores of thousands to bow in this mausoleum before Lenin. Some came "by order" from the Soviet factories and institutions; others came from curiosity. There probably were many who either secretly hated Lenin or were quite indifferent to his fate; but at the same time there were many others who came with genuine reverence for the memory of the leader, and the visit to the Mausoleum roused in them emotions of loyalty to the successors of Lenin who were expected to continue his work.

If the words of Lenin himself at the Eleventh Party Convention may be used here, his death gave to his successors a new extension of time for the payment of the political obligations issued by the Communist party to the Russian people. Did they know how to take advantage of this extension of time? On this point history still has to speak the last word.

What an idea for a museum =

XI

Lenin as a Political Leader

1.

THE activity of Lenin may be viewed from various angles, and there are various possible estimates of its results. But however it may be judged, there can be no denial of the fact that his personality exerted tremendous influence on the course of political development in Russia, and through Russia upon the whole world. For the effectiveness of his tactics, Lenin must be enrolled among the most formidable political leaders of men. Adherents of Lenin have compared him as a revolutionary figure with Robespierre and also with Cromwell.¹ In political leadership, he probably outranks Robespierre. The comparison with Cromwell can be better applied to his political rôle. Like him, Lenin not only knew how to fight the old order, but also how to organize a revolution and direct it in a definite channel.

In spite of some likeness in this regard there was, of course, an immense discrepancy between the two men. Their innermost teachings were entirely divergent: While Cromwell was a deeply religious man, Lenin was an atheist; while Cromwell was primarily concerned for the national welfare of his people, Lenin first of all was an internationalist; while Cromwell did not destroy the system of private ownership, Lenin saw in such destruction his chief historical task. Cromwell had much more respect than Lenin both for man's individuality and for historical traditions. Besides, the two men had

to act in quite different periods and under unlike social circumstances.

2.

THE unique quality of Lenin, as a political leader of our times, consisted, as has been noted more than once, in the combination of the most abstract intellectual program with an uncommon capacity, when need arose, to adapt his tactics to the demands of actual conditions of life. This was a highly unusual combination in one person; he was at the same time fanatic and opportunist.

Cases are not rare, in political life, in which radical socialistic leaders, achieving power, have lodged their abstract theories in archives and have given heed only to the facts of daily life. But in distinction from them, Lenin remained a fanatic for his ideal even after complete political power had fallen into his hands. Only at the very end of his career, during the period of the New Economic Policy, there began to sound more weakly in his mind the voice of that ideal on which his whole political life had been based up to that time, as it yielded to the new concepts arising out of the actualities of life around him.

Illness and death interrupted the last phase of Lenin's activity, and he bore with him to the tomb the secret of the limit to which he might have continued his retreat "on the intellectual front."

Lenin's idealistic fanaticism is the clue to his great political valor. The question here is not one of personal bravery. Unlimited personal courage, readiness to sacrifice life, is a distinctive mark of many political leaders, and among them revolutionaries. In this regard Lenin was not distinguished. But the question here is of politi-

cal boldness. Lenin was not afraid to proclaim slogans, or "theses" according to his customary term, that cut straight across not only what is called public opinion but also the beliefs of his own party. Once he had declared a new slogan, Lenin maintained it firmly, giving no heed either to ridicule or condemnation, until either the goal he had set had been attained or until his own judgment of the course of events had brought him to a conclusion that it was necessary to make a new change in tactics.

It was his very fanaticism, his blind faith in the rightness of his basic political ideal, that gave Lenin the determination required to go contrary to all his sympathizers and supporters. And at such moments he did not fear to stand alone.

Lenin's opportunism, in turn, made it possible for him to divine when the demand and the time had really grown ripe for new tactics, and at what instant it had become impossible to push farther and was instead necessary to retreat and to search for some way around obstacles.

Together with his stubborn and undeviating fanaticism, Lenin possessed a remarkable political instinct which aided him in sensing the rise and fall of popular feeling and even of international emotion. Some of his companions, by their own confession, were held in a sort of superstitious awe of this political astuteness of their leader.²

Side by side with the combination of fanaticism and opportunism, another pair of contrasting faculties existed in Lenin: destructiveness and constructiveness. All during the first half of his career, until the seizure of power, Lenin preached the destruction of all the sur-

rounding institutions of the *bourgeois* order of society and of the state. But once he had achieved power, he hastened to build a new structure, to erect some sort of dikes, to wall off at least a few small islands in the sea of general ruin and chaos. After the period of destruction, Lenin called for organized construction, which later evolved in the form of the New Economic Policy.

3.

LENIN possessed a strength of will which was unusual in the circles of Russian intellectuals. There is a widespread impression of the gentleness of the Slavic spirit, capable of enduring sufferings and deprivations, but incapable of an active struggle for existence. This concept cannot, in my opinion, be extended to cover the whole history of the Russian people; and if it can be accepted with reservations, it applies chiefly to the groups of Russian intellectuals of the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries. After the Revolution those of the earlier Russian intellectuals who still survived changed significantly. The Russian people, in the course of its long history, has produced not a few active men of strong will, in the various spheres of life, including the political. In this connection, it is enough to refer to Peter the Great.

Lenin belonged to the number of such Russian leaders of strong will. In him there was no trace of "Turgenevist" brooding, love of self-analysis, or any spiritual discord. But he did not possess only in general the will to political action. He had specifically the will to power, and in this respect he was still less like the typical Russian intellectuals of his time.

After the November Revolution, Lenin grasped the

helm of power with all his strength, and only illness preceding death could tear him away from it. This constituted his great superiority over his political antagonists. While the members of the Romanov family, one after another, renounced power because in itself it meant nothing to them, while the Kadets and Social Revolutionaries one after another resigned from the staff of ministers of the Provisional Government, Lenin stood ready to hold his position at any price, hesitating at nothing.

4.

ALL during his life Lenin preached the doctrine of Marxism, which disregards the rôle of the individual in history and takes into account only mass psychology and mass movements. Nevertheless, Lenin understood perfectly the rôle of a leader in the revolutionary movement. He understood, too, that at the time the leader was himself.

Lenin, it has been said earlier, was not distinguished among the ranks of the revolutionaries for any special personal bravery. But there is no reason to think that he was a coward. Nevertheless, more than once in the course of his activities there appeared an intense concern for his own safety. In 1905, upon receiving news in Geneva of the movement in Petrograd led by Father Gapon, Lenin did not leap up, like Trotsky, to go to Russia and take a direct part in the Revolution, but continued to stay in Switzerland and returned to Russia only after the manifesto of October 30. After having made preparations some weeks later following his return to Russia, for an armed uprising in Moscow, Lenin himself did not go to Moscow, but to Finland to attend

a party conference. In July, 1917, Lenin went into hiding instead of appearing in court to answer the charge that he had received money from the Germans. Lenin guarded himself because he believed that without him his colleagues could not cope with the course of events.

He not only regarded himself as the leader of the movement, but he desired others so to regard him. In unsigned newspaper articles written by him before the seizure of power, there sometimes occurs complimentary mention of his own name. So, not too frequently but nevertheless insistently, he accustomed his party comrades to the idea of the political value and weight of his name. And if, before Lenin's own return to Russia in 1917, it meant very little to the wider circles of the Russian people, over members of his party Lenin already exercised the fascination of a leader.

5.

LENIN was remarkable as an orator for the inner force and logic of his speeches. He knew how to find the words that would sweep the great masses of the workers off their feet with emotion, and that would likewise sway the peasants when he wanted to win them to his side.

Among the leaders of the Russian Revolution there were, however, many orators more spectacular than Lenin. It was not in the arts of the orator that the secret of his power lay.

Lenin was not sparing of speeches, but he did not rest his main hopes on eloquence. He knew how to create between the leader and the masses a tie more definite than any oratorical phrase—a tie that consisted in the connecting link of the party.

The Bolshevik party, later known as the Communist party, has been from the beginning a quite unique social phenomenon, a political party only in name, but in fact much more than that. It has been a kind of Jesuit order, a close comradeship of fanatics united by a common ideal and bound together by the most rigid discipline.

At the outset of his political career, Lenin considered the creation of such a party indispensable for the achievement of his aims. What importance he attributed to it is evident from the fact that for the sake of these ideas of organization which he held, he was not afraid to break with his sympathizers in 1903, running the risk of finding himself without funds and without followers. Lenin welded his party together in the blood of the Moscow uprising of 1905, even though that attempt at revolution failed. He utilized the years of the Duma *régime* to send the roots of the party deep and wide among the workers. When he arrived in Russia in 1917, he had at his disposal a loyal political staff and reliable corps of co-workers, such as not one of his antagonists possessed. It remained only to connect these groups with the broad masses of the people, and this Lenin accomplished through his ability to invent and to spread among the people exactly the slogan which at that instant could evoke a response.

6.

IN the struggle for power Lenin did not falter at the use of any means. Among them were slander and willingness to stir up the ignorant masses against anyone else in order to avert responsibility from himself. For the purpose of attracting people to his side, Lenin did not stop to think twice about playing on the darkest pas-

sions of the mob—envy and hatred. The official slogans that he proclaimed at the time of the Revolution in 1917, were: "Peace"—to attract the soldiers; "Land"—to satisfy the peasants; "Workers' Control"—to gratify the workers.

However well these slogans were adapted to the desires of the broad masses of the people, there was little in them to content Lenin; for him they sounded still too parliamentary and academic. He wanted a cry that would grip the people in the streets, that would set aflame the feelings of unorganized crowds and summon them at once to rally around the Red flag of the Bolsheviks. This cry was "Loot the looters." And this cry, as Lenin himself later explained, was a rendering in popular language of the thesis of Marx and Engels concerning "expropriation of the expropriators."

Lenin's favorite method consisted in the gradual "deepening of the revolution," carried out under his program, not all at once, but bit by bit. At first he struck a blow at the great capitalists, counting upon the coöperation not only of the proletariat, but of the petty *bourgeoisie*; in the next phase, having already seized the property of the capitalists he began to apply pressure to the petty *bourgeoisie*. He likewise started with an endeavor to unify all the peasants against the owners of large estates; then, in the following phase, he began to preach a union of the poor peasants against the rich peasants. Thanks to this method, during the first phase Lenin had the support of far larger groups than he would have had if he had set himself at once to the application of his program as a whole. Many of the people who followed him in the first phase tried to withstand him in the second—but it was already too late. And

Lenin himself, having calculated his tactical moves in advance, was making ready during the first phase of his program for the introduction of the second phase. So the plan for the class division of the villages and the unification of the poor peasants against the rich peasants was complete in Lenin's mind in 1903, and of course it was in order in November, 1917, when he won over all the peasantry to his side by publishing the Social Revolutionary program of equality.

7.

IN carrying his plans into effect, Lenin was merciless, attributing no value either to human life or to individual personality. He constantly charged his antagonists—"imperialists," the *bourgeoisie*, the landowners, and the Tsarist *régime*—with atrocity in dealing with other people. What was the character of Lenin's own actions?

If the number of people killed at the direct instigation of Lenin be taken into account—disregarding those killed in the "regular" civil war—and also the number of people who died from famine in consequence of his economic policy, the result is a staggering figure. It is enough to say that the number of Russians who died from famine in 1921–22 was twice the number of Russian soldiers killed and disabled in the World War. If judgment is to be based on the number of human lives destroyed by the government of Lenin, then it is impossible not to list Lenin among the most fearful tyrants history has known.

8.

LENIN dealt with people not as individuals, but merely as members of social classes. And only one class, the

proletariat, according to his view had an unqualified right to existence. Even in relation to the peasants, Lenin kept within the limits, until the last years of his life, of an attitude of half-recognition, stating the reservation whenever possible that he personally valued only the hired farm workers and the poor peasants.

As for the *bourgeoisie*, this social class was the object of his genuine hatred. Lenin probably detested the *bourgeoisie* more fiercely than he did the landowners, just as he probably hated the liberals more than he hated the autocracy.

A man, as an independent personality outside the limits of social classes, simply did not exist for Lenin. This explained his impatience with his political enemies.

In 1907 there died the eminent Russian political leader, Count Heyden, a member of the First Duma, a moderate conservative, a man of entirely lofty character. Not only the political sympathizers but the antagonists of Count Heyden, the liberals and radicals, expressed themselves in sympathetic memorials on the occasion of his death. Lenin flew into a fury, considering that such an attitude toward a political foe "infects the Russian people with the miasmas of subservience and serfdom." Lenin's argument was simple: How was it possible, for any reason, to praise Count Heyden, when he had been an owner of a big estate? From such a principle there followed naturally that system of "class terror" which Lenin applied through the agency of the "Cheka"—the familiar term for the All-Russian Extraordinary Committee to Combat Counter-Revolution. People must be seized as hostages, because of their affiliation with the *bourgeois* social class, and not because

of any suspicion of having taken part personally in activities against the Soviet. Further, when the course of events made it seem necessary to him, Lenin did not hesitate at punitive measures even against "his own" classes. Among the hostages who were arrested and shot there were thousands both of peasants and workers. In instances of refusal to submit to the Soviet authority, the peasants were subjected in masses to shooting and deportation—only in such circumstances official reports termed them "rich peasants." Discipline in the Red army was maintained by like harsh measures.

9.

LENIN had two different ways of dealing with people—his way toward his own and his way toward those he regarded as alien. When anyone attacked his sympathizers, there was no limit to his indignation; but when he himself attacked his opponents, it seemed to him the natural thing to do. When Lenin himself was accused of receiving money from foreigners and was called a traitor, he expressed disgust at the very possibility that such a charge should be leveled against the head of the party. But at the least hint of a connection between his enemies and foreigners, Lenin would accuse them of being "bought up" by the foreign *bourgeoisie* and assert that this explained all their actions. One clear example shows Lenin's two ways of dealing:

The Bolsheviks, Carl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, were killed on January 15, 1919, in the streets of Berlin, by German "White" officers, as they were being transported to prison after their arrest. Condemning this "brutal and treacherous murder," Lenin wrote, "Words cannot be found to express the abominableness and

baseness of this executioner's deed." He laid the guilt for this act, as a crime, at the door of the German Social Democratic Government, and cried "death to the executioners."

The Kadet deputies, Kokoshkin and Shingarev, who had arrived in Petrograd to take part in the Constituent Assembly, were killed a year earlier, on January 19, 1918, by Bolshevik sailors, in one of the hospitals of the city, after having been arrested on an order issued by Lenin declaring the Kadet party outside the law and after then having been transferred from prison to the hospital because of illness. Further, it should be noted, Kokoshkin and Shingarev believed in the possibility of combating the Bolsheviks by parliamentary means and were making preparations for this struggle, while Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg were arrested after having begun an armed conflict with the Government. What seemed revolting to Lenin in 1919, in connection with events in Germany, he himself caused to be done in Russia in 1918.

10.

LENIN's class point of view in dealing with people was closely related to his attitude toward religion and the church. He found the essential reason for the church in its rôle as a class institution; according to his conception, the church was necessary to the rich classes in order to keep the poor in subjection and slavery. It is comprehensible that he therefore should have regarded the church and organized religion with extreme hostility.

His hatred toward religion, however, is apparently not to be explained only by his oversimplified social philosophy. Its roots ran much deeper. Lenin divined

that religion is the fundamental basis of human individualism; it creates a place, if only a small place, in the individual's soul, as an unapproachable refuge, a shelter from the supervision and control of a political party. Fighting against individualism, wishing to turn all persons into useful implements for the party, Lenin naturally had to direct his blows at religion as the last sanctuary of the individual. He fought not only against the established church, it must be kept in mind, but against religion in general, against any reverence for the Supreme Being even though preserved only in the human heart. It was exactly such inward religion of the spirit that seemed to Lenin an evil much more dangerous than a church, since he could battle more easily against a visible church. In 1913 Lenin wrote to Maxim Gorky:

Every sort of a religious idea, every concept of any kind of little godhead, every coquetting even with a little god, is an inexpressible baseness . . . the most horrible sort of infection. Millions of sins, vilenesses, violences, and physical diseases can be far more easily revealed to the masses, and are therefore much less dangerous than this delicate, spiritual idea of a nice little godlet, dressed up in most decorative "idealistic" robes.³

So it was exactly for this reason that Lenin flew into a rage when he discerned the least hint of religion in even the most abstract philosophical works. At one time he took a fervent interest in the philosophy of Hegel. Lenin's synopses of Hegel, with his own notes made in the course of reading, have been preserved. Having read that passage in Hegel's *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* in which he speaks of Epicurus and condemns him for having had no concept of the "final goal of the world, of the wisdom of the Creator," Lenin writes with irritation, in his notebook in which

he was keeping his synopsis, that Hegel was always "missing God"; adding, "Idealistic scalawag!"⁴

In all of his hatred toward religion, Lenin considered it disadvantageous for his purposes to combat religion by too sharply violent measures. Direct prohibition to adhere to any religion or church Lenin imposed only upon members of the Communist party. In relation to all the rest of the people, Lenin judged it necessary to move step by step. "To combat religious prejudices, it is necessary to be extraordinarily cautious," he said. But he considered this combat one of the chief tasks of his Government, placing in charge of the direction of anti-religious propaganda none other than Trotsky.

11.

LENIN fought against religion, it has been shown, as a support of a human individualism. The turning of the spirit toward God meant the impossibility of its absolute and unreserved submission to the Communist ideal and the Communist party. And Lenin demanded from all his followers just such unreserved submission.

The Communist party, it has been said, is not an ordinary political party but a kind of fanatic order, endeavoring not only to direct the actions of people, but to supply the motives definitely for all their thoughts and deeds, to supervise the very inmost movements of their spirits. From this arises both its exclusiveness and its intolerance. It has been and could not but be the sole political party in Lenin's state.

All other political parties Lenin gradually debarred. But since the Communist party was not only a political organism but, above that, a church of its own kind, or rather an antichurch, it had to attempt to destroy all

churches and religions throughout the earth. This aim Lenin set for himself, but he only considered it necessary to move very guardedly toward its achievement.

12.

FOR Lenin the Communist doctrine was not merely a political doctrine. It took the place of a religion, it was his philosophy, it guided his scientific thought. "Dialectic materialism" he accepted from Marx and Engels. Their teaching gave him the unshakable foundation for all his political beliefs. He adopted this foundation as the dogma of absolute verity, as a philosophical and scientific axiom. This basic center of the system of Marxism was not open for Lenin to any questioning or uncertainty. But although he took this fundamental philosophy of Marxism as dogma, he was far from considering it necessary to follow out all of the indications given by Marx for practical politics.

Lenin was no blind adherent of Marx; he constructed his own political system independently, only deriving it from the basic concepts of Marxism. He made essential contributions to the study of Marx, in the field of theoretical explanation of political and economic phenomena as well as in the field of political tactics. One example of this is Lenin's teaching in regard to "imperialism" as a new phase of capitalism, the phase of monopolistic capital. His theses compiled for the Communist International concerning the rôle of colonial and semicolonial countries in the world revolutionary movement, were derived precisely from this teaching. Lenin also supplemented Marxist thought importantly in relation to national problems. And no less essential were the changes that he introduced in politi-

cal tactics. Thus the idea of the indispensability of union between the proletariat and the peasantry was developed and emphasized by Lenin in the evolution of Marxism as applied to Russian and then to colonial conditions. Likewise this tactical Jacobinism, the creation of a centralized secret party directing the whole revolutionary movement, was not borrowed by Lenin from Marx. His predecessor and model in this regard may be considered to have been the Russian revolutionary of the 1870's, Tkachev, much of whose advice as to tactics was put into effect by Lenin.⁹ All these things together went to make up "Leninism" as a special sort of political system, constituting a development of Marxism. Nevertheless, Marxism of course formed the center of Leninism, and gave its structure and clarity to Leninism.

With the introduction of the New Economic Policy, Lenin altered his political practice. But he did not change his basic ideas; either he did not wish or was not able to change them.

The Marxist dogma, like a sort of dead weight, continued even after the introduction of the New Economic Policy to pull all the creative enterprises of Russian political leaders back toward the abyss. And this weight hampered the further development of the policy itself.

13.

THE figure of Lenin as a political leader was not at once perceived and estimated by his contemporaries in its true stature. In the heat of factional fights and the dust clouds of the period of the Second Convention of the Social Democratic party in 1903, the majority of Russian Socialists regarded Lenin as a quarrelsome member

of the central institutions of the party. After the failure of the Moscow uprising in 1905, they began to look upon him as an insane fanatic capable of wrecking both the party and the Revolution by his madness.

The wider nonpartisan circles of the Russian people either did not know the name of Lenin or thought little about him.

Lenin's new tactics after the year 1907, his utilization of legalized political agencies, afforded to him close intellectual contacts with the upper groups of the Russian working class. This fact, however, was not adequately evaluated at the time either by his sympathizers or his antagonists. If Lenin had died during the War or even at the beginning of the Revolution in the spring of 1917, the news would probably not have created any special impression among the Russian people, except within the narrow circles of his own party and the higher groups in the labor organizations.

Lenin began to loom large in public consciousness only during the Revolution of 1917. Yet even in November of that year, one of the leaders of the sailors, Dybenko, perhaps only as a joke, found it possible to propose to Krasnov's Cossacks to exchange Kerensky for Lenin. The great political capacities that Lenin possessed were not apparent either to his enemies or even to those who thought alike with him. Many people watched the formation of a government headed by Lenin at the time, as if it were an amusing act in a political operetta, thinking that it would be all over in two weeks. Had Lenin died in November, 1917, it would have been commonly said that his death had saved him from political downfall.

During the years of civil war Lenin enjoyed popu-

larity—outside of the circles of his party associates—only among the workers, and not among all of them. The peasants, with the exception of the poor peasants, were generally incensed against him, and during the period of the Committees of the Poor in the summer of 1918 they actually hated him with a bitter resentment.

If Lenin had died in the winter of 1920–21, many would have said that energetic and intense as his activity had been, its result was nevertheless economic catastrophe. The New Economic Policy alone gave him any actual widespread popularity among the masses of the people, not only among the workers, but also among the peasants, and at that time the attitude of the peasants toward him may have been more favorable than the attitude of the workers.

Then, soon after the introduction of the New Economic Policy, Lenin died. In 1924 the broad masses of the people—disregarding, of course, the definitely anti-Bolshevik groups—probably were sincerely shocked by the news of his death. Did this feeling persist in the years that immediately followed and will it persist in the future? Everything depends upon the Soviet system created by Lenin.

At the present time it is still impossible to say whether this system has been firmly established among the Russian people, not to speak of its extension throughout the world. The new wave of militant Communism, which began to rise at the end of 1927, has led to a fresh intensification of conflict within Russia, both in the villages and the cities. The Communist Government thought the time appropriate to start a new drive both on the economic and on the "spiritual"

front. This new Communist wave surges across the practical program of the New Economic Policy, that is to say, across the practical conclusions resulting from Lenin's will. Yet this wave swells up from the intellectual depths of Marxism, and consequently of Leninism. The movement is not contrary to Leninism, but proceeds out of it.

The future rôle of Leninism in Russia and throughout the world therefore depends upon the fate that awaits the Communist Government in Russia, and on this also depends history's estimate of the personality and political leadership of Lenin himself.

NOTES

The quotations from Lenin in this volume follow the second Russian edition of his writings. (The Lenin Institute under the auspices of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party [Bolsheviks]: Government Printing House [Gosizdat]: Moscow-Leningrad.) Accordingly, whenever the corresponding volume in the second edition had not yet reached the writer, quotations were taken from the first Russian edition.

The following notes indicate sources of information in those cases in which the statements of the author concern controversial questions and are not based directly on the words of Lenin himself, or in which reference is made to words of Lenin not included in the collection of his works.

G. V.

New Haven, November, 1930

CHAPTER I

1. V. Burtsev, *Borba za svobodnuiu Rossiiu. Moi vospominaniia* ("The Fight for a Free Russia. My Reminiscences") (Berlin: Gamaion, 1923), I, 147.
2. *Ibid.*, pp. 159 ff.

CHAPTER II

1. M. Gorky, "Leonid Krassin," in the edition: M. Gorky, *Vospominaniia. Rasskazy. Zametki* ("Reminiscences, Tales, Notes") (Berlin: Kniga, 1925), pp. 42 ff. Cf. A. Kaun, "Maxim Gorky in the Revolution of 1905" (*Slavonic Review*, IX, 140).
2. Gorky, *ibid.*, p. 49. Cf. Byloe (1918), 6 (12), pp. 194 f.
3. Count S. Witte, *Vospominaniia. Tsarstvovanie Nikolaia II* ("Reminiscences. The Reign of Nicholas II") (Berlin: Slovo, 1922), II, 147 ff.
4. L. Trotsky, *My Life* (New York: Scribner, 1930), p. 218.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 202.
6. S. F. Medvedeva-Ter-Petrosian, "Tovarishch Kamo" ("Comrade Kamo") (*Proletarskaia Revolutsia*, Nos. 31-32, 1924), pp. 127 ff.

CHAPTER III

1. V. I. Nevsky, *Istoriia R. K. P. (b)* ("The History of the Russian Communist Party") (Leningrad: Priboi, 1926), p. 338.

2. *Ibid.*
3. E. V. Tarle, *Evropa v epokhu imperializma* ("Europe in the Epoch of Imperialism") (2d ed., Moscow-Leningrad: Gosizdat, 1928), p. 74.
4. *Leninsky Sbornik*, II, 174.
5. *Padenie Tsarskogo rezhima* ("The Fall of the Tsarist Régime") (Moscow-Leningrad: Gosizdat, 1925), III, 277 ff.; IV, 431 ff.

CHAPTER IV

1. Ya. Hanecki, *Arest V. I. Lenina v Avstrii v 1914 g. po dokumentam* ("The Arrest of V. I. Lenin in Austria in 1914, according to official documents") (*Leninsky Sbornik*), II, 173 ff.
2. *Leninsky Sbornik*, I, 137.
3. For the defense of Lenin against these charges, see *Collected Works* (in Russian), XXII, 195.
4. Report of Jean-Henri Bint from the archives of the Commissar of the Provisional Government abroad, S. G. Svatikov, was published in the volume by G. A. Alexinsky, *Du Tsarisme au Communisme* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1923), pp. 29-30. The contents of the report in full are appended according to a copy kindly made at my request by S. G. Svatikov.

"Note. 30. XII. 1916.

Oulianoff. J'ai installé une surveillance Spiegelgasse, 27 [Zurich] à partir de 25 Dec. [1916] et dont j'ai pris la direction. Le 28, au matin, Oulianoff, muni d'un petit sac à main, sortit de chez lui et prit le train pour Berne, où nous l'avons accompagnés. Arrivé à 10 heures à Berne, il se rendit directement à l'Hôtel de France, près de la gare, loua une chambre, sortit une demi-heure après de l'hôtel, se rendit à la station de tramways située devant la gare, et alla à l'autre bout de la ville, où se trouve la Fosse aux Ours. Il remonta à pied vers la ville, se tenant sous les arcades et se retournant de temps en temps, puis, soudain, quittant les arcades et sans se retourner, il entra à la Légation allemande. Il était 11 h. 1/2.

La surveillance aux abords de la Légation a été exercée jusqu' à 9 heures du soir, sans qu'on vit sortir Oulianoff. Il n'avait pas non plus reparu à l'Hôtel de France, ni le soir, ni le lendemain matin.

La surveillance fut reprise le 29, au matin, à la Légation, et ce n'est que vers 4 heures de l'après midi qu' Oulianoff sortit et se rendit en toute hâte à l'Hôtel de France, où il resta environ un quart d'heure. Il a repris ensuite un train qui nous a ramenés à Zurich.

(signed) H. BINT."

S. G. Svatikov, the former Commissar of the Provisional Government abroad, informed me in a letter sent by him from Paris under the date of January 5, 1930: "I can assure you that this document was really written on December 30, 1916, and not in 1917, at the time of the arrival of the Commissar of the Provisional Government,

to whom was intrusted among other affairs the responsibility of carrying out a complete investigation of the activities of the secret Police (*Okbrana*), and not later when the overthrow of the Government on October 25 had made Lenin the target for attacks on the part of persons disagreeing with him."

CHAPTER V

1. A. A. Brusilov, *Moi vospominaniia* ("My Reminiscences") (Moscow-Leningrad: Gosizdat, 1929), p. 214.
2. General Max Hoffman, *Der Krieg der versäumten Gelegenheiten* (München: Verlag für Kulturpolitik, 1924), p. 174.
3. Philipp Scheidemann, *Memoiren eines Sozialdemokraten* (Dresden: Carl Reissner, 1928), I, 427 ("... die Reise Lenins ... ein Arrangement Dr. Helfphands gewesen ist ...").
4. Erich Ludendorff, *Meine Kriegserinnerungen* (Sechste, unveränderte Auflage, Berlin: Ernst Siegfried Miller und Sohn Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1920), p. 407.
5. Hoffman, *Der Krieg der versäumten Gelegenheiten*, p. 174.
6. Alexander F. Kerensky, *The Catastrophe* (New York and London: D. Appleton & Co., 1927), pp. 229 ff.

CHAPTER VI

1. W. Nicolai, *Geheime Mächte: Internationale Spionage und ihre Bekämpfung im Weltkrieg und Heute* (2d ed., Leipzig: K. F. Koehler, 1924), p. 88:

Die militärische Handlung unterbrach die Propaganda. Sie wurde erst Anfang September 1917 wieder möglich. Die missglückte Offensive hatte aber die alte Parole auf die unbedingte Fortsetzung des Krieges ihrer Wirksamkeit beraubt. An der russischen Front war zu spüren, wie die bolschewistische Propaganda, welche die gegenteilige Propaganda vom Frieden vertrat, Boden gewann. In dieser Richtung setzte auch eine vom deutschen Nachrichtendienst betriebene Propaganda ein. Da für beide Seiten das gleiche Ziel verfolgt wurde, so fiel die Propaganda vielfach zusammen. Es setzte an vielen Stellen eine Verbrüderung zwischen deutschen und russischen Truppen ein. Es war deutschen Nachrichtensoffizieren möglich, in die russische Reihen zu gelangen und dort für die Frieden zwischen Russland und Deutschland zu werben. Sie fanden bei den Truppen begeisterte Aufnahme und wurden auf den Schultern durch Schutzengraben und Lager getragen.

It must be mentioned in this connection that documents secured by representatives of the Government of the United States also give evidence that agents of the German General Staff were in Russia and particularly in Smolny Institute. (*The German-Bolshevik Conspiracy*. War Information Series, No. 20, October, 1918.) A spe-

cial commission of American historians recognized the authenticity of these documents. On the other hand, there were persons who contested their genuineness. The question requires further critical examination, and therefore the writer does not consider it appropriate at the present time to make use of these documents. But the statement of Colonel Nicolai is quite plain by itself and hardly leaves place for doubt.

2. According to the reminiscences of M. W. Davis, who was an eyewitness of the scene.
3. C. K. Cumming and W. W. Pettit, *Russian-American Relations* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Howe, 1920), pp. 88-89.

CHAPTER VII

1. V. Vladimirova, *God sluzbby sotsialistov kapitalistam* ("A Year of Socialist Service to the Capitalists") (Moscow-Leningrad: Gosizdat, 1927), pp. 259 ff.; A. Paquet, *In kommunistischen Russland* (Iena: E. Diederichs, 1918), pp. 32-38; S. P. Melgunov, *Grazhdanskaia voina v osveshchenii P. N. Miliukova* ("The Civil War as Interpreted by P. N. Miliukov") (Paris, 1929).

CHAPTER VIII

1. L. Trotsky, *My Life* (New York: Scribner, 1930), pp. 462 ff.
2. From the resolutions of the Second Congress of the Communist International. See the resolutions in the Appendix to Volume XXV of the *Collected Works of Lenin* (in Russian), pp. 566 ff.

CHAPTER IX

1. F. A. Golder, *On the Trail of the Russian Famine* (Stanford University Press, 1927).
2. Trotsky, *My Life*, pp. 470-471.

CHAPTER X

1. This and the following quotations from Trotsky are taken from *My Life*, pp. 470 ff., and p. 507.
2. This "will" of Lenin is printed in the Appendix to the book by L. Trotsky, *The Real Situation in Russia* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1928), pp. 320 ff. Although the publisher, Max Eastman, says that the "will" was issued by him in full, nevertheless the sense of Lenin's words makes it clear that the Introduction is missing.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 322.

CHAPTER XI

1. M. N. Pokrovsky, *Oktiabrskaiia Revoliutsiia* ("The October Revolution") (Moscow: Printing House of the Communist Academy, 1929), pp. 20 ff.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 18.
3. *Leninsky Sbornik*, I, 145-146.
4. *Ibid.*, XII, 255 (*Pravda*, January 22, 1930).
5. Pokrovsky, *Oktiabrskaiia Revoliutsiia*, p. 36. This same observation was made by M. M. Karpovich in his report at the meeting of the American Historical Association in December, 1929.



INDEX

- Academy of Sciences, 215
 Adler, V., 124, 125, 140
 Africa, 268
 Agrarian problem, 45, 80, 81, 102, 103, 170
 Agricultural machinery, 4, 99, 254, 284
 Agriculture, 4, 9, 273, 274, 281; People's Commissariat of, 184, 262
 Alakaevka, 20
 Alexander II, 2
 Alexander III, 3, 16, 17, 61
 Alexandra Feodorovna, 134, 135
 Alexandrovich, 232
 Alexeiev, M. V., 221
 Alexinsky, G. A., 88, 166, 332
 Allies, 152, 157, 187, 188, 207, 222, 224, 225, 228, 235, 242-244, 246, 248, 251, 259, 272, 277, 295, 296
 America, 225, 266
 American People, 211; Relief Administration, 291; Socialist Labor Party, 251
 Amnesty for political offenders, 71
 Andreiev, L. N., 65
 Anglo-American capital, 248; French imperialism, 150, 207, 285
 Antonov, 275
 Antonov-Avseenko, V. A., 179
 Archangel, 228, 246
 Armed uprising, 62, 63, 64, 75, 76
 Armistice, 242, 250
 Army, the Russian, 57, 68, 70, 133, 147, 161, 168, 185, 186, 207, 221; demobilization, 202; General Staff, 63; Headquarters, 185-187; Intelligence Bureau, 163; munitions, 133
 Arzamas, 278
 Asia, 266, 268
 Association of Russian Factory and Mill Workers of the City of St. Petersburg, 56, 60, 63
 Astrakhan, 15
 "August Bloc," 115, 126
 Australia, 266
 Austria, 2, 115, 116, 123, 124, 126, 153, 251
 Austria-Hungary, 126
 Austrian army, 224; Government, 154; military circles, 116; Ministry of the Interior, 124, 125; prisoners of war in Russia, 227, 251; Reichsrat, 116, 124; Social Democrats, 116, 124, 140
 Autocracy, 13, 71, 85
 Avenarius, R., 108
 Azef, E., 11, 35, 55, 56, 110, 112, 120
 Azov, Sea of, 245
 Balkan countries, 251
 Banks, 190, 198, 199; *see also* State Bank
 Barricade warfare, 62
 Bashkir Republic, 255
 Bashkirs, 255
 Bavaria, 256
 Bebel, A., 65, 114
 Beletsky, S. P., 111, 112, 121, 191
 Belgian police, 47
 Beltov, *see* Plekhanov
 Berlin, 28, 140, 322
 Berne, 127, 129, 131, 142, 153
 Bernstein, E., 32
 "Black Hundreds," 71, 72
 Bint, J. A., 142, 322
 Bint and Sambin, 142
 Black Sea, 68, 244, 245, 256
 Blank, A., 15
 Blockade of Soviet Russia, 259, 272
 "Bloody Sunday," 61-63

- Blumkin, J., 232
 Bogdanov, A., 107
 Bolshevik Party, 50, 66, 212, 318;
 Central Committee, 127, 129,
 130, 135, 155, 158, 160, 162,
 164, 166-168, 173, 174, 182,
 183, 204-209; Conferences,
 131, 158; Conventions: Third,
 65-68, 81; Sixth, 167, 168;
 Duma Faction, 129, 130, 135;
 Moscow Committee, 173, 203;
 Petrograd Committee, 148,
 166, 173, 203; *see also* Social
 Democratic Labor Party, Rus-
 sian; Communist Party, Rus-
 sian
 Bolshevik propaganda, Funds,
 151-152, 162-165
 Bolsheviks, 49, 53, 54, 59, 60, 65,
 66, 70, 72, 74-76, 78-82, 84,
 88-90, 94, 95, 102, 104, 106-
 110, 112-121, 127, 129, 130,
 133, 135-137, 145-147, 151,
 155, 157, 159-165, 169-173,
 175, 176, 179, 181-183, 185,
 187, 189, 190-192, 195, 197,
 203, 205, 219, 220, 222, 224,
 225, 228, 230, 231, 233-236,
 240, 242, 245, 250, 252, 253,
 257, 258, 274, 319, 323
 "Bonapartism," 59, 102, 103
 Bonch-Bruевич, V., 161
Bourgeoisie, 26, 131, 136, 142,
 146, 148, 150, 166, 167, 169,
 171, 172, 190, 193, 196, 204,
 213, 214, 219-221, 225, 226,
 239, 240, 248, 252, 267, 272,
 293, 319-322; tax on the, 240
 Bread cards, 172, 200
 Brest-Litovsk, 140, 142, 143,
 187, 202, 203, 205, 208-210,
 213, 215, 222, 224, 226, 227,
 229, 242, 285, 286
 Briand, A., 295
 Bronstein, *see* Trotsky
 Brusilov, A. A., 147, 263, 333
 Brussels, 47, 55
 Budapest, 257
 Budenny, S. M., 265
 Bukharin, N. I., 131, 132, 203,
 205-207, 216, 255, 306
 Bullitt, W. C., 246, 277
 Bulygin, A. G., 63, 69
 Bund, 31, 47, 48, 51, 89, 260
 Bushmen, 255

 Cabinet of Ministers, 71
 Cadets, military, 162, 181
 Cannes, 295
 Capitalism, 10, 27, 43, 215, 268,
 277, 288, 293
 Capitalists, 198, 281, 298
 Capri Island, 108
 Carpathian Mountains, 116
 Cattle, 219, 274
 Caucasus, 14, 222, 225, 245, 308
 Central Executive Committee of
 the Soviets, All Russian, 169,
 179, 182-184, 192-195, 199-
 208, 217, 218, 225, 230, 234,
 239, 242, 249, 254, 255, 264,
 284, 294, 303
 Central Powers, 123, 139, 141,
 187, 202, 208, 227
Cheka, 172, 190, 220, 232, 239,
 321
 Cherevanin, F. A., 223
 Chernomazov, M., 115
 Chernov, V. M., 126, 195
 Chicherin, 208, 296
 Chief Committees, 217, 287
 China, 269
 Chkheidze, N. S., 146
 Church, 6, 323, 324
 Cities, Russian, 6
 Civil War in Russia, 68, 128,
 131, 156, 166, 216, 236, 243,
 252, 253, 259, 260, 269, 272,
 274, 277, 280, 281, 286, 291,
 294, 304, 320, 328; in the
 United States, 63
 Clemenceau, G., 111
 Clergymen, 60
 Cluseret, G. P., 62, 63
 Coal, 245, 261, 272, 273, 290

- Colonial and semi-colonial countries, 267, 268
- Commerce, 289, 290; foreign, 294, 295; exports, 295; imports, 295; People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade, 164
- Committees of Political Education, Second Convention, 289
- Committees of the Poor, 218, 219, 231, 232, 241, 273
- Committees on Literacy, 23, 24, 29
- Communal ownership of land, 86
- Communes of consumers, 199
- Communism, 216, 261, 262, 269, 277, 278, 281, 285-287, 299
- Communist Government, 18, 330
- Communist International, 139, 251, 267, 268, 292-294; Congresses: First, 251, 252, 266, 297; Second, 266-268, 293; Third, 292-294; Fourth, 303
- Communist Party, Russian, 140, 215, 216, 229, 239, 260, 318, 325; Central Committee, 240, 251, 260, 270, 305; Conventions: Seventh, 209; Eighth, 252, 253, 255, 256, 269; Ninth, 261, 262, 279; Tenth, 280, 284, 285, 305; Eleventh, 296, 298, 300, 301, 311; Twelfth, 309; factional grouping within the party, 107, 108, 182, 183, 285; Political Bureau, 297, 302, 303; *see also* Bolshevik Party
- Communists, 127, 230, 260, 267, 288-290, 299, 300
- Compulsory labor, 271, 286
- Concessions to foreigners, 277, 278
- Confiscation of land, 81
- Conservatives, Extreme, 95, 112, 118, 133
- Constantinople, 246, 266
- Constituent Assembly, 66, 81, 90, 145, 161, 166, 167, 170-172, 177, 178, 190-195, 220-222, 228, 245, 266, 323; elections to, 191, 192; composition by parties, 191, 192
- Constitution, Russian, 2, 84
- Constitutional Democratic Party, *see* Kadets.
- Constitutional Government, 40
- Consumers' coöperative societies, 261, 262
- Coöperatives, 248, 261, 262, 287
- Copenhagen, 113
- Cossacks, 88, 181, 182, 220, 221, 259, 262, 263, 328
- Council, Imperial, 78, 79, 96, 97
- Council of Labor and Defense, 247, 261
- Council of People's Commissars, 179, 180, 183, 185-187, 191, 196, 202, 205, 207, 208, 223, 229, 237, 238, 241, 249, 306
- Counter-revolution, 220, 224, 229
- Court, Imperial, 76
- Cracow, 115, 116, 124, 125
- Crimea, 262, 263, 266
- Cromwell, O., 312
- Crusade for grain, 218, 223
- Cultural development of Russia, 5
- Currency, 273
- Czechoslovaks, 227-230, 234, 236, 245, 256, 259
- Davis, M. W., 334
- Decembrists, 38
- "Deepening of the Revolution," 72, 151, 319
- Delianov, I. D., 20
- Denikin, A. I., 222, 245-247, 257-259, 263
- Development of Capitalism in Russia, The*, 21, 29, 31, 97, 102
- Diamand, 124
- Dictatorship of the *bourgeoisie*, 252; of the proletariat, 252, 279, 282; of the proletariat and the peasantry, 67
- "Discussion on trades-unions," 279, 284

- Distribution of wealth, 10
 Don, 220, 221, 222, 244, 245, 259; Cossacks, 190, 220, 224
 Donets Basin, 261, 292
 Dreyfus case, 166
 Dukhonin, N. N., 185, 186, 187
 Duma, 3-5, 12, 69, 70, 77-81, 85, 87, 90, 96, 98, 104, 110, 112, 122, 123, 134, 145, 146, 150, 157, 266, 267, 285, 286; boycott of the elections, 79, 80, 82, 87, 94, 107; the Bulygin, 69, 70, 78; electoral law, 78, 93, 94; First, 82-88, 98, 101, 107, 123, 134, 321; composition by parties, 82; Second, 88-92, 98, 101, 123, 148; composition by parties, 88; Third, 93-98, 101, 103, 105-107, 116-118, 123, 141; composition by parties, 95; Fourth, 98, 103, 113, 116-120, 123, 127, 130, 133-136, 144; composition by parties, 118; Executive Committee, 144
 Durnovo, P. N., 75
 Dybenko, P. E., 179, 328
 Dzerzhinsky, F. E., 190, 191, 232, 233, 265
 Dzhunkovsky, V. F., 119
 Eastman, M., 334
 East Prussia, 265
 Economic reconstruction, 260, 269
 Education, 5, 9, 97, 99, 100, 106
 Ekaterinburg, 235
 Ekaterinoslav, 31
 Electrification of Russia, 215, 217, 260, 270, 284
 Emancipation of serfs, 2, 4
Emigrés, Russian, 28
 Empirical Monism, 108
 Engels, F., 62, 319, 326
 England, 8, 123, 141, 150, 152, 225, 243, 245, 294
 English Government, 152; intervention in Russia, 224; Liberals, 92; Navy, 244
Entente, 123, 129, 141, 142, 202, 224, 226, 227, 229, 243, 259, 296
 Epicurus, 324
 Erzberger, M., 154
 Estonia, 208, 259, 277
 Europe, 1, 4, 5, 99, 211, 243, 250, 252, 257, 266
 European nations, 300
 "Expropriations," 77, 91
 Extraordinary Commission to Combat Counter-Revolution, *see Cheka*
 Factory shop committees, 159, 174, 196-198
 Famine, 274, 291, 297, 299
 Far East, 56, 227, 259
 Farm laborers, 219
 Fedoseiev, N. E., 20
 "Fighting bands," 91
 Finance, 287; Commissariat of, 287; *see also* Banks
 Finland, 70, 77, 84, 89, 92, 104, 161, 167, 173, 208, 251, 255, 277; station in Petrograd, 155
 Finnish Social Democrats, 167
 Food, 145, 172, 189, 199, 200, 281, 286, 287; dictatorship, 217; distribution, 238; People's Commissariat of, 217, 218, 262; requisitioning squads, 200, 201, 217, 218, 219, 223, 232; speculators, 200; supply, 217, 237
 Foreign League of the Russian Revolutionary Social Democracy, 53
 Fotieva, L., 308
 France, 1, 28, 77, 123, 149, 150, 152, 208, 227, 235, 243; Russian loans in, 77
 Francis Joseph, 126
 Freedom of assembly, 70; of conscience, 44; of occupation, 44; of press, 44, 276; of speech, 44, 276
 French, the, 226, 227, 245; army, 120, 244, 256; capital, 56;

- Chamber of Deputies, 111;
Government, 152, 256; inter-
vention in Russia, 256; loans,
77, 122; navy, 244; revolution
of 1848, 63; socialists, 125;
spirit, 38
- Fürstenberg, *see* Hanecki
- Galicia, 115, 116, 123
- Ganetsky, *see* Hanecki
- Gapon, G., 56, 60, 63, 64, 65,
316
- Gatchina, 175, 181
- Geneva, 53, 59, 69, 70, 73, 104,
316; library, 62
- Genoa, 295; Conference, 295,
296
- Georgia (Caucasus), 308
- German agents, 136, 184; army,
151, 206, 224, 244; *bourgeoisie*,
139; Embassy in Berne, 142,
153; in Moscow, 234; General
Staff, 140, 141, 153, 154, 185;
Government, 143, 152-155,
206, 233, 234, 323; imperial-
ists, 152, 153; military com-
mand, 151; occupation of South
Russia, 224, 225; proletariat,
151; Reichstag, 153; Social
Democrats, 65, 72, 114, 125,
126, 154; states, 1; war pris-
oners in Russia, 251; in Yaro-
slavl, 234; War Prisoners'
Commission No. 4, 234; work-
ers, 251
- Germans, 132, 162, 163, 168,
184, 203, 205, 207, 221, 222,
224, 226, 227, 230, 231, 235,
242, 244, 285, 317
- Germany, 8, 28, 35, 110, 113,
120-124, 129, 139-142, 149,
152-155, 158, 163, 165, 203,
204, 207-212, 215, 223-225,
227, 229, 231, 234, 242, 243,
250-252, 323
- Glasser, 308
- Goldenberg, I. P., 156
- Golder, F. A., 291, 334
- Goremykin, I. L., 82, 86, 134
- Gorki (village), 301
- Gorky, M., 59, 108, 126, 324,
331
- Government, Russian Imperial,
12; labor policy, 39; reaction,
39, 40
- Grain, 201, 217, 219, 237, 249,
274, 281; requisitioning squads,
217, 218
- Greek army, 245; intervention in
Russia, 256
- Grigoriev, 257
- Grimm, R., 153
- Guchkov, A. I., 150, 158
- Guétier, 302
- Hanecki, 120, 124, 150-152, 155,
163-165, 332
- Hegel, G. W. F., 324, 325
- Helphand, *see* Parvus
- Helsingfors, 167, 181
- Heyden, Count P. A., 321
- Hindenburg, P., 141
- Hoffmann, M., 153, 154, 333
- Hoover, Herbert, 291
- Horses, 274
- Hostages, 17, 230, 239, 322
- Hottentots, 255
- House of Preliminary Detention,
29
- Hungary, 251, 252, 256, 257
- Imperial Duma, *see* Duma
- Imperialism as the Highest
Phase of Capitalism*, 138, 267
- India, 269
- Industry, 4, 6, 7, 9, 22, 39, 196,
216, 272, 273, 287, 290, 298
- Insurance Council, 119, 137
- Intellectuals, 5, 8, 9, 10, 15, 19,
20, 34, 40, 64, 72, 128, 180,
315
- Intelligentsia, 8
- "International," 137
- International, First, 14; Second,
125, 127, 131, 137, 251; Third,
see Communist International
- International Soviet Republic, 252

- Internationalist Socialist Bureau, 137
 Inviolability of the individual and of places of residence, 44; of the person, 71
 Irkutsk, 259
 Iron, 245
Iskra, 24, 37-43, 47-53, 57, 58, 105; funds for publication, 35, 58
 Italians, 295
 Ivanovo-Voznesensk, 75, 130
Izvestia, 177
 Izvolsky, A. P., 123
- Jacobinism, 327
 Janin, M., 259
 Japan, 57, 69, 122, 128, 129, 225, 227; Russia's war with, 57
 Japanese, the, 289; army, 227; intervention in Russia, 224, 227
 Jewish Social Democratic Union, *see* Bund
 Jews, 71
 Judicial reform of Alexander II, 2
 July uprising (1917), 161-166, 168
- Kadets, 13, 21, 79, 80, 82-84, 87, 88, 94, 95, 98, 106, 118, 134, 141, 146, 157, 161, 190, 192-194, 220, 248, 316, 323, 328; agrarian program, 82, 84
 Kaledin, A. M., 189, 190, 220, 221
 Kalinin, M. I., 254
 Kalmykova, A. M., 24, 35, 58
 Kamenev, L. B., 109, 113, 114, 130, 148, 149, 156, 166, 173, 179, 182, 183, 302, 303-309
 Kamenev, S. S., 236, 258, 259
 Kamkov, B., 210, 231, 232
 Kamo, *see* Ter-Petrosian
 Kaplan, F., 239
 Karpovich, M. M., 335
 Kaun, A., 331
 Kautsky, K., 28
- Kazan, 18, 20; University, 18
 Kerensky, A. F., 146, 156, 158, 161, 163, 168-170, 174, 181, 182, 185, 220, 227, 230, 328, 333
 Kerensky, T., 15
 Khardin, A. N., 21
 Kharkov, 130
 Khrustalev, *see* Nosar
 Kiental, 137, 138
 Kiev, 31, 110, 203, 209, 230, 258, 263
 Kirghizes, 255
 Kokoshkin, F. F., 193, 323
 Kokovtsev, Count V. N., 134
 Kokushkino, 18
 Kolchak, A. V., 245-247, 257, 259
 Kollontai, A. M., 150
 Kornilov, L. G., 168-171, 221, 222
 Kozlovsky, 276
 Kozlowski, M., 163, 164
 Krasikov, P. A., 48
 Krasilnikov, A. A., 142
 Krasnov, P. N., 181, 182, 224, 230
 Krasnoyarsk, 30
 Krassin, L. B., 59, 92, 294, 331
 Kremlin, 308
 Kronstadt, 85, 86, 162, 275; uprising, 275, 276, 280
 Krupskaya, N. K., 22, 30, 37, 124, 308
 Krylenko, N. V., 131, 179, 186, 187, 202
 Krylov, I. A., 290
 Kshesinskaya, M. F., 155, 162
 Kuban, 222, 244, 259; Cossacks, 222
 Kühlmann, R., 202
 Kurllov, P. G., 110
 Kuskova, E. D., 32, 106
- "Labor armies," 261; discipline, 213, 270-272; legislation, 7; movement, 39, 70; organizations, 104; strikes, 61; unions, 8; *see also* Workers

- Laborites, 82, 88, 95, 118, 125
 Lafargue, P., 28
 "Land Captains," *see* *Zemskie Nachalniki*
 Land Decree, 177
 Landowners, 5, 6, 40, 46, 67, 190, 198, 248, 281, 321
 Lao-Yang, 57
 Latvia, 255, 277
 Left-wing Communists, 203, 204, 215, 223
 Left-wing Social Revolutionaries, 176, 183, 184, 193, 194, 204, 210, 223, 231-234, 247; Central Committee, 205
 Legislative Assembly, 44
 Lena Goldfields Company, 110
 Lenin, V. I., parents and childhood, 15; education, 15, 17, 18, 20, 21; becomes a Marxist, 20; leader of Marxist circles in St. Petersburg (1893-1895), 25-29; polemics with the *narodniki*, 25-27; imprisoned, 29, 30; deported to Siberia, 30-33; married, 30; emigrates, 35; editing the *Iskra*, 36-42; compiling the party program, 42-45; role in the Second party convention, 48-52; resigns from the editorial staff of the *Iskra*, 53; struggling with the Mensheviks, 54, 58, 59; preparing armed uprising, 62, 63, 76; returned to Russia (1905), 73; directing activities of the Soviet, 75; attitude toward the "expropriations," 91, 92; boycotting the elections to the First Duma, 78-80; canceling the boycott, 87, 94, 95; attitude toward the Duma, 81, 84, 85, 87, 90, 104; toward Stolypin, 101-103; second emigration (1907), 104; moves from France to Austria (1912), 116; arrested in Austria at the beginning of the World War, 124, 125; set free and allowed to go to Switzerland, 125; struggling against the "social-patriots," 127; advocates defeat of Russia, 128, 129; returned to Russia (1917), 149, 155; hiding after the July uprising, 166, 167; directing the November Revolution, 172-174; creating the *Cheka*, 190; developing the economic program of communism, 198; attitude toward the Constituent Assembly, 66, 81, 166, 167, 172, 177, 191-195; concludes the Brest-Litovsk peace, 202-209; answers to Wilson, 211; advocates state capitalism, 215; creates the Committees of the Poor, 218, 219; attempt on his life, 239; organizes defense of Soviet Russia in Civil War, 247; enforces system of pure communism, 260-262, 269-271; advocates the New Economic Policy, 280-285; the New Economic Policy in foreign relations, 294-296; urging a new economic spirit among the Communists, 288-290, 299, 300; health getting worse, 296, 297; first stroke, 301; recovering from illness, 302, 303; writes a will, 304-307; second stroke, 309; agonizing, 309, 310; death, 310; body put in a mausoleum, 311; estimations of contemporaries, 327-329; compared with Cromwell, 312; with Robespierre, 312; personal characteristics, 28, 36, 38; constructiveness, 314, 315; destructiveness, 314, 315; fanaticism, 313, 314; opportunism, 314; economic sense, 286; as orator, 317; strength of will, 315; will to power, 315; ready to use any

- means, 318; ruthlessness, 320; different ways of dealing with people, 322, 323; scientific interests: student of economics, 21, 29, 31; of philosophy, 108, 324, 325; attitude toward church and religion, 323-325; adherent of Marxism, 108, 326; Marxism supplemented, 326, 327; practical policies: "deepening of the revolution" method, 319; class point of view in dealing with people, 320, 321; hatred toward *bourgeoisie*, 16, 204; advocating confiscation of all food supplies as means of maintaining power, 172; attitude toward civil war before the November Revolution, 127, 132, 138, 139, 156; advocating class struggle in the villages, 46, 68, 201, 217-219; his idea of the Communist party, 41, 49, 50, 325, 326; his internationalism, 249, 250; starts propaganda for the Communist International, 127; laying foundations of theory for international communism, 138, 139; head of the Communist International, 251, 252; explains the policies of the Communist International, 266-269; advocates national rights of the smaller peoples, 254, 255; touches of Russian patriotism, 214; attitude toward Germany, 139-143, 206, 207, 332; relations to Hanecki and Parvus at the beginning of the Revolution, 150-152; assailed on receiving funds from Germany, 163-166
- Leninism, 27, 138, 327, 330
- Lesnoi, 173, 174
- Lettish regiment, 233; Social Democrats, 89
- Levy of food, 249, 281; *see also* Food, requisitioning squads
- Liberalism, Russian, 12, 13, 19, 55
- Liberals, Russian, 12, 24, 40, 57, 58, 71, 122, 123, 128
- "Liberation of Labor" Group, 28, 35, 47
- Libraries, 6; people's, 24
- Liebknecht, C., 137, 322
- Lifland, 208
- "Liquidators," 106, 113, 114
- Lithuania, 132, 255, 277
- Lloyd George, D., 246, 295, 296
- Loans, cancellation of, 199
- London, 37, 65, 89-92, 104
- "Loot the looters," 180, 219, 319
- Ludendorff, E., 140, 154, 184, 185, 333
- Lunacharsky, A. V., 107, 108, 166
- Luxemburg, R., 137, 322
- Lvov, Prince G. E., 144, 156
- Lvov City, 265
- Mach, E., 108
- Makarov, A. A., 111
- Makhno, N. I., 244, 257
- Malinovsky, R. V., 112-115, 117-121, 130
- Manifesto of October 30/17 (1905), 70, 71, 73, 78, 85
- March Revolution, 120
- Marek, 116, 124
- Markin, N. G., 188
- Martov, L., 22, 25, 28, 32, 34, 37, 43, 49-53, 58, 126, 149, 152, 153, 155
- Martynov, A. S., 51
- Marx, K., 14, 19, 26, 62, 319, 326
- Marxism, 18, 19, 20, 21, 26, 27, 32, 38, 66, 326, 327, 330
- Marxists, 10, 20, 22-25, 27, 28, 30-36, 40, 288
- Materialism and Empirical Criticism, 108
- Melgunov, S. P., 334
- Menshevik-Internationalists, 126, 152

- Mensheviks, 27, 53, 54, 59, 60, 65, 66, 70, 74, 76, 78, 79, 81, 82, 87-89, 94, 95, 104-107, 113, 115, 117-120, 126, 146-149, 156, 158-160, 163, 167, 170, 176, 192, 197, 210, 223, 231, 260, 280; conferences, 66, 223; *see also* Social Democratic Labor Party, Russian
 Merchants, 4, 289
 Metal Workers, All Russian Congress of, 295-297
 Michael Alexandrovich, 144, 149
 Michelson factory, 239
 Middle class, 6, 13, 58, 72
 "Middle peasants," 45, 46, 237, 249, 253, 254, 274
 Militant Communism, 271
 Military Revolutionary Committee of the Petrograd Soviet, 171, 173, 174
 Miliukov, P. N., 16, 98, 134, 150, 157, 158, 166
 Ministry of the Interior, 54, 61
 Ministry of Public Education, 97, 99, 106
 Minsk, 31, 265
 Minusinsk, 30, 32
 Mirbach, Count W., 224, 227, 231, 232, 234
 Mitskevich, S. I., 21
 Mogilev, 187
 Molodechno, 265
 Mongolia, 30
 Morozov, S. T., 59, 74, 75
 Moscow, 23, 30, 31, 39, 56, 63, 64, 70, 71, 74-77, 85, 88, 108, 112-115, 121, 173, 181, 209, 210, 212, 221, 225, 230, 232-234, 238, 239, 246, 247, 251, 252, 256, 258, 260, 266, 271, 280, 292, 294, 297, 311, 316; Province, 117; Soviet, 225, 237, 271; State Conference, 169; uprising (1905), 75, 76-80, 91, 318, 328
 Motion-picture houses, 6
 Mukden, 68
 Munich, 37, 40, 43
 Municipalities, 2, 39, 69
 "Municipalization of Land," 82, 84
 Muraviev, M. A., 181, 230, 234
 Murmansk, 224, 228
 Naroch, 265
Narodnichestvo, 10
Narodniki, 10, 19, 22, 24, 26, 27, 30, 35, 40, 67, 98, 125
 National income, 99
 Nationalists, 95, 118
 Nationalities, problem of, 254, 255
 Nationalization of industry, 216, 270; of land, 82, 84
 National minorities, 82, 88, 95, 118
 Navy, the Russian, 68
 Nekrasov, N. A., 214
 Nevsky, V. I., 100, 331
 New Economic Policy, 214, 215, 260, 276, 277, 283-287, 290, 292-294, 297-299, 303, 304, 313, 315, 327, 329, 330
 New Hampshire, 70
 Nicholas II, 55-57, 61, 62, 69, 95, 126, 134, 144, 145, 214, 235
 Nicolai, W., 184, 185, 333
 Niessel, 208
 Nizhni Novgorod, 278
 Nobility, 4, 69
 Norwegians, 132
 Nosar, 70, 75
 Noulens, J., 208
Novaya Zhizn, 74
 November Revolution, 304, 315
 Novorossiisk, 259
 Nowy Targ, 124, 125
 Obolensky, V. V., 188
 Octobrists, 54, 79, 80, 87, 95, 98, 118
 Odessa, 244, 245, 256
 Omsk, 245
 Oranienbaum, 276
 Order No. 1, 147
 Orel, 259

- Orenburg Cossacks, 228
 Orient, 254, 268; Russian economic penetration, 56
Osvobodzenie, 41, 55
 Ozerki, 130
- Paper currency, 273
 Pares, B., 290
 Paris, 28, 41, 63, 104, 105, 113; Commune, 63
 Parliament, 267
 "Partisan Demonstrations," 77, 91
 Parvus, 72, 73, 140, 141, 151, 154, 163-165, 333
 Peace conference, 203; decree, 177; negotiations, 187, 202
 Peasants, 1-4, 6, 7, 11, 45, 46, 67, 68, 80-82, 84, 93, 97, 99, 102, 103, 177, 199, 217-219, 241, 249, 257, 258, 262, 271, 274, 275, 278, 281-283, 287, 291, 298, 299, 321, 322, 329
 People, Appeal to, *see Narod-nichestvo*
 Perekop, 266
 Pereverzev, P. N., 162, 166
 Perm, 245
 "Permanent Revolution," 73
 Persia, 269
 Peter the Great, 174, 215, 315
 Petliura, S., 244, 258
 Petrograd, 129, 130, 136, 144-147, 149, 150, 155, 158, 161, 163, 166-168, 171, 173-175, 180, 181, 192, 194, 195, 199, 200, 202, 210, 212, 218, 220, 221, 230, 259, 266, 276, 316, 323; *see also* St. Petersburg
 Petrograd garrison, 144-146, 162, 174; Soviet, 144, 146, 147, 157, 170, 171, 173, 187, 200, 237; Executive Committee, 144, 146
 Petroleum, 245
 Petty bourgeoisie, 260, 280
 Petty credit institutions, 99
 Piatakov, G. L., 131, 306
 Pig iron, 273, 290
- Piker, *see* Martynov
 Platten, F., 153
 Plehve, V. K., 40, 55-57, 61
 Plekhanov, G. V., 19, 26, 28, 36, 37, 42-44, 46, 49, 52, 53, 105, 113, 126, 149
 Pokrovsky, M. N., 107, 335
 Poland, 251, 262-266, 268, 269, 277, 294
 Poles, 82, 88, 89, 95, 118, 132, 263-265
 Poletaiev, N. G., 113
 Police Department, 11, 19, 30, 35, 39, 55, 61, 64, 76, 77, 110-113, 115, 117, 120, 136, 189; foreign agency, 47, 142; labor policy, 56, 61
 Polish army, 265; Communists, 265; Government, 263; Social Democratic Party, 163, 164; Social Democrats, 89; Socialists, 117
 Political parties in Russia, 11, 12
 Poltava, 60; Theological seminary, 60
 "Poor peasants," 45, 46, 68, 168, 201, 218, 219, 249, 274, 321, 329
 Poronino, 116, 123, 124
 Port Arthur, 129, 289
 Portsmouth, New Hampshire, 70; peace of, 70, 122
 Postnikov, V. E., 21
Potemkin, 68
 Potresov, A. N., 34-36
 Prague, 115
Pravda, 114, 115, 119, 148, 149, 156, 162, 163, 165, 195
 Press, freedom of, 44
 Prices on manufactured goods, 273
 Prinkipo Islands, 246, 251, 277
 Productivity of labor, 10, 272
 "Progressive bloc," 98, 134
 Progressives, 95, 118
 Proletarian culture, 304
 Proletariat, 66, 67, 131, 151, 196, 321; *see also* Workers

- Proletarii*, 85
 Protopopov, A. D., 145
 Provisional Government, 15, 66, 121, 144-150, 156-158, 160-163, 165-167, 169, 170, 174, 175, 180, 181, 187-189, 191, 199, 220, 237, 263, 316, 332
 Provisional Revolutionary Committee of Poland, 265
 Provocation, police, 11, 75, 76
 Prussia, 2
 Pskov, 33-35, 181
 Putilov Works, 61, 144

 Radchenko, S. I., 34
 Radek, K., 133, 164
 Radomyslsky, *see* Zinoviev
 Railways, 70, 200, 217, 261, 264, 273, 290
 Railway Union, Executive Committee, 182, 191, 197
 Rasputin, G. E., 135
 Razliv station, 167
 Reactionary *régime*, 57
 "Recall" faction, 107
 Red army, 205, 206, 229, 230, 233, 236, 238, 245, 247, 250, 251, 256, 257, 259, 264-266, 268, 276
 Red Guards, 170, 180, 181, 192, 193, 195, 199, 200
 Red International of Trades-Unions, 293, 294
 Red military cadets, 276
 Red Square in Moscow, 311
 Red Terror, 239
 Reichsrat, *see* Austria
 Reichstag, *see* Germany
 Religion, 6, 323, 324
 Requisitioning of grain, 241, 249, 274; *see also* Food, requisitioning squads
 "Revolutionary Communists," 233
 Revolutionary Military Council, 236, 264
 Revolution of 1905, 1, 3, 7, 38, 72, 73, 76, 107, 109, 140, 150; of 1917, 1, 3, 5, 6, 145
 "Rich peasants," 45, 46, 201, 272, 273, 322
 Riga, 130
 Rights of citizen, 71
 Robespierre, M., 312
 Rodzianko, M. V., 119
 Romanov, M., 149, *see also* Michael Alexandrovich
 Romanovs, 145, 220, 316
 Rome, 290
 Rosenfeld, *see* Kamenev, L. B.
 Rostov on the Don, 259
 Rumanian army, 257
 Rumanians, 256
 Russia, in Eighteenth century, 1; cultural development, 5, 6; economic growth, 4; social and political development, 1-3; government and administration, 3, 11-12; economic depression after 1899, 39; governmental reaction, 39, 40, 54-56; economic penetration in the East; imperialistic policy in the Far East, 56; war with Japan, 56, 57, 68-70, 122; revolutionary movement (1904-1905), 57, 60; constitution, 70, 71, 78, 79; conflict between the Imperial Government and the Duma, (1906-1907), 83-91; progress under Duma *régime*, 95-99; joining the *Entente*, 123; war with Germany started, 122; war with Austria started, 124; attitude of the people toward the war, 133; conflict between the Emperor and the Duma, 133-136; fall of the Empire, 144, 145; fall of the Provisional Government, 174, 175; November Revolution: Soviet *régime* established, 175-179; Soviet constitution, 230, 231, 233; disintegration of the Russian army, 184-187, 202; formation of the Red army, 205, 229, 230, 236; *régime* of pure com-

- munism started, 198; Brest-Litovsk treaty: peace with the Central Powers, 209; treaty annulled, 242; civil war started, 221; ended, 269; war with Poland, 263-265; treaty with Estonia, 277; with Finland, 277; with Latvia, 277; with Lithuania, 277; collapse of the system of communism, 272-274; famine, 291; the New Economic Policy started, 284; commercial treaty with England, 294; treaty with Turkey, 294; with Poland, 294; new drive of militant communism, 329, 330
- Russo-Japanese War, 56, 122, 128, 289
- Ryazan, 275
- Rykov, A. I., 179, 183, 306
- Sailors, 162, 180, 181, 187, 193, 195, 275, 328
- St. Petersburg, 15, 20-25, 27, 28-33, 35, 56, 57, 60-64, 70, 71, 73-76, 85, 88, 99, 113-115; Theological Academy, 60; University, 15, 20; *see also* Petrograd
- SS. Peter and Paul Fortress, 162, 175, 193
- Samara, 20, 21, 228
- Sambin, 142
- Samoilov, F. N., 129
- Sarajevo, 123
- Saratov, 275
- Sarts, 255
- Sassnitz, 155
- Savings banks, 99
- Savinkov, B. V., 168, 169, 222
- Sazonov, S. D., 123
- Scandinavian countries, 251
- Scheidemann, P., 154, 333
- Schlichter, A. G. 199
- Schmit, N., 74
- Schools, *see* Education
- Secret ballot, 44, 66, 81, 90; police, 35, 39; treaties, 188
- Separate peace, 204
- Serfdom, 1, 2, 5
- Sergius Alexandrovich, 56
- Sestroretsk, 167
- Shingarev, A. I., 193, 323
- Shipov, I. P., 188
- Shliapnikov, A. G., 129
- Shushenskoe, 30, 33
- Siberia, 29-32, 37, 70, 110, 130, 148, 149, 227, 228, 235
- Siberian Government, 228
- Simbirsk, 14, 18
- Sipiagin, D. S., 39
- Skoropadsky, P. P., 224, 244
- Smilga, I. T., 173
- Smolny Institute, 170, 174, 184, 199
- Social Democrat*, 140
- Social Democratic Labor Party, Russian, 27, 31-33, 36, 40, 42, 44-46, 66, 110; Central Committee, 31, 51, 52-54, 58, 59, 65, 81, 89, 90, 105, 106, 113; conferences, 76, 94, 105, 106, 113; Conventions: First, 31, 32, 42, 47; Second, 38, 44, 47-49, 52, 55, 58, 70, 105, 164, 327; Third, 65-68, 81; Fourth, 81, 82; Fifth, 89, 91, 92, 104, 105, 164; the Duma faction, 88-91, 105, 106, 113-115, 117, 118; membership figures, 23, 60, 61, 74, 75, 92; party constitution, 49-51, 68; program, 42-45; funds, 35, 58, 59, 74, 75, 92, 113, 114; press, 74, 77, 83; *see also* Bolshevik Party, and Mensheviks
- Social Democratic movement, international, 28
- Social Democrats, Russian, 22, 24, 34, 35, 41, 55, 58, 64, 60, 74, 77, 79, 81, 82, 84, 87-89, 94, 95, 98, 105, 118, 127, 128, 140, 149
- Social Democrats of Poland and Lithuania, 132
- Socialism, Russian, 10, 12, 215

- "Socialistic army," 202; parties, 12, 146, 182, 276
- Socialists, Russian, 13, 64, 65, 146, 148, 155, 167
- Socialization of land, 201
- Social Revolutionaries, 11, 55, 67, 79, 82, 84, 88, 94, 101, 112, 118, 120, 125, 126, 146-149, 156, 158, 159, 167, 170, 176, 178, 183, 184, 191-195, 210, 220, 222, 228, 231, 234, 238, 239, 259, 260, 316, 320; party council, 222; of the left, *see* Left-wing Social Revolutionaries
- Society of Mutual Aid Among Workers in Mechanical Industries, 39
- South America, 268
- Soviet Bavaria, 256; Hungary, 256; Ukraine, 209
- Soviet Congress, All Russian, First, 159, 160; Second, 173, 175-179; Third, 201, 205; Fourth, 209-212, 226; Fifth, 230, 231, 233, 236; Sixth, 241, 249, 250; Seventh, 260; Eighth, 269-271, 278; Ninth, 289, 292, 295, 297
- Soviet constitution, 230, 231; Government, 92, 142, 171, 172, 175, 181, 184, 186, 193, 195, 202, 205, 208, 211, 212, 219, 222, 224, 227-229, 232, 234-236, 238, 242, 247-250, 257, 259, 262-265, 268, 269, 272, 274, 275, 277, 281, 284, 295, 298, 299, 310; trusts, 287
- Soviet of Peasants' Deputies, All Russian, 177, 183, 184, 193, 194; of Workers' Deputies (1905), 70, 71, 73, 75; of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies (1917), 144, 146, 148
- Soviet Revolution in Bavaria, 256; in Hungary, 252
- Soviets, elections, 275, 276
- Spartacists, 252
- Stalin, J. V., 92, 179, 265, 285, 302, 304-309
- State Bank, 188, 287
- "State capitalism," 215, 218, 287, 293
- Stockholm, 73, 81, 129, 150, 151, 155, 163, 164, 203
- Stolypin, P. A., 5, 8, 85, 88-91, 93, 96-99, 101-103, 110, 111, 134, 141, 266; agrarian reform, 86, 96, 97, 102, 103
- Strikes, 136; general, 70, 74, 75, 85
- Struve, P. B., 23, 24, 26, 27, 32, 34, 41, 55, 101, 262, 288
- Students, university, Russian, 40
- Stuttgart, 41
- Sukhanov, N. N., 173
- Sukharevka, 271
- Supreme Council of National Economy, 198, 262, 270
- Svatikov, S. G., 332
- Sveaborg, 85, 86
- Sverdlov, J. M., 173, 183, 235, 254, 305
- Sviatopolk-Mirsky, Prince P. D., 57, 61, 63
- Sweden, 104, 155, 163
- Swedes, 132
- Swiss Government, 153
- Switzerland, 28, 35, 37, 125, 127, 132, 137, 149, 152, 154, 155, 251, 316
- Tambov, 275
- Tammerfors, 76
- Tarnopol, 168
- Tauride Palace, 144, 170, 171, 192, 266
- Tax in kind on grain, 241, 283, 284, 286, 287
- Tereshchenko, M. I., 161
- Terioki, 94
- Ter-Petrosian, S. A., 92, 331
- Terrorists, 40
- Textiles, 238
- Theatres, 6
- Third International, *see* Communist International

- Tiflis, 92
 Timber, 261
 Tkachev, P. N., 327
 Tobolsk, 235
 Tractors, 284
 Trade-unionism, 32
 Trades-unions, 99, 100, 104, 159, 197, 248, 249, 261, 279; Central Council, All Russian, 160, 161, 197, 198; conferences, 160, 161, 197, 279; discussion on, 279; Red International of, 293, 294
 Trälleborg, 155
 Trepov, D. F., 63
 Trotsky, L. D., 37, 49, 51, 70, 72, 73, 75, 91, 92, 100, 115, 126, 140, 149, 162, 165, 166, 170, 171, 173, 179, 188, 203-208, 229, 232, 236, 251, 260, 264, 279, 296, 301-310, 316, 325, 331, 334
 Tsarskoe Selo, 61
 Tsereteli, H., 88, 148, 160, 161
 Tsurupa, A. D., 306
 Tsu-Shima, 68
 Tugan-Baranovsky, M. I., 23
 Tikhachevsky, M. N., 264, 265
 Turgenev, I. S., 315
 Turkey, 269, 294
 Turukhansk, 32
 Tver, 55
 "Twenty-One Conditions," 267
 Ukraine, 161, 203, 208, 209, 223, 224, 231, 243, 244, 254, 255, 257, 258
 Ukrainian autonomy, 161; Rada, 161, 208, 213, 230; Socialists, 244; Soviet Republic, 255
 Ukrainians, 230
 Ulianov, A. I., 15
 Ulianov, D. I., 15
 Ulianov, I. N., 14
 Ulianov, V. I., *see* Lenin
 Ulianova, A. I., 15
 Ulianova, M. A., 14, 15, 17
 Ulianova, M. I., 15
 Ulianova, N. K., *see* Krupskaya
 Ulianova, O. I., 15
 "Underground" politicians, 12
 "Union for Combat to Liberate the Working Class," 28, 29, 31
 Union of the Russian People, 71, 79, 96, 189; of Towns, 133; of Unions, 69; of Zemstvos, 133, 144
 United States of America, 63, 99, 149, 210, 211, 227, 291
 Universal suffrage, 44, 66, 81, 90
 Universities, 6, 70
 University autonomy, 70
 Ural Cossacks, 228; Mountains, 245; region, 261, 273
 Uritsky, M. S., 192, 266
 Varsetis, I. I., 233, 234, 236
Vekhi, 100, 101
 Viborg, 84, 94, 167, 173
 Viborg Appeal, the, 84
 Vienna, 115, 124, 125
 Village industry, 270; soviets, 241, 249
 Vladivostok, 224, 227, 228
 Volga, 227, 228, 245
 Volkenstein, M. F., 21
 Volunteer army, 221, 222, 225, 258, 259, 262
 Vorovsky, V. V., 164
Vpered, 59, 67, 107
 Wages, workers', 7, 99, 272
 War Communism, 271, 289, 294; Industry Committees, 133, 136, 137, 150; prisoners, Russian, in Germany, 120, 121
 "War for peace," 131, 132
 Warsaw, 264, 265
 Weigand, 265
 White army, 243, 246, 259, 272; *see also* Volunteer army
 White Guards, 280, 281
 "White Poles," 264
 White Russia, 255
 Wilson, W., 210, 211, 246

- Winter Palace, 61, 174, 175
 Witte, Count S. Y., 22, 54, 56,
 70, 71, 82, 83, 93, 96, 331
 Workers, 5, 7, 8, 11, 39, 42, 50,
 60-63, 67, 69, 75, 76, 85, 93-
 95, 99, 100, 105, 107, 109-
 111, 135, 144, 156, 157, 170,
 181, 199, 213, 218, 220, 237,
 240, 271-273, 282, 322, 329
 Workers' control of industry,
 195, 216
 Working day, 7, 73
 World Revolution, 250, 281,
 282; War, 1, 3, 38, 77, 96, 98,
 103, 112, 122, 123, 125, 126,
 128, 130, 147, 151, 154, 156,
 158, 203, 223, 242, 243, 247,
 251, 254, 320
 Wrangel, P. N., 262, 263, 265,
 266, 269, 288
 Yaroslavl, 234
 Yenisei Province, 30; River, 30
 Yudenich, N. N., 259
 Yuriev, 83
 Zasulich, V. I., 36
Zemskie Nachalniki, 3, 97
 Zemstvov, 2, 39, 40, 55, 57, 69
 Zimmerwald, 131, 132, 137, 138,
 153, 251
 "Zimmerwald Left," 131-133,
 153
 Zinoviev, G. E., 109, 113, 114,
 116, 133, 162, 166, 167, 173,
 182, 183, 302, 305
 Zubatov, S. V., 8, 39, 56, 60, 61,
 63, 189
Zubatovschina, 39, 56
 Zurich, 125, 142, 332
Zvezda, 113



